The Overflight Question: Indonesia and Strategic Independence

Date: May 05, 2026

In line with Indonesian President Prabowo’s push to upgrade strategic ties with the US, Indonesia and the United States formally concluded a Major Defence Cooperation Partnership (MDCP) on April 13, 2026. The MDCP provides a guiding framework to advance bilateral defence relations across military modernisation, professional training, and interoperability exercises. While the MDCP provides Jakarta with access to advanced capabilities, for Washington it deepens Indonesia’s integration into the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. 

However, the signing of the MDCP was almost immediately overshadowed by reports of a proposed blanket overflight access for American military aircraft across the Indonesian archipelago for contingency operations, crisis response and mutually agreed exercise-related activities. While these reports drew immediate criticism in Indonesia, officials merely acknowledged that discussions were ongoing. 

In this policy brief, the author analyses the implications of this proposal in the context of Indonesia’s existing legal framework and obligations under UNCLOS, as well as the increasing trend of negotiating military access through a range of logistics and interoperability agreements. She observes that the elasticity of the proposed single notification-based regime could encompass all manner of US air operations, leaving Indonesia with no meaningful basis to distinguish between the various purposes of military overflight. 

As an archipelagic state, Indonesia has designated three north-south corridors for foreign ships and aircraft. However, US military routes linking its bases from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean follow an east-west trajectory. According such blanket east-west access would undermine Indonesia’s own national practices and obligations under UNCLOS, and move it closer to conceding the US interpretation of its overflight rights. 

As a critical buffer in Southeast Asia’s security architecture, Indonesia’s geostrategic significance is difficult to overstate. The US already has standing overflight arrangements with its regional allies, and the addition of Indonesian airspace would fill a conspicuous gap. 

The author concludes that the Trump administration’s pursuit of expanded operational access across Indonesia’s critical air and sea corridors facilitates planning for contingencies across the Indo-Pacific. However, for Indonesia it is considerably harder to make the case, both domestically and diplomatically. It remains to be seen if Indonesia will stand by its avowed principles of “bebas aktif” - the pursuit of an independent and active foreign policy based on the careful management of sovereignty and balanced relations with major powers. 

To read this DPG Policy Brief Volume XI, Issue 14, please click “The Overflight Question: Indonesia and Strategic Independence”.