



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power



DPG China Monitor

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Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

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ABOUT US

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DPG China Monitor

DPG China Monitor is compiled by our research team from open source Chinese media. Your comments and feedback can be addressed to Antara Ghosal Singh at antara@dpg.org.in

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(Photographs top to bottom)

A file photo of Indian and Chinese troops in a face-off in the Ladakh Sector. Source: ANI

Satellite imagery released by US firm Maxar Technologies, showing the PLA holding ground in the Galwan Valley and strengthening its military positions in the area. Source: Hindustan Times

Chinese President Xi Jinping interacting with President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, June 22, 2020, Source: People's Daily

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Abstract

China-India relations hit rock bottom in June. In a major escalation after weeks of tension at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a violent face-off broke out in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh on June 15, 2020 following a brutal and premeditated PLA attack. On June 16, India confirmed 20 casualties from the incident, including a commanding officer. There was no official confirmation from the Chinese side on the number of their casualties. However, reports in the international and Indian media claimed that between 35 - 43 Chinese soldiers were killed and scores of others injured during the clash.

The Chinese media's coverage of the ongoing border dispute comprised multiple narratives. First, while echoing the official stance, the media blamed India for the deteriorating situation at the LAC and strove to paint India as an aggressor. Various Chinese commentaries further pointed out that India's "offensive posturing" was not directed only against China, but also towards other neighbours in South Asia. The India-Nepal dispute over Kalapani and the reorganisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir were cited over and over again. Another narrative was how India is taking advantage of the adverse international situation facing China. There were references to developments such as President Trump's February, 2020 visit to India, and the conclusion of an India-Australia military logistics support agreement, among others. Commentaries repeatedly warned that India was making "misjudgements" at the LAC, firstly by assuming that China will not enter into a conflict with India on account of increasing strategic pressure from the United State and secondly, by believing that India can pose some sort of a military challenge to China. In addition, the Chinese media also strove to drive a wedge within Indian society and manipulate controversies over "Hindu nationalism", "Hindu-Muslim conflict" and "RSS idea of a Hindu nation" in order to dilute India's national outrage against China after the Galwan Valley incident.

However, despite such overbearing commentaries, there was disappointment in China that New Delhi has not buckled under Chinese pressure and instead was continuing with an increasingly tough line on the border dispute. Secondly, there was growing concern about the Boycott China movement gaining traction in India, which may kick-start a similar trend across the globe, pushing back Chinese products, technology and capital. A section of China's strategic community also remained concerned that a further decoupling of China-India relations will strengthen the "anti-China alliance" between the United States, India, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries, whose key objective is both to reshape global industrial chains and to leverage

the Indo-Pacific strategy to check and balance China's military and economic power.

China also kept a close eye on India's military build-up at the border and its high-profile purchases of advanced weapons from across the world. At the tactical level, the media argued, there is no immediate threat to China from these arms procurements as deliveries will take time to mature and in any case it is impossible to achieve full combat capability at such a short notice. At the operational level, however, there was concern about India's procurement of Storm Shadow air launched, long-range cruise missiles (Anglo-French origin), which in the Chinese assessment, is the most powerful tactical weapon obtained by the Indian military in this round of military purchases. This, reports observed, can improve the overall combat capability of the IAF by posing a threat to Chinese front-line air bases. As the Indian military develops its offensive capabilities, the thinking within Chinese strategic circles is that China should adopt a "first battle, final battle" approach and even explore a ballistic missile attack campaign, which is otherwise reserved for stronger opponents. However, overall the dominant narrative in China remained that strategically it is "unwise" for China to take the initiative to open a comprehensive conflict with India at this point and, therefore, efforts should be made to tone down the war rhetoric.

Among other developments during the month, a high-level video conference on the Belt and Road Initiative was held on June 18, 2020 with the theme of "strengthening the Belt and Road international cooperation and jointly fighting COVID-19", where it was revealed that about 20% of BRI projects had been severely affected, 30%-40% moderately affected, while 40% remained unaffected by the epidemic.

Despite some differences over Hong Kong and the COVID-19 pandemic, China-EU relations showed signs of bouncing back during the month. The 10th round of high-level strategic dialogue on June 10, 2020 was followed by the 22nd China-EU Summit on June 22 where both sides affirmed that "China-EU are partners rather than rivals", "there is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and Europe", "despite China's global ambitions it does not threaten world peace" and that the "EU will not embark on any kind of Cold War with China." Other than this, an "Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19" was held on June 17, 2020 where it was stressed that closer cooperation between China and Africa "is needed more than ever."

On internal security front, China's top legislative body, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, "strongly condemned and

resolutely opposed" the signing of the "Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020" by the United States President on June 18, arguing that "the U.S. move has grossly interfered in China's internal affairs and seriously violated international law and the basic norms governing international relations."

Economic figures released by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on June 15, 2020 saw mixed reactions in domestic economic circles. Many Chinese strategists were hopeful of a speedy recovery of the Chinese economy as factory activities continued to pick up in May, and China's domestic consumption also showed signs of growth. However, others remained skeptical as China's May CPI growth rate (2.4%) was lower than the previously expected 2.7% and the May PPI fell 3.7% year-on-year, also lower than the previous forecast of a 3.3% decline.

Meanwhile, China noted with concern the Vietnamese Parliament's approval of the Vietnam-EU Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and Investment Protection Agreement. The development exacerbated China's rising concerns over "China being isolated" and "Global supply-chains moving out of China". It was advocated that China should prioritise economic and trade cooperation with the EU and ASEAN countries respectively, fast track its joining of the CPTPP and thereby continue opening up to the outside world and maintaining the stability of the existing global industrial and supply chains.

Foreign and Security Policy

China-India Relations



A file photo of Indian and Chinese troops in a face-off in the Ladakh Sector.
Source: ANI

On June 15 2020, a severe and deadly clash broke out between the Chinese and Indian troops in the Galwan Valley. This, being the most serious direct physical conflict between Chinese and Indian soldiers since 1975, marked an “inflection point” in China-India relations and attracted much global attention. On June 16, India confirmed 20 casualties from the incident, including a commanding officer. There was no official confirmation regarding casualties from Chinese government sources, however, reports in the international media and Indian media claimed between 35-43 Chinese soldiers killed and scores of others injured during the clash.

The Chinese media’s coverage of the ongoing border dispute comprised multiple narratives. First, while echoing the official stance, it blamed India for

the deteriorating situation at the LAC and strove to paint [India as an aggressor](#)¹. Their key argument has been that in recent days, India's infrastructure construction in the border area has greatly increased, and regardless of the differences in the two countries' understanding of the border issue, India has "forcibly" built some infrastructure on the Chinese side of the LAC. India's "arrogance" and "fearlessness", they said, are the main reasons for the continued tension.

Various Chinese commentaries further pointed out that India's "offensive" posturing at the border is not only directed against China, but also towards other neighbours in South Asia. The India-Nepal dispute over Kalapani and the reorganisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir were raked up over and over again to strengthen their argument that "India violates international norms and relevant Security Council resolutions, and blatantly regards the unilateral restoration of the disputed territory as an internal affair of India".

Another oft-repeated narrative in the Chinese Press was of how India was taking advantage of the adverse international [situation](#) facing China². "At a time when China-US relations are in doldrums, US President Trump paid a state visit to India during February 24-25, amidst due pomp and show. As China-Australia relations became tense, India and Australia signed mutual logistics support agreements on June 4," noted an article in the Chinese media. In its signature condescending tone, Chinese media warned "India's aspirations should be commensurate with its own strength. For India, the United States is far away, while China as a neighbour is a geographical reality. India's [sobriety](#)³ at the border and commitment towards the strategic autonomy principle will be crucial for the future course of China-India relations".

As part of its psychological operations, China's state media intensified its threatening posture vis-à-vis India. Commentaries in the Chinese media repeatedly warned, India was making "misjudgements" at the LAC, first, by assuming that China will not enter into a conflict with India, given the increasing strategic pressure from the United States and secondly, believing that India can pose some sort of a military challenge to China. "They must know that in 1962, China and India had roughly the same national strength and even then India could not face China. Today, China's GDP is 5 times that of

¹ Guan Peifang, '加勒万河谷——中国从来不是挑衅者', Huanqiu Shibao, June 30, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yrGebNpFPv>

² Long Xinchung, '印度的抱负应与实力相称', Huanqiu Shibao, June 10, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yacpJC8vTA>

³ Qian Feng, '新德里能否留住战略清醒?', Huanqiu Shibao, June 22, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3ykZLtLCgFn>

India, and China's military expenditure is more than 3 times, according to Western statistics. China is already a highly industrialized country, while India is still in the initial stage of industrialization. Most of China's advanced weapons are manufactured within the country, whereas India's advanced weapons are all imported. How can India dare to encounter China now?" asked an article in the Huanqiushibao.

Simultaneously, Chinese media [strove](#)⁴ to drive a wedge within Indian society and manipulate controversies over "Hindu nationalism", "Hindu-Muslim conflict", "RSS idea of a Hindu nation" to dilute India's raging nationalism against China after the Galwan Valley incident. It strove to construct a narrative that India's transformation from a "diverse secular society" under the Indian National Congress to somewhat of a "Hindu Rashtra" under PM Modi led BJP government has led to India's intensified "great power mentality", and rising nationalism against China, which, they argued, requires a speedy reversal for China-India relations to be [reconstructed](#)⁵.



Satellite imagery released by US firm Maxar Technologies, showing the PLA holding ground in the Galwan Valley and strengthening its military positions in the area.

Source: Hindustan Times

⁴Yuan Jirong, '崛起与雄心·印度反华情绪的背后', Huanqiushibao, July 1, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3ys1ysOseo0>

⁵Hu Shisheng, '印度过激举动背后的行为逻辑', Huanqiushibao, July 2, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yssYIxHKYh>

China appeared somewhat disappointed that New Delhi has not buckled under Chinese pressure and instead continued to maintain a [tough line](#) on the border dispute⁶. In addition, there is particular concern about the [Boycott China](#) movement gaining traction in India⁷. Chinese media reacted sharply⁸ to the news of India's ban on Chinese apps, its regulation on import of [power supply equipment](#)⁹, its plan to impose tariffs and increase trade barriers on about 300 different type of goods imported from China, together with its new directive to rule out the use of Chinese equipment in the upgradation of the 4G equipment of the state-owned Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) among others. Various Chinese commentators tried to play down the development, arguing that it is impossible for a smaller economy to sanction a bigger economy and that this is a counterproductive move which will end up hurting the Indian economy more than the Chinese economy. Deep down, however, there has been much unease in China's strategic circles over the possibility that India's "Boycott-China" movement may start a contagion across the world, in terms of pushing back of Chinese products, technology and capital. A decoupling of China-India relations, they fear, will strengthen the "anti-China alliance" between the United States, India, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries, whose key objective are to reshape global industrial chains, use the Indo-Pacific strategy to check and balance China's military and economic power, and expand international organisations such as the G-7 to weaken China's influence in international affairs.

On the other hand, Chinese media expressed grave concern over the news that India might have given its armed forces "complete freedom" when dealing with China at the LAC. China kept a [close eye](#)¹⁰ on India's military [build-up](#)¹¹ at the border and its large scale purchase of advance weapons from across the world. There has been much discontent within the Chinese strategic community over why so many countries are vying to sell weapons to India, and even offering condolences over the loss of lives of Indian soldiers.

⁶ '张召忠谈中印边境局势下一步：不能全盘相信印度承诺', July 3, 2020, Sina Military News, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/zhengming/2020-07-03/doc-iirczymm0289413.shtml>,

⁷ '印度民族主义者莫用"抵制中国货"自嗨', Huanqiu Shibao, June 19, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yiY7qnFxbu>

⁸ '三步走断绝与中国关系 印度准备开战了?', Xilu.com, July 2, 2020, <http://www.xilu.com/sstj/20200702/1000010001136363.html>

⁹ '印度反华动作不断 外媒评价：民粹主义、自我安慰！', China.com, June 30, 2020, <https://military.china.com/global/37602073.html>,

¹⁰ '印度为应对边境局势的武器大采购，对中国威胁大吗？', China.com, July 5, 2020, https://military.china.com/retie/37602168_9.html

¹¹ '挑衅？玩持久战？印度在中印边境大搞演习 苏-30、阿帕奇悉数登场', Netease.com, July 7, 2020, <https://3g.163.com/news/article/FGS35FEC0515DHOR.html>

Many Chinese strategists compared the situation at the LAC with that of the Warring States Period in the Chinese history. They argued that although the confrontation is between China and India, countries such as Russia, Europe, Israel and the United States, do not want to see an Indian setback or a decisive winner in the subcontinent any time soon and therefore are selling arms to strengthen the Indian army, to slow down China at the LAC and to prevent it from starting a military conflict.

At the tactical level, the Chinese media pointed out, there is no immediate threat to China from India's large scale arms procurement of weapons, as deliveries will take time to mature and in any case it is impossible to achieve full combat capability at such a short notice; From the operational level, however, China seemed concerned about India's procurement of the SCALP or Storm Shadow long-range attack cruise missiles, which as per the Chinese assessment, is the most powerful and best performing tactical weapon obtained by the Indian military in this round of military purchases. This, they say, can improve the overall combat strength of the Indian army and can pose a threat to Chinese military's front-line air bases. As the Indian army develops its offensive capabilities in battle, the thinking within the Chinese strategic circles is for China to adopt the "first battle, final battle" approach and even explore ballistic missile attack campaign, which is otherwise reserved for stronger opponents. However, overall the dominant narrative in China remained that strategically it is "unwise" for China to take the initiative to open a comprehensive conflict with India at this point and, therefore, efforts should be made to tone down the war rhetoric.

The Belt and Road Initiative

A [high-level video conference](#) on Belt and Road international cooperation was held on June 18¹², with the theme of "strengthening the Belt and Road international cooperation and jointly fighting COVID-19. The meeting was [presided](#) over by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi¹³. Foreign ministers or ministerial officials from 25 countries reportedly attended the conference, along with senior officials from the United Nations and the World Health Organization including WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and UN Development Programme Administrator Achim Steiner.

¹² 'High-level conference on Belt and Road int'l cooperation scheduled for June 18', Xinhua, June 16, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/16/c_139143667.htm

¹³ 'Wang Yi presides over video conference on Belt and Road int'l cooperation', Xinhua, June 19, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/19/c_139151013.htm

The objective of the meeting was “to implement the consensus of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, promote Belt and Road partners to strengthen international cooperation in fighting the pandemic, carry out experience exchange and policy coordination for the resumption of work and production, and promote high-quality joint pursuit of the Belt and Road Initiative.” Chinese president Xi Jinping, in a [written statement](#) to the conference¹⁴, stated that “The Belt and Road will be a model of health for protecting people's safety and well-being, a model of recovery for restoring economic and social activity, and a model of growth for unlocking development potential.” A joint statement was issued at the end of the meeting, highlighting the common desire of the participating countries to accelerate the recovery of the economy while fighting the epidemic. It was further revealed during the meeting that about 20% of the projects in the “[Belt and Road](#)” have been severely affected by the epidemic, 30%-40% are moderately affected, while 40% remains unaffected¹⁵.

Reports highlighted that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ([CPEC](#)), the “flagship” undertaking of China's Belt and Road Initiative, have been encountering problems of late due to the corona crisis. There have been reports in the international media about Pakistan reducing its annual CPEC allocation to \$159 million, down by about a third from last year. It is also reportedly seeking to renegotiate CPEC related repayments, on grounds that Chinese and local companies had inflated the costs of some power plant projects. Trashing these reports as “exaggerated problems”, China's state media asserted “it would be misguided for anyone to assume that China would drop or delay CPEC projects due to such setbacks.”¹⁶

China-EU Relations

Chinese President Xi Jinping had a video conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen on June 22 as a part of the 22nd China-EU Summit. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang co-hosted the leaders' meeting together with the two presidents from the EU side. This was the first formal summit between Chinese leaders and the new EU leadership, and the highest-level bilateral meeting since the coronavirus outbreak. The highlight of the meeting, as per

¹⁴ President Xi sends message to conference on Belt and Road int'l cooperation, Xinhua, June 19, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/19/c_139149835.htm

¹⁵ ‘一带一路是疫情洪水冲不垮的堤岸’, Huanqiu Shibao, June 19, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yigtjCUdcw>

¹⁶ ‘China's confidence in CPEC won't be shattered despite setback’, Global Times, June 29, 2020, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1192945.shtml>

the Chinese assessment, included, both China and the European Union “reaffirming their commitment” to conclude a comprehensive bilateral investment [agreement](#) in 2020¹⁷, which is expected to open up new avenues for China-EU cooperation.



Chinese President Xi Jinping interacting with President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, June 22, 2020, Source: People's Daily

The key [message](#) stressed during the meeting was that “China-EU are partners rather than rivals”, that “there is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and Europe and no strategic obstacle in the path of cooperation”, and that “they can drive the global economic recovery, together”¹⁸ Before this, EU’s foreign minister Josep Borrell held bilateral talks with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi as a part of the 10th round of high-level strategic dialogue on June 10, where he stated that “despite its global ambitions...China does not threaten world peace” and thereby, assured China that “the 27-nation-bloc will not embark on any kind of Cold War with China”. Chinese [media](#)¹⁹, therefore, inferred that “although the EU’s attitude on some China-related issues is influenced by the US, Europe will not blindly follow US moves to oppose China,


¹⁷‘中欧关系什么最重要，一目了然’, Huanqiu Shibao, June 23, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3ylozNDIN11>

¹⁸ ‘Leaders’ meeting injects fresh impetus into China-EU relations amid pandemic’, Xinhua, June 23, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/23/c_139161669.htm

¹⁹ ‘European Union can play vital role in preventing a ‘new Cold War’’, China Daily, May 29, 2020, <http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/29/WS5ed04a25a310a8b2411594a8.html>

but will instead proactively promote the development of China-Europe relations in the [post-pandemic era](#)²⁰.

China-Africa Relations



Chinese President Xi Jinping chairing the Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19 in Beijing, June 17, 2020, Source: Xinhua

An "Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19" was held on June 17 via video conference. The summit was jointly [initiated](#) by China, South Africa, the rotating chair of the African Union (AU) and Senegal, co-chair of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)²¹. Leaders of African countries, including members of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government and rotating chairs of major African sub regional organizations, and the chairperson of the AU Commission, attended the summit. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the World Health Organization Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus also attended the meeting as a special invitee. Chinese President Xi Jinping

²⁰ 'EU chooses pragmatic approach to China, distances itself from US', Global Times, June 10, 2020, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191201.shtml>

²¹ 'Xi to chair extraordinary China-Africa summit on solidarity against COVID-19', Xinhua, June 16, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/16/c_139144072.htm

[chaired](#)²² the summit and delivered a [keynote speech](#)²³. The [highlights](#) of the speech were: China and Africa will enhance solidarity, friendship and mutual trust in the face of COVID-19, China will support Africa's response to COVID-19 by every possible means, African countries will be among the first to benefit from vaccines developed in China, and the debt of relevant African countries will be cancelled. It was further stressed that closer cooperation between China and Africa "is needed more than ever"²⁴

As per the Chinese assessment, the significance of this [Special Summit](#) lies in the consensus reached between China, the African Union, the United Nations and WHO at the China-Africa Solidarity Anti-Epidemic Summit, which they argued, will not only profoundly affect the anti-epidemic situation on the African continent, but also shape the future course of China-Africa relations. However, Chinese strategists warned that potential challenges towards China-Africa cooperation over Covid-19 crisis comes from rising nationalism and anti-China sentiment in certain African countries and African's strong trust and familiarity/identification with European and American standards, medical systems and medicines²⁵.

Internal Security

China's top legislative body, Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress, "strongly condemned and resolutely opposed" the signing of the "Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020" by the United States on June 18, arguing that "the U.S. move has grossly interfered in China's internal affairs and seriously violated international law and the basic norms governing international relations."

China's state media [stated](#) that the Chinese government and the Chinese people will no more be bothered by such "Bills", and will carry on with its development work in the region as always. However, the interference of external forces, they argued, will only intensify the sense of solidarity and patriotism among the people of all ethnic groups in China. On the other hand, China will strive to expedite the process of publicising positive developments

²² Xi chairs China-Africa summit, calls for solidarity to defeat COVID-19, Xinhua, June 18, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/18/c_139147167.htm

²³ Keynote speech by President Xi Jinping at Extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity Against COVID-19, Xinhua, June 18, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/18/c_139147084.htm

²⁴ Xi chairs China-Africa summit, calls for solidarity to defeat COVID-19, Xinhua, June 18, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/18/c_139147317.htm

²⁵ Shen Shiwei, '中非团结抗疫意味着什么', Huanqiu Shibao, June 18, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKtrv>

in Xinjiang and generate favourable public opinion on the issue internationally²⁶.

Economy

Economic figures [released](#) by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) on June 15, saw mixed reactions from China's economic circles²⁷. Many Chinese strategists were hopeful of a speedy recovery of the Chinese economy as factory activities continued to pick up in May with the value-added industrial output going up 4.4 percent year on year. China's domestic consumption also showed signs of growth as China's retail sales of consumer goods, declined 2.8 percent year on year in May, rebounding from a drop of 7.5 percent in April. However, China's May CPI growth rate (2.4%) was lower than the previously expected 2.7% and the May PPI fell 3.7% year-on-year, also lower than the previous forecast of a 3.3% decline. Looking at trends, some observers argued that the CPI may fall to the 1% era in the second half of this year, there might be a new round of [deflation](#), and the healthy recovery of the economy will not come as soon as expected. On the other hand, there is also a growing concern in certain sections of China's strategic community that if trillions of dollars' worth new infrastructure projects are launched by the Chinese government this year, this may lead to inflation in the second half of the year.²⁸

Meanwhile, China noted with concern the Vietnamese Parliament's approval of the Vietnam-EU Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and the Investment Protection Agreement. According to the agreement, both Vietnam and Europe will gradually reduce or cancel about 99% of the tariffs in bilateral trade in goods over the next 10 years. The development exacerbated China's rising concerns over "China being isolated" and "Global supply-chains moving out of China". However, China's state media ruled out such concerns as "unrealistic" and "exaggerated". Instead, it argued that the [general trend](#) of China's economic stability and long-term improvement have not changed²⁹, China will need to further prioritise economic and trade cooperation with the EU and ASEAN countries individually, fast track its joining of the [CPTPP](#) and thereby, continue

²⁶ Li Weijian, '新疆发展不受美国"法案"干扰', Huanqiu Shibao, June 20, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yix9fv1819>

²⁷ 'China's economic figures inspire hope for global recovery', Xinhua, June 16, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/16/c_139143625.htm

²⁸ Cao Heping, '不必过于担心通缩或通胀', Huanqiu Shibao, June 15, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3yeeZgzLsiB>

²⁹ '越欧签自贸协定，中国为何"躺枪"', Huanqiu Shibao, June 11, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3ybSQHT0qc0>

opening up to the outside world and maintaining the stability of the existing global industrial and supply chain³⁰.

On the other hand, on June 6, [China](#) celebrated the first anniversary of 5G commercial licensing. China's state media narrated how in this one year China has "quietly" built the world's largest 5G network. The number of 5G base stations in China has reached about 300,000, and it is expected to reach about 600,000 by the end of this year, which is reportedly 15 times that of the United States. In addition to base stations, China has more than 36 million 5G users, and this number is expected to exceed 100 million by the end of the year. However, certain section of Chinese media lamented that despite the facts and figures, the general Chinese populace is yet to comprehend fully or value China's success in this domain³¹.

³⁰ Wang Huiyao, '中国加入 CPTPP 的时机正在成熟', Huanqiushibao, June 11, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/3ybSdiT1oNU>

³¹ Xiang Ligang, '世界最大 5G 网"蓄势待发', Huanqiushibao, June 5, 2020, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKrig0>



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