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Conference on ‘India’s Maritime Security Challenges’
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“India’s Maritime Security Challenges”
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Concept Note
India’s core national interest can be described as assuring the material, economic and societal security of its citizens. Securing this interest in the maritime domain demands that India have the ability to use the seas for her own purpose, while dissuading, deterring or preventing others from using them in ways that are to her disadvantage. The reasons requiring use of the seas for our own purposes and the means enabling such use constitute India’s maritime interests, which inevitably face a host of challenges. The nation’s maritime security, therefore, lies in possessing the ability to overcome these challenges at affordable costs.

The Indian peninsula caps the Indian Ocean, jutting out deep into it like a dagger into its centre. This makes India the geographic key not only to the Indian Ocean, but also to Asian economic security. It was, in fact, this central position that led to India’s cultural imprint stretching from the shores of Africa across the Indian Ocean to Bali and even well into the Pacific. That civilisational connect was, however, broken by the colonial period.

Post independence, India was blessed with a benign maritime environment. Unlike on land, there was no serious maritime threat that demanded the immediate and continuous attention of national security planners. The end of World War II had left the Indian Ocean Region as a strategic backwater, peripheral to the security interests of the global powers of the day. The aspiration to renew India’s historical connect with the rest of Asia led to the first Asian Relations Conference being convened in Delhi in March 1947, before independence. But India’s aspirations to lead Asia received a setback at Bandung, and collapsed with the humiliating loss to China in 1962. The Cold War further isolated India from South East Asia. It took a near financial meltdown and the collapse of the Soviet Union for India to regain its Asian outlook and evolve the Look East Policy in 1991.

The shift of global economic power back to Asia and remarkable economic growth following liberalisation have led to a sea change in our maritime environment. India’s economic growth is contingent upon the continued availability of imported goods, particularly energy, by way of crude oil, natural gas and coal; as well as the ability to export the products of its industry to overseas markets. Given the barriers to trade and transit rights on our Western and Northern borders, as well as the poor state of overland connectivity to the East, the primary connect for India’s growing trade has to be maritime. Securing this connect, as also India’s oceanic fishery and mineral wealth; while dealing effectively with governance challenges in the maritime zones, become key interests.

Furthermore, the Northern Indian Ocean has emerged as a key connector for global trade, linking not only raw material providers in the littoral with their consumers in the Asia Pacific,
but also industrialised nations of East Asia with their markets, in the Indian Ocean (IO) and on both sides of the Atlantic. These vastly increased trade and energy flows form an integral part of the global economic system which has been secured by American power. This paradigm faces challenge from a resurgent China as well as from those who seek to exploit the ungoverned nature of the seas. Security needs have thus brought great power competition and rivalry to India’s maritime doorstep. USA maintains bases at Djibouti, Bahrain and Diego Garcia. China is setting up its first IO base at Djibouti; Gwadar is destined to be the second, while numerous other ports are being developed as logistic facilities that could support PLAN operations in the IO. UK has, with the inauguration of its Naval Support Facility at Manama in November 2016, formally returned to the Ocean. Japan has a base at Djibouti. France has one there also, in addition to its numerous island territories in the Southern IO. Anything from 100-175 potent warships from these countries are present in the region on a 24x7 basis, constituting a potential challenge India can ill afford to ignore.

The maritime medium has little by way of natural barriers, such as rivers, mountains, deserts etc, which can serve as defensive lines to delay movement of force. Movement at sea is rapid with no requirement of road axes for logistic support. A task force can easily advance over 1000 Km every day. The range and accuracy of seaborne weapons has increased dramatically, with land attack cruise missile range of the order of many hundreds of Km to a few thousand Km commonly available. All these predicate the need for strategic depth, maintaining awareness of all that happens in the vast expanse of the ‘No Man’s Land’ which is the sea, as well as the ability to rapidly react before developments can impact on the nation.

It is here that India’s geographic location comes to the forefront. It enables India to be a security provider, facilitator, spectator or obstruction, depending on its leaders. Island territories in the Andaman and Nicobar, astride international SLOCs connecting the Pacific to the Indian Ocean add to India’s geographic advantage, as do the Lakshadweep, lying astride SLOCs connecting the Persian Gulf and Red Sea to the Pacific. But if these natural gifts are not recognised and exploited, they could become a liability. The same island territories, as also others in the Indian Ocean, could become a springboard to dominate India once again.

Challenges to India’s maritime interests emanate from two distinct fronts. The first is geopolitical, emanating from adversaries, current and potential. Foremost amongst these is economically and militarily resurgent China, challenging USA’s global hegemony and desirous of shaping the regional and global environment to its own advantage. Already the largest trading partner of almost all Asian and African nations, China has visibly set out to acquire the ability to control the maritime medium that connects them. The vastly increased salience of the maritime domain in China’s national outlook is evident in the military strategy white paper of May 2015, which says, “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests”. So the PLA Navy has grown into the second largest navy in the world, increasingly focused on pushing American power outside the ‘Island Chains’ and operating in the Indian Ocean, leading to even traditional American partners like Philippines and Australia becoming ambivalent about where their future interests lie. Power seems to be the only principle China understands, and the massive
increase in China’s naval power is a pointer towards its being used to secure what it perceives to be its rights in disputes, both current and those that could be manufactured in the future.

The other front, not really connected, but linked in public perception because of the common maritime domain, is the host of unconventional challenges that have arisen, due to expansion of both maritime zones following UNCLOS 1982 and trade flows. These include piracy and armed robbery at sea; maritime terror; illicit traffic in drugs, arms and humans; transnational crime; natural disasters; illegal, unreported, unregulated and aggressive fishing; illegal migration; environmental pollution; the occasional need for non-combat evacuation operations; climate change and others. Response to these ‘governance’ challenges is often conflated with that required to deal with geopolitical ones. There is no doubt need to deal with such challenges, but the mechanism used may not necessarily be the same one.

Solutions to India’s maritime security lie at two levels: building up of national capacity, including instruments of power and infrastructure, as well as building partnerships with other states, vital because of the free nature of the seas. There are clear indicators that India’s political leaders are no longer sea blind. The Act East and Link West policies, engagement with ASEAN, the ARF and the EAS, strategic partnerships with Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean nations, participation in the ADMM++ mechanism, aspirational commitment towards India being a ‘Net Security Provider in the Indian Ocean’ and PM Modi’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), all point towards increased political understanding of the salience of the maritime medium and the need to secure it. Furthermore, there are bilateral strategic partnerships in the maritime domain, as constituted under the Indo-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the Indo-US Joint Strategic Vision for the Indian Ocean, both of which have action plans under implementation. What is yet to become visible is a long term overall action plan with the requisite political commitment, by way of funding. Discussion of a coherent national action plan to secure India’s maritime interests is the focus of this seminar.

The seminar will comprise the following:-

(a) **Inaugural Session.** Keynote address by the Chief of the Naval Staff.

(b) **Session I (Challenges and Capabilities).** This session will explore current and emerging challenges in the maritime domain as well as the current status of India’s maritime capabilities, with a view to identifying critical gaps.

(c) **Session II (Technologies, Partnerships and Sentinels).** This session will explore technologies, partnerships and sentinels such as island territories to secure our maritime interests.

(d) **Session III (Strategic Options).** This session will, through a panel discussion, explore India’s strategic options to meet maritime security needs.

(e) **Concluding Session.** Concluding address by Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee.
PROGRAMME
0900-0930  :  Registration
0930-1030  :  Inaugural Session:
   Welcome by Air Marshal Naresh Verma, AVSM, VSM, Director, India International Centre [5 minutes]
   Remarks by Mr. Siddharth Shriram, Chairman and Managing Trustee, DPG/Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, DPG [10 minutes]
   Keynote Address by Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff [30 minutes]
   Q&A [15 minutes]

1030-1045  :  Tea/Coffee [Pergola Terrace]
1045-1200  :  Session I: Challenges and Capabilities
   Chair: Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM VrC, Former CNS [5 minutes]
   Speakers:
   Sanjaya Baru: India’s Maritime Challenges [15 minutes]
   Vice Adm. Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM: Current Capabilities and Critical Gaps [15 minutes]
   Q&A [30 minutes]
   Summing up by Speakers and Chair [10 minutes]

1200-1315  :  Session II: Technologies, Partnerships and Sentinels
   Chair: Ambassador Nalin Surie, Director General, ICWA [5 minutes]
   Speakers:
   Vice Adm. Satish Soni, PVSM, AVSM, NM: Technological needs in the 15-20 year horizon [15 minutes]
   Cmde Lalit Kapur, Senior Fellow, DPG: Leveraging Partnerships and Sentinels [15 minutes]
   Q&A [30 minutes]
   Summing up by Speakers and Chair [10 minutes]
1315-1430 : Lunch [Pergola Terrace]

1430-1545 : Session III: Panel Discussion: India’s Strategic Options:

Moderator: C. Uday Bhaskar, VSM, Cmde (Retd.) [5 minutes]
Panel Discussion [40 minutes]
Panelists:
Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, Former CNS, Distinguished Fellow, DPG
Rear Adm. K. Raja Menon
Lt. Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & Bar
Q&A [30 minutes]

1545-1610 : Concluding Session

Concluding Address by Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, Former CNS, Distinguished Fellow, DPG [15 minutes]

Vote of Thanks: Cmde Lalit Kapur, Senior Fellow, DPG [10 minutes]
Keynote Address by
Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC,
Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman
Chiefs of Staff Committee
1. At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh and the Delhi Policy Group for inviting me to deliver the keynote address at this conference. It is indeed an honour to offer my views to this august audience. Think-tanks such as the Delhi Policy Group are pre-eminent forums that allow brainstorming of perspectives and help shape our policies for the future.

2. I would also like to compliment the Delhi Policy Group for selecting a very apt subject for today’s Conference. There is a pressing need at all levels to understand the rapid transformation shaping the maritime space around us and to prepare adequately for future challenges. This would be possible only through a deliberate process of structured debate, with a singular aim of preparing a coherent national action plan for securing India’s maritime interests.

3. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is widely acknowledged that the fortunes of a nation are determined, to a great extent, by its geography. Looking at India’s geography, we can only rejoice at our good fortune.

4. India has a coastline of over 7516 Km, 1382 Islands and about two million square km of Exclusive Economic Zone. The anticipated addition of 1.2 million square km of continental shelf will make India’s total seabed area equal to its landmass. 95 percent by volume and 68 percent by value of India’s external trade is through these oceans.

5. India has invested heavily in oil and gas exploration in foreign waters. These new oil and gas fields form a vital link in our energy security chain. Nearly 80 percent of India’s crude oil is routed via the seas and 11 percent of national crude oil requirement is met from domestic offshore resources within our EEZ.

6. From a regional perspective, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, is home to more than 60% of the world’s population and has emerged as the centre of global manufacturing and service industry. The most important maritime choke points and trade routes of the world exist in this region. Asia
has seen approximately Seven Lakh - Fifty thousand (7,50,000 ships) calling at her ports in the year 2015-16. This robust trade forms around 60 percent of global exports and imports in volume and tonnage and has contributed to 35 percent global export growth in 2016. Therefore, any disruption in these maritime highways is bound to have a global impact.

7. India’s central position in the IOR, astride the important sea lanes of the world, gives us immense strategic advantages as well. It facilitates reach, sustenance and mobility of our maritime forces, thereby giving us an ability to effectively influence this maritime space.

8. Towards this, our government’s ‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’ and ‘Link West’ policies would help India pursue and nurture economic and strategic relationships in the extended neighbourhood. Focussed infrastructural developments including roads, ports, islands and space assets within India, and a proactive outreach to countries in the region is reshaping the strategic narrative in a novel manner.

9. While this geography affords us opportunities to harness the seas to our advantage, it has also placed us at the very centre of the ongoing ‘Strategic churn’ taking place in this region. Its impact on India in the future will be determined by our outlook and choices that we adopt today.

10. For several decades, we have been fortunate to have experienced largely peaceful seas. Majority of the threats were bundled together at the lowermost end of the spectrum of conflict.

11. We are now experiencing rapid changes and increasing challenges in the seas that we considered our uncontested backyard till a few years ago. Just as we are re-awakening to the criticality of the oceans to our existence, most nations are already investing in developing capabilities to harness and secure their waters. The marine medium with the resources contained therein, has emerged as one of the key drivers defining international behaviour in the 21st century.

12. In the last decade or so, Asia’s demographic, economic and military transformation, has nurtured a voracious thirst for resources in various nations. The need for securing resources has, on one hand, prompted nations
to explore avenues far away from home and on the other, increased their territorial assertiveness and nationalistic ambitions.

13. An example of this would be the conflicting maritime territorial claims between countries in the East and South China Sea that have been fuelled by China’s expansionist attitude. These are further aggravated by China’s opportunistic interpretation of International Law. The net result of these activities is increased militarisation and regional geo-political instability in the region.

14. Closer home, the waters of the Indian Ocean have also become the playground for great power ambitions. A quick scan of the IOR reveals the extent of the presence of extra-regional powers in this region.

- Djibouti currently houses bases of the USA, Japan, France as well as China.
- Bahrain acts as a base for USN and RN operations.
- Diego Garcia has seen permanent USN presence for decades.
- It is estimated that about 100-125 extra regional warships operate in this region on a daily basis. In addition, China’s projects in ports such as Gwadar and Hambantota as well as the Melaka Gateway project in the Malacca Strait have the potential to develop into military basing facilities.

15. If these ports are exploited as suspected, China’s operational expediency in this region will multiply manifold. As of now, PLA Navy Anti-Piracy Escort Forces have been operating in the Gulf of Aden region since 2008. As I speak today, one PLAN submarine is operating in the Northern Arabian Sea, along with a Submarine Support Ship. Chinese ‘research vessels’, capable of undertaking monitoring activities have a near continuous presence in our neighbourhood.

16. Pakistan has also embarked on the modernisation of its Navy. The PN is planning to acquire fleet replenishment tankers and anti-submarine corvettes from Turkey. Further, Sino-Pak defence cooperation has resulted in inductions such as the F22P frigates, Harbin Z-9c helicopters, Missile Fast Attack Crafts and Patrol Vessels of various tonnage. China has also agreed
to provide the PN with advanced submarines and all associated infrastructure.

17. Another development is the situation in the Bay of Bengal. Whereas, the Northern Arabian Sea has traditionally been in focus due to the large number of extra regional forces operating, the Bay of Bengal is steadily and surely gaining prominence and we need to focus on this region.

- China is cementing its influence in the Bay of Bengal through development of dependencies in countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar. Sale of Chinese submarines to Bangladesh, the Pyra Deep-Sea port project in Bangladesh as well as the China-Myanmar crude oil and natural gas pipelines terminating at the Kyakpyu (KAIFU) port in Myanmar are some examples of this strategy.
- It will not be long before we start seeing PLAN ships making regular port calls at these ports.

18. The effects of policy shifts in Europe and the US are also being felt in the region.

- The change of guard in the US and the vigorous propagation of the ‘America First Policy’,
- The untimely review of EU’s defence arrangements and contributions to NATO,
- France’s assertion of its status as a stakeholder in the IOR and,
- The re-invigorated Sino-Russian relationship have induced a discernible amount of strategic uncertainty.

19. Such issues have nudged countries in the region to revisit their traditional foreign policies as well as strategic and economic alignments.

20. With conflicts emerging at many fundamental levels and multiple national interests being involved, this maritime region is becoming a theatre for rivalry between numerous stakeholders. Detailed deliberations would help to understand the impact of these influences on the maritime security of the region and I am sanguine that some of these issues will be discussed during this conference as well.
21. Ladies and gentlemen, the situation that I have described so far does promise us interesting times ahead. A closer examination of our maritime security environment also brings out multiple non-traditional challenges.

22. The principal challenge which keeps the world’s attention occupied by its frequency and magnitude is the scourge of terrorism. What used to be an internal security threat to countries has now transformed into a menace of global proportions. The reach, access to technology, organisational flexibility and financing avenues that terrorist organisations enjoy today is unprecedented. Amongst the various types of terrorism prevalent today, use of the seas for state sponsored terrorism has captured our focus and resulted in commitment of significant efforts and assets towards securing our shores.

23. Other challenges include maritime piracy, human and drug trafficking, vagaries of climate change as well as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

24. These non-traditional challenges continue to manifest as urgent issues demanding our immediate attention. Due to their apparent urgency, they tend to hijack the discourse and influence both force structuring as well as operational planning. Responses and infrastructure accretions tend to get re-prioritised in favour of the short-term sub-conventional threats as against the long term conventional threats. We are therefore, forced to strike a balance between the two.

25. Ladies and gentlemen, the Indian Navy has adopted a multidimensional approach to address the challenges to India’s maritime security. I will now briefly describe our approach for ensuring maritime security.

26. Our national approach towards maritime cooperation has been clearly enunciated by the vision of our Hon’ble Prime Minister in the acronym SAGAR, which stands for ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’.

27. In pursuance of the Government’s ‘Neighbourhood First and Act East Policies’, the Indian Navy has deepened its ties with Island countries in the IOR and nations of the Western Pacific.

28. We have progressed several initiatives that include transfer of technology and hardware to build up capacities of nations such as Mauritius, Seychelles,
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Vietnam and our efforts have helped
enhance their maritime capabilities.

29. Our capacity enhancement initiatives also include measures for cooperative
development through training, technical support and hydrographic
cooperation.

- The Indian Navy has undertaken hydrographic assistance for Mauritius,
Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Tanzania, Kenya and Oman to name a few.
- We provide training assistance to more than 42 navies, with nearly 1,000
personnel being trained in various establishments of the Indian Navy.

30. In terms of enhancing security, India has positioned one ship in the Gulf of
Aden since 2008 for Anti-Piracy Patrols. Our ships on patrol have escorted
more than 3000 ships irrespective of flag. We had no incidents of piracy in
the western IOR since 2012, but with the recent hijacking of ARIS 13, a
Comoros-Flagged tanker in March and an Indian Dhow near Socotra, in April,
the threat of piracy re-emerging has become a real concern. Our warships
Mumbai and Sharda countered two separate piracy attacks as recent as in
April and May this year.

31. We have also strengthened our maritime cooperation initiatives at
operational levels with the US, Japan and Australian navies in particular.

32. Further, the Indian Navy’s Coordinated Patrols with Indonesia, Thailand and
Myanmar are aimed at addressing regional illegal maritime activities.

33. Our prompt response in rendering Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief to affected regions and evacuation of a large number of civilians, across
nationalities, from strife torn regions of the world has demonstrated our
commitment to the common good. In Yemen, we safely evacuated close to
2000 Indian and about 1300 foreign nationals from 35 nations, from an
intense combat zone (1783 Indians and 1291 foreigners).

34. The Indian Navy’s initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium –
IONS; and MILAN – the biennial gathering of regional navies at Port Blair,
have enabled constructive dialogue amongst navies of the Indian Ocean
Region. In fact, through the IONS initiative, guidelines have also been
formulated for coordinated Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations in the region.

35. The Navy is also enhancing its deployment ranges and sustenance potential. Ships of the Western Fleet have recently returned to after a two month deployment to the Mediterranean and Europe. INS Tarkash is currently visiting various ports on the west coast of Africa. The Eastern Fleet is on a 60 days deployment to various countries of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

36. Ladies and gentlemen, the confidence to deploy and sustain for progressively increasing durations mirrors our faith in the increasing indigenous content of our ships. The Indian Navy has pioneered indigenisation since the early sixties, when we commissioned our first indigenously built ship, INS Ajay. The steady focus on indigenisation has led us to the current capacity where our shipyards are audaciously spearheading construction of offshore patrol vessels, corvettes, stealth frigates, destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines.

- It is quite encouraging that the Indian Navy has commissioned 127 indigenous ships till date.
- 41 more ships are on order and all of them are being built indigenously.

37. The Navy continues to nurture the domestic industry and progressively imbibe state of the art technologies. Towards this, we have formulated the Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan, which gives the requirements of the Indian Navy for indigenous development for the period 2015 to 2030.

38. The Navy has also promulgated an 'Indian Navy – DRDO Synergy' policy in 2013. In this, 90 products have been identified to be developed by DRDO over the next decade. They have been divided into six clusters and are being monitored through regular synergy meetings. The institutional thrust on indigenisation has helped both the Service and the Indian industry tread the learning curve confidently.

39. All these endeavours are aimed towards improving our infrastructure and force levels. Towards this we have commissioned new operational bases,
increased training capacities and upgraded many air-fields. We have also operationalised air enclaves as well as coastal radar stations and expanded berths and jetties towards enhancing infrastructure. Whilst indigenous shipbuilding has aided in augmenting our force levels, we have also inducted various new weapon systems and equipment that have significantly enhanced our combat potential.

40. Ladies and Gentlemen, as I brought out earlier, the large number and types of vessels operating in the Indian Ocean Region makes our maritime environment very dense. This has increased the requirement to develop an effective Maritime Domain Awareness infrastructure. For developing an effective MDA along our coasts and in our offshore areas, a chain of coastal radar stations has been set up.

41. The Navy has also set up a National Command Control Communication and Information (NC3I) Network, integrating 51 stations of the Navy and the Coast Guard. Inputs from Coastal Radar Chains and AIS receivers of Mauritius and Seychelles are also being received at Information Management and Analysis Centre, Gurgaon.

42. These and other initiatives such as exchange of White Shipping Information would enable us to progressively increase awareness of our primary maritime areas of interest, with significant benefits, both in peace and conflict.

43. Ladies and gentlemen, through persistent endeavours, the Indian Navy has emerged as a potent, multi-dimensional, balanced and professional force. It is still a growing force and is strengthening its capability of conducting the full spectrum of maritime operations in India’s maritime areas of interest.

44. Having looked at the Indian Navy’s contributions to maritime security in the region, there are several issues that merit discussion in this august forum.

45. The first and the foremost would be whether enough is being done to address the present and future maritime security challenges?

46. How effective are our acquisition and infrastructure plans? The need for them to be based on our long-term national strategy, and to follow a whole of government approach for timely results is crucial.
47. The next issue would be regarding the strategic options available to India. How do we preserve our strategic autonomy whilst simultaneously engaging with like-minded countries? This is likely to be a challenge in this dynamic global scenario.

48. The technology denial regimes prevalent today nudge us to question if we are doing enough to imbibe cutting edge technologies? This would be critical to reduce dependencies and enhance the domestic defence –industrial base. We also need to explore options to leverage partnerships.

49. In addition to all these issues, at a very fundamental level, we need to honestly assess whether our conventional and strategic capabilities, designed to deter a full-blown war, are adequate to deter situations that are ‘less-than-war’ like?

50. I am sure that these and many more such issues will be intensely deliberated during the course of this conference.

51. Ladies and Gentlemen, before I conclude I would like to reiterate that today we live in uncertain times, in a significant geographical location and a rapidly evolving regional as well as global scenario.

52. India’s progress in the coming decades will be significantly influenced by the security and stability of our seas. Therefore, at no stage should we let the present calm of the seas lull our senses. Our pursuit of economic and technological growth should be matched by measures to enhance our maritime influence and our ability to project maritime power.

53. I wish to assure this distinguished audience that the Indian Navy remains steadfast and ready to safeguard the nation’s maritime interests anytime, anywhere and every time.

54. I am sure that the deliberations during this conference would be engaging and the outcomes fruitful. I am eagerly looking forward to the proceedings of this conference and the enlightened comments as well as suggestions that would be forthcoming on these important issues. I wish the Delhi Policy Group success in all its endeavours and may it grow from strength to strength in its path of progress.
Thank You and Jai Hind.

55. An interactive question session followed. The questions pertained to who India and the IN saw as the lead partner for the future; IN initiatives in the Bay of Bengal, the Western end of the critical fulcrum connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, non-military challenges and development of the A&N Islands, the blue economy, the Navy's funding concerns and Pakistan's developing maritime nuclear capabilities. The CNS clarified the issues involved in a frank and lucid manner.

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Maritime Challenges – Dr Sanjay Baru

56. The speaker focused his address on two critical challenges that had emerged during the Q&A session following the Keynote address, viz the challenge of declining defence budgets and naval budget shares, and the China-Pakistan axis. He likened the situation facing India today to that of 1991, when the nation faced strategic uncertainty engendered by collapse of the Soviet Union coupled with a severe economic crisis. The comfort we had derived from the bilateral relationship with USA in the last 15 years seemed to be disappearing, with USA itself going through major political and economic turmoil, although a better picture would be available on completion of the Modi visit to USA at the end of this month.

57. The difference was that the government in 1991 had a difficult political environment as it lacked parliamentary majority. If today’s government, despite a clear majority in parliament, was unable to engender confidence in the economy and lift the rate of economic growth, it was because we had not understood the nature of ongoing global change, how it impacts on us and what we need to do to address the challenges. He believed the time had come for fundamental re-examination of the national growth strategy over the next five years, if not longer.

58. The speaker observed that one of the reasons that the Navy came to secure greater attention from Mr Vajpayee and Mr Manmohan Singh was because of India’s increasing integration in the world economy in general and the Asian economy specifically. As India’s share in world trade grew and the economy shifted to Asia, the importance of the Indo-Pacific grew. At the same time, dependence on West Asia for energy grew. India could not connect with neighbours to the West or East over land, so structural changes in the Indian economy, coupled with the arrival of China in the Indian Ocean, dictated greater investment in naval capability. But recent years were showing both a decline in global trade, as well as in India’s share of this trade. Perhaps the only market showing hope was China, but India had a trade deficit of over $ 50 billion with China. He then asked the pointed question, what would declining importance of international trade mean for investment in naval capability? He also observed that no one in India was looking at this from a holistic
perspective: economists and strategists were looking at it from within their own spheres. In the short term particularly, where India was moving from one tax regime to another, how would this impact on the government’s ability to invest in naval capability?

59. On the China-Pakistan axis, the speaker stated that it constituted an external challenge that would have to be faced, but the comfort India could derive from its earlier relationship with USA and Japan was now in question. Major Western powers including USA, France and Germany no longer had the fiscal capacity to commit to Asian security. This constituted a change in our strategic environment, but was not adequately recognised in the way we plan for our security. The time had come where we had to take up the responsibility of managing our external environment, and this was not going to be possible unless the internal capacity to do so exists.

60. Given all the constraints, the speaker opined that what we certainly could do was focus on “Make in India”. India’s industrial development from independence till 1990 was based on government sector led import substituting industrialisation. In 1991, that model changed to private sector led investment, wherein we invited others to come and manufacture in India consumer goods both for domestic consumption and export. That model of industrial development had also lost steam, with global demand going down and protectionism rising. Import substituting industrialisation in defence manufacturing offers scope for increased growth, but movement towards this was hesitant. No creative thinking was visible on how the country could move rapidly towards defence manufacturing. In the short run, opening up defence manufacturing to foreign investment provided a quick way towards generating employment. The speaker closed with expressing the hope that the RM and FM could unify thinking of the two different ministries involved and enable them to act with the same combined intent.
The Admiral built his talk around three parts, as follows:-

(a) Capabilities should not be based only on threats and challenges. Rather, they should be based on a determination of what is required to further national interest, not just protect it.

(b) The Indian Navy has made substantial progress in this direction during the decades since independence.

(c) Identifying the gaps in capability.

Interest Based Capability. The speaker reminded the audience of the words enshrined in the American Constitution, which authorised the government to raise an army when required, but mandated that it “maintain a navy”. Given its geography, India’s prosperity and security was inextricably linked to the Indian Ocean. He stated that it was not the job of navies to defend coastlines – that was best left to the Coast Guard. The task of the navy was to bring the enemy to battle and defeat him as far from our shore as possible. While the seas were free and all nations were welcome to use the Indian Ocean as required, he said that India must have capability such that others could operate in this region only in cooperation with, but not in conflict with India.

IN Achievements. He highlighted that capabilities encompassed not just platforms and weapons, but also the ethos of the Service, a culture of professional debate and one of innovation. The IN had done well beyond what could have been expected in the years after independence. It had built, in just 70 years, the fifth largest navy in the world, one that could field two Carrier Battle Groups, 5-6 Surface Action Groups, 140 ships and over 200 aircraft, all in a climate where hardly anyone in government had any knowledge or interest in matters maritime. This had involved indigenisation, education of various stakeholders, developing even niche areas like meteorology and diving, investing in technology and development of weapons and sensors that were quite good, while building up support infrastructure that was noted worldwide, as well as exercising and developing interoperability with numerous other navies.
64. **Capability Gaps.** The speaker identified the following major gaps in capability:

(a) **Platforms.** Critical gaps existed in submarines, helicopters and minesweepers. Government was aware of these gaps but had not been able to address them effectively.

(b) **Capability.** Gaps existed in anti-submarine warfare, artificial intelligence, cyber, space, ballistic missile defence and anti-satellite capability. The Navy had taken note of these gaps, but there was need to move faster to address them.

(c) **Deployment.** There was need to figure out how to maintain sustained forward presence, especially in the North West Indian Ocean.

Q&A

65. The questions that followed related to reasons for decreasing budgetary allocations in an era of increasing overall expenditure, the need for prioritization in defence spending and shortcomings of the method currently in vogue for such prioritization, limitations of the current model of defence manufacturing and India’s queasiness in engaging with big powers. The panel elaborated on their presentations clearly, without holding back.
In his opening remarks, the speaker identified the approach adopted by the IN to harness technology. A robust (and entirely indigenous) ship and submarine design organisation coupled with 48 DRDO labs and other facilities had so far met some of the Navy’s aspirations to for self reliance. The Navy had, in 2015, redefined the Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan 2015 – 2030 and 93 critical technologies were being pursued. He identified the Arihant SSBN, BRAHMOs supersonic (anti-ship and land attack) missile and Barak-8 MRSAM as path-breaking successes. There were, however, numerous other projects in which huge investments had been made and returns were not commensurate.

The speaker then identified a range of technologies that the IN needed which were either available with advanced countries or being researched by them. On advanced munitions, he identified the Nirbhay cruise missile programme, drone launched guided missiles and loitering missiles, directed energy weapons and the electro-magnetic railgun as weapons of choice for the future. Another thrust area had to be unmanned combat vehicles that could operate autonomously in all three dimensions. He identified precision guidance to avoid collateral damage, advanced artificial intelligence to enable decision making, a good collision avoidance system, exploitation of internet of everything technology and better satellite coverage as some of the pre-requisites for success. The feasibility of participating in some of USA’s ongoing projects, such as the ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV); SHARK – an underwater submarine hunting probe; upward falling loads that remained dormant on the seabed and rose on demand; X-47 unmanned aircraft; the VTOL drone (TERN) and Solar Eagle, a self sustaining UAV powered by sunlight with an endurance of five years, merited exploration.

He identified space as another dimension where other nations had made much progress, including in anti-satellite weapons. ISRO had a stellar record, but our capability to exploit space for military applications remained limited to the CARTOSAT series, the naval communications satellite Rukmini and a few spinoffs from the IRNSS programme. Additional military satellites for
communication and with advanced space based sensors for reconnaissance; launch of on-demand mini satellites, instant imaging, anti-satellite weapons; anti-ballistic missile systems; EMP hardening of our satellites and launch of a constellation of satellites to enable accurate determination of position at sea needed to be planned for.

69. Cyber warfare and development of the ability to exploit the cyber dimension was another area that merited focused effort. There was need to integrate capabilities available with NTRO, DIARA, DRDO and Service Headquarters and other government agencies under one organisation. Another area was aircraft carrier technology: he advocated the need to build more and bigger aircraft carriers in quicker timeframes while assimilating advanced technologies like EMALS, Advanced Arrester Gear (AAG) and integrated full electrical propulsion or nuclear propulsion. To condense timelines and monitor the indigenisation of technology, he recommended the setting up of an ATV type of structure for aircraft carriers.

70. The Admiral that the DPP had already gone through eight iterations and yet no big ticket project except the P-8I had been acquired for the IN through this route. The acquisition of 16 MRH helicopters had already taken 15 years of processing and could serve as a case study to identify the shortcomings in our system. Unless we resolved the bureaucratic maze of the acquisition process, we would never be able to imbibe technology.

71. Structurally, India’s defence industry lacked both the infrastructure and the resources for R&D. Foreign companies were willing to collaborate but resisted transfer of technology. DRDO labs had done well in spurts, only to lag behind subsequently. Their initial gains were not consolidated and claims were often exaggerated. There was need for stringent performance audit and to substantially improve user interface. He observed that the current strength of just 39 IN officers in DRDO was clearly inadequate.

Leveraging Sentinels and Partnerships - Cmde Lalit Kapur (Retd)

72. The speaker built his talk in three parts, as follows:-

(a) Understanding the nature of challenge and response.

(b) Leveraging sentinels.
(c) Leveraging partnerships.

73. **Nature of Challenge and Response.** Challenges to India’s maritime interests arose at different levels, as follows:-

(a) The most obvious one was the challenge of preparing for inter-state conflict. This challenge was multi-dimensional, encompassing the surface, air, sub-surface, coastal, space, cyber and other dimensions. India had enjoyed a relative period of calm at sea, but the growing presence of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean coupled with the apparent retreat of USA meant that there was now increased scope for maritime conflict with China, singly or in collusion with Pakistan. The task of the IN was to deter conflict, or if forced upon the nation, to end it quickly on favourable terms. India was, however, already facing a low intensity hybrid conflict on a daily basis, and it was only a matter of time before this appeared at sea also.

(b) Next in order of intensity was the challenge from non-state forces. This included pirates, subversives and terrorists, poachers, traffickers in drugs, illicit weapons, people and weapons of mass destruction, criminals, illegal migrants, polluters etc. This challenge was limited to the surface dimension. While it was a high visibility challenge, it did not impinge on the survivability of the nation.

(c) Last was the challenge of dealing with natural disasters, or of non-combat evacuation of Indian diaspora abroad. IN capability in this regard was adequate.

74. History had showed that loss of control over the surrounding seas of the Indian Ocean would inevitably lead to the economic subjugation of India, followed by political subjugation. It was, therefore, vital for India to consider prevention of domination of the Indian Ocean by any hegemonic power while maintaining the sanctity of territorial borders and internal cohesion as its singular national security strategic goal. The speaker then went on to state that dealing with challenges necessitating use of force required awareness and response, and sentinels and partnerships were vital for both. They also provided defence in depth.

75. **Leveraging Sentinels.** The speaker elaborated upon the strategic benefits that our island territories offered us. The A&N group was ideally located to act as
a springboard for India’s Look/Act East Policy, but were more often seen as a distant outpost and strategic liability. They enabled surveillance of all straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, were optimally suited to construct an A2AD bubble to deny ingress into the Indian Ocean by inimical powers and enabled provision of defence in depth to any threat from the East. The current security infrastructure of A&N was, however, at best designed to deal with the challenge from non-state actors and nature; it did not inspire confidence in the ability to deal with the potential challenge from China. There had been announcements of developing the A&N as a maritime hub, but implementation of pronouncements and allocation of resources for this purpose remained concerns. There was an urgent need to move A&N from a purely naval agenda to a national priority. A similar situation prevailed in the Lakshadweep group and there was need to create infrastructure to enable monitoring of the entire Arabian Sea here.

76. **Leveraging Partnerships.** The speaker observed that the increased presence of China in the Indian Ocean signalled the approach of a changed era. India had, as a matter of policy, refrained from entering into security partnerships post independence. He suggested a change in this long standing policy was warranted. India’s choices were essentially to continue with strategic autonomy, or find partners, or accept subordinate status to China. Each entails its own costs. The choice could not be delayed indefinitely.

77. In conclusion, the speaker said that India had only grudgingly paid the costs of security. As it stood on the cusp of emerging as a regional power, it was time to determine whether the current shunning of security partnerships still served our strategic purpose, or merited change. He quoted from Sant Tulsidas and the Melian Dialogue to make the point that right came into question only between equals in power; while the strong did what they could, the weak suffered as they must.

**Q&A**

78. Questions related to India’s strategy for closing technological gaps, the limitations of the DRDO, involvement of private sector in defence procurement and leveraging partnerships for technology. The speakers clearly brought out limitations in the existing technology absorption and the defence procurement processes.
(Summary of Session)

79. The title of the Conference was “India’s Maritime Security Challenges”. CNS had, during his opening address, clearly flagged issues that merited discussion by the Conference, including the following:

(a) Whether enough was being done to address present and future maritime security challenges.

(b) How effective were the nation’s acquisition and infrastructure plans, and the need for them to be based on our long terms national strategy, as well as to follow a whole of government approach for timely results.

(c) How could India preserve strategic autonomy whilst simultaneously engaging with like minded countries.

(d) Whether we were doing enough to imbibe cutting edge technologies in an environment of technology denial regimes. These would be critical to reduce dependencies and enhance the domestic defence industrial base.

(e) Exploring options to leverage strategic partnerships.

(f) Whether conventional and strategic capabilities, designed to deter a full-blown war, were adequate to deter less-than-war situations.

80. The Terms of Reference given to the panel called for them to “Discuss India’s strategic options to address deficiencies in maritime capability, keeping in mind political and financial costs that would have to be paid to address them, and to rank these in order of preference”. The preceding sessions had in fact raised a number of issues that were intended to feed into the panel discussion scheduled as the last session.

81. It is perhaps a reflection on the nature of strategic discourse in India that panellists focused on individual presentations and generic issues, rather than debating specifics within the expert panel with a view to identifying recommended solutions. This led to a session where individual opinions of the
panellists on a range of strategic issues were offered, but careful analysis of these opinions by an expert panel followed by a consensual view could not emerge.

**Speaker I: R Adm K Raja Menon**

82. The Admiral started by defining his concept of India’s grand strategy, basing it on adaptation of China’s grand strategy published by Princeton University. He visualised India’s grand strategy as comprising of the following:

(a) Avoiding war at almost all costs. India should fight only if war is thrust upon us. Focus should be on building comprehensive national power, the largest component of which is economics. India should thus focus on maintaining a growth rate of over 8% for the next two decades at least.

(b) Maintaining nuclear deterrence against China and Pakistan.

(c) Building comprehensive national power. This would require maintaining an 8% growth rate for at least two decades, creating employment for the demographic dividend till India’s population stabilised in 2025, and shifting to manufacturing.

(d) Maintaining stability in the IOR and the status quo both diplomatically and militarily.

(e) Maintaining conventional deterrence against China on the borders, conventional superiority over the PLAN in the Indian Ocean (he opined that the remnants of the PLA entering the Indian Ocean after having encountered USA could be dealt with by the IN), and conventional superiority over Pakistan.

83. He then turned to different projections of growth for global economies. All projections indicated that the GDP of China and India would continue to grow. An IMF projection indicated that by 2050, China’s GDP would have grown to $103 trillion, while that of India would be $55 trillion. Taking even pessimistic projections and assuming that India spent 2% of its budget on defence and 20% of this came to the Navy, it could be projected that the Navy’s share of the
budget would grow to $172 billion by 2050. This raised the need for a matching strategic vision, otherwise India would be hampered by a stuttering strategic vision paralysed by the current poverty in funding.

84. He then moved to population projections, citing the American census bureau. These showed that China’s kindergartens and crèches had already started depleting during the period 2000–2010, while the same age group in India formed the major chunk of the population. The youth bulge in India’s population would remain till 2025-2035, while in China, the larger part of its population would be over 50 years of age by then.

85. The speaker then turned to the need for resources, both for China and India. The only untapped resources China could access lay in Africa and South America. These could reach China only through the Indian Ocean. This would inevitably force China to come into the Indian Ocean in a big way, exacerbating their Malacca Dilemma. But Chinese strategists knew their job. They would ensure satellite surveillance and satellite communications for the PLAN, along with maritime air cover which was being put in place in Djibouti, bases, and they would create a favourable geopolitical environment by investing cash in infrastructure, building political relationships, joint operations, ship visits and use of bases. Finally, they would create the requisite operating experience.

86. The Admiral then turned to restructuring of the Chinese military commands. He saw the current restructuring as but a preliminary step, which had not yet taken into account the OBOR, which was going to connect China with the manufacturing centres of Europe via a massive project involving expenditure of over $1 trillion. It was evident that the PLA was not yet thinking strategically, but this could be expected to change. He expected that the PLA would, by 2050, have a Pacific Command, a South East Asia Command and an Indian Ocean Command.

87. Would the IN be able to match these changes? In the speaker’s view, there were some deficiencies. He anticipated that state to state conflict would decrease with increasing democratisation of states. The task of warships would change from sinking other warships to intervening in the land battle. Warships would, therefore, change to carry increasing numbers of long range land attack cruise missiles, of the Nirbhay/Kalibr type. He opined that if India had had such missiles during Op Parakram in 2002 and the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, India would have been able to use them.
88. The Admiral then went on to suggest restructuring of the Indian Army and IAF; these aspects have not been included in the summary as they are outside the scope of the Conference. He went on to posit an IN strategy of sea denial for the PLAN CVBG, with Indian SSN’s tailing it, while retaining our own CVBG for sea control and power projection. He visualised India and USA having moved closer, with USA tying down two PLAN CVBGs in the Pacific. Finally, he envisaged India as the arbiter in all regional rivalries, as also in the permanent Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry.

Speaker 2: Admiral Arun Prakash

89. Admiral Arun Prakash started his talk by commenting on the following aspects of the previous speaker’s vision:

(a) On the demographic dividend, he pointed out that it would be wasted unless jobs were created for the working age group. Three years of the Modi government had not led to any discernible improvement in job creation. There was also a shift in focus to manufacturing and high technology. Taken together, the two implied robotics and artificial intelligence, which could not be considered as leading to job creation. India needed to think out of the box to be able to utilise its demographic dividend.

(b) On expansive visions of India’s rising GDP, he pointed out that it created hopes which could not, however, be realised because of low per capita incomes. Low per capita income would inevitably result in development being prioritised over security so far as national expenditure was concerned. He opined that we should talk only about per capita income when forecasting defence budgets.

(c) There was no mention of Joint Commands in Adm Menon’s vision of the future. This continued the practice of the three Services thinking individually. For example, when saying that each service should have its own expeditionary command, this played into the IAF argument that India had no expeditionary desires, hence there was no need for a Chief of Defence Staff. The aspiration of the services on ground was for a
Chief of Defence Staff and jointness, something that Admiral Prakash completely subscribed to.

(d) Talk of defence expenditure approaching $1 trillion raised the question of where this money was going to be spent, apart from putting it into people’s bank accounts or giving it to other nations. The DRDO, at their current pace, and the Indian defence industry, could not generate the kind of hardware that could absorb that scale of expenditure. This needed to be factored in while making predictions of expenditure.

90. The speaker then moved on to his own suggestions. On the grand strategic plane, he said that the national leadership had been remiss in not ensuring the coalescence of the Indian Ocean Region into a single strategic entity. This left our smaller neighbours in the lurch. There was episodic interaction with Maldives and Sri Lanka, but by and large the door had been left open for China to come in. He remarked that as far back as 1945 KM Panikkar had said that the Indian Ocean was vital not only for prosperity but also for India’s existence and freedom. It should, therefore, remain truly Indian. We had since the 1960s been trying to keep extra-regional powers out, including by inventing an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, but the big powers did exactly what they wished. The smaller countries in India’s neighbourhood, however, thought this was a ploy to spread India’s own hegemony and the IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka had only reinforced that opinion. This had, in turn, made India wary of any regional initiatives. Concurrent with the end of the Cold War and non-alignment, SAARC had virtually died out. Initiatives such as IORA and IONS continued to languish. There was, nevertheless, vast scope for cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Even if limited to non-conventional challenges such as piracy, maritime terrorism and natural disasters, there was considerable scope for India to take the lead in formulating an Indian Ocean consolidation plan and creating an Indian Ocean Maritime Partnership, where India could perhaps take the lead and provide funding and hardware, while other nations signed on, enabling building of bridges. The speaker was also quite caustic about India aspiring to be a “net security provider” which he described as another fiction, because one could provide security to others only after one could provide security to oneself. It was essential that India provided its Navy the wherewithal to become a Blue Water Navy before making such rash promises.
91. At the grand strategic level, the speaker observed that India should be pushed by its political leaders to create maritime partnerships where we provided the public goods for others (in the IOR) to use. This included striking alliances, which went against the grain of entrenched Indian foreign policy. By herself, India did not stand a chance against China in the foreseeable future. The partnerships were vital for signalling – Admiral Prakash endorsed the previous speaker’s view that India must avoid war because that would set development back by decades, so India must do all that is possible to avoid war, including building partnerships. PM Modi had done his best, including by reaching out to all island nations, inviting them for his inauguration, visiting them, hosting an India - Africa Summit at New Delhi, talking of Projects SAGAR and MAUSAM, systemic infirmities prevented progress. With that, he turned to the need for an all of government approach, to replace the silo approach currently followed by government.

92. Many countries in the neighbourhood have openly said that they gave India the first right of refusal for big infrastructure projects. He cited the examples of Hambantota, Chittagong, Colombo, and even a project offered by Myanmar. We were, however, unable to muster the will, money and organisational skills to accept and execute these projects. The talent and resources certainly existed in India. There was need for an all-of-government approach and creation of Special Purpose Vehicles to execute such projects, involving representation from MoD, MEA, MoF and the Navy, so that if we promise Oman that we will build a port for them, we do it in 2-3 years. Chah Bahar had now been hanging fire for over 15-20 years. Agalega islands had been offered to us on a plate but nothing much was happening there. Something had been offered by Seychelles also (Assumption Island). There was a pressing need to correct the lack of coordination between MEA, MoD and MoF at the strategic level. We would ensure friendly neighbours if we did this.

93. At the operational level, the Admiral brought out the need for Maritime Domain Awareness. A start had been made, but much remained to be done. There was need for 24x7 satellite coverage, 30-40 more Maritime Patrol Aircraft, the ability to launch small satellites at short notice, development of strategic ASW which would need seabed based sensors at choke points and in vital areas. If we wanted to hold out a credible threat of interdicting China's merchant traffic and energy SLOCs, there was need to explore how this was to be done. What were the international laws in the regard? Did we have the
requisite capabilities? What would happen if China opposed? What would happen if neutrals were interdicted and they went to town over it? These were issues that needed to be looked into.

**Speaker 3: Lt Gen Anil Ahuja**

94. In his address, Gen Ahuja highlighted the need for balance between needs on land and needs on the seas. He brought out that developing strategy necessitated exercising options, catering for geopolitical and geostrategic changes, paucity of resources (at least till 2050 when as per Adm Menon’s projections plenty would be available), and catering for slippages due to manufacturing delays, denial of technology etc. He asked what role was visualised for the Navy when we spoke of ensuring secure seas. He brought out the need to decide the extent of the footprint, and how much we wanted to stretch. Developing from this, he queried as to what capabilities were required, and how did we want to structure ourselves. Did we want or need three aircraft carriers, or better amphibious capability, or more submarines? Strategic options had to be fashioned in these three domains, and he suggested that the Niti Aayog template of planning for a 15 year vision, 7 years strategy and 3 years action plan be considered.

95. He then went on to talk about the options that needed to be worked out. The first requirement was to work out distribution of roles and responsibilities between the Navy, the Coast Guard and Andaman and Nicobar Command. Following this there was need to take a call on thrust areas. He cited the example of the Indo-US Aircraft Carrier Working Group; every time this group made some progress we had to go back and tell the other side that we hadn’t made up our mind on whether we wanted a carrier or not. There was need to take a call on whether it was truly necessary, or whether we were ever going to be expeditionary. How far were we willing to stick our neck out in the foreseeable future?

96. The speaker then developed on the need for integration of the services and creation of joint commands and a CDS. He was clear about the definite needs to integrate and prioritize needs. The Armed Forces had not been able to decide options and stick to them. They had not been able to ensure assured
budget support for their development requirements and priorities. Assured budgets were the pre-requisite for strategic planning. He felt we may not be able to go for theatre commands and the CDS simultaneously, but there was definite need for someone who could integrate the requirement for the next 10-15 years, align it to the budget and then ensure that the requisite budget was received. That, in his view, was the way to develop capabilities.

Q&A

97. The question session focused on the kind of power India wanted to be and its national security strategy and the impact of China’s growing economic and military presence in the Indian Ocean. Speakers offered their views.
I’ll take my cue from what Lalit Kapur had said, one of the remarks he made that one of the tasks of the Navy is to deter China and, perhaps the China – Pakistan axis in the future. In the not too distant past there was a time when India’s demographic, nuclear capabilities and military strength tantalised us with the hope of becoming China’s rival. Today China’s economy is 5 times the size of ours and growing. Its achievements in aviation, space, military and cyber technologies are truly impressive. Its military has grown in capability and sophistication while steadily downsizing its man power. China’s aspiration to world power status is on the verge of being fulfilled and will happen sooner than expected perhaps due to Donald Trump.

Now one stark difference between India and China comes out from the fact that Chairman Mao’s doctrine of continuous revolution saw the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution inflicting colossal suffering and a huge cost on human lives on China. But the break from what was seen as China’s decadent past saw old customs, cultures and habits and ideas being jettisoned. Religion was stigmatised as superstition and an instrument of foreign interference and places of worship in China were closed. For all the trauma and anarchy that it caused, Mao’s destruction of traditional China ensured that his successors had a clear field to introduce economic reforms and focus national energies on the profound modernization that has turned China into an economic giant that will soon be a military super power.

What about us? Now given Prime Minister Modi’s strong mandate, his resolute leadership and visionary approach, it seemed at one point that India too, riding globalization and FDI, was poised for a great leap forward. But it is now clear India’s rise to great power status will depend not just on the adroit management of the economy but also on the resolution of internal conflicts and external geopolitical challenges. Regrettably the nation’s focus on substantive issues including national security, is being continuously diluted and its energy dissipated by trivial issues relating to political, social and religious agendas. China having translated its enormous economic gains into cohesive military power, expects neighbours to submit to its hegemony and we need to take note of their perception about us. Most Chinese security analysts are sceptical about India’s capabilities and believe that India lacks economic and military heft and is not governed well enough to be a serious
rival. At the same time, there are many PLA analysts that portray India as an ambitious and potentially expansionist power, especially in the IOR with some asserting that India is quietly waiting for an opportunity to avenge its 1962 defeat, much like what we say about Pakistan and the 1971 war.

101. China’s political leadership during the past two decades came to the conclusion that maritime strength would play a key role in China’s rise. Maritime strength in all its dimensions which they have seemed to have fully understood and I think Admiral Liu Huaqing had a key role to play in this understanding. So ever since Xi Jinping designated the maritime domain as an essential building block of his Chinese dream, the communist party has been focusing very sharply on it and systematically they have built up their holistic maritime power. Today China is the world leader in ship building. It has a 5000-ship strong merchant navy, the largest in the world. Its Coast Guard is the biggest and China runs the world’s biggest mechanized ocean going fishing fleet. Chinese shipyards are rapidly adding to their fleet of destroyers, frigates, diesel submarines, logistic ships, and home built nuclear submarines are on patrol. Their second air craft carrier has been launched and many more are on the way. Very soon the PLAN will be equal in capability or at least in numbers to the US Navy and in the future, they hope to overtake it in capability as well.

102. Now notwithstanding Beijing’s dismissive attitude, India needs to focus sharply on China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean Region. Their overwhelming imperative in this region is security of their sea lanes, especially for transportation of energy because their economy is very delicately poised on uninterrupted supply of energy. 40% of China’s oil traffic passes through Hormuz and almost 80% through the Malacca Strait and hence the Malacca dilemma.

103. In order to blood the PLAN which had never ventured beyond the first island chain, for the last 9 years they have been maintaining a standing patrol in the Horn of Africa. These patrols have given the PLA Navy tremendous confidence as well as nurtured their confidence for a blue water deployment. So, let’s not delude ourselves that they are not capable of being a blue water navy. But their ability to protect their SLOC’s will remain severely constrained by their distance from home ports, air bases and logistic centres. To protect their SLOC’s they may need to establish sea control in the Indian Ocean at a certain time and that will require surface ships, aircraft carriers
etc. Those who wish to interdict SLOC’s on the other hand only need to employ submarines or aircraft or surface ships. Now at this juncture the Sino-Indian equation may appear to be tilted in China’s favour but as the world’s largest democracy, a nuclear weapon state, and a significant economic and military power, it is incumbent upon India to stand firm as a bulwark against Chinese attempts to regional hegemony. To consolidate our economic and military powers we need to create some breathing space with the help of friends and diplomats. As the new great game unfolds in the Indo-Pacific, our policy makers and diplomats will need to play hardball and practice realpolitik and as they do so they must remember that in India’s modern and capable navy they have a powerful instrument of state policy which they must use. A user’s handbook in the form of a comprehensive maritime security strategy comes along with it and it is high time the national leadership applies their collective minds to India’s neglected maritime domain.

104. Let me in this context touch upon 4 or 5 major points that require the attention of our national security establishment. Number 1 is strategic thought and a national maritime strategy as distinct from a maritime strategy. Now here let me make the point that as the Indian Navy gathers its military capabilities and strength etc., we are all very proud of it but we must not suffer the illusion of just by having a strong navy we will become a maritime power in the way China has. Because the navy is one component of maritime power and unless we put every other component in place we should not be calling ourselves a maritime power.

105. To start with, we lack security discourse, our decision-making elite is preoccupied with elections and George Tanham had diagnosed us as suffering from strategic myopia, a point which has been hotly debated. But the fact remains for seventy years we’ve not issued a White Paper, doctrine or national security doctrine etc. As a consequence of this the armed forces had to extemporize in what I would call a strategic void as far as plans, strategies and doctrines are concerned. By way of contrast from 1998 till last year China issued 9 White Papers on the average one every year and a half. Each White Paper is titled differently and shows a different thrust in a different direction. So, in this context certain China related issues call for a very focused attention on the path of our national security apparatus and for the evolution of some countervailing strategies. First, apart from everything else that is happening in the South China Sea, power struggle going on there, China has reclaimed six coral reefs and made them into island fortresses for
deployment of ships, aircrafts, and missiles. The significance for us is that it has shortened the distance that a Chinese unit must travel to reach the Indian Ocean by between 600-900 miles. If it comes from Sanya it is only 600 miles away, so they are that much closer to the Andaman Nicobar Islands than they were previously. Secondly, they’ve gone into serial production of aircraft carriers. So, if they are going to have six aircraft carriers including some nuclear ones, where are they going to deploy them? Indian Ocean seems to be a likely scenario, so what are we going to do about this? And the issue of chain operational bases of Djibouti, Gwadar, who knows Hambantota etc. They are there, they are a fact of life and if they actually impinge on our national security or not is something we need to take a measure of. The choices for us are stark. The constraints of our political system render it unlikely that we will be able to bridge the economic and certainly the military gap within a reasonable timeframe. Under these circumstances as I said earlier, a military confrontation is out of the question and the only hedge for us is to create a countervailing power equation through partnerships, alliances and so on. But the point here is, who is to cogitate and reflect, to think out of the box and produce solutions. The politicians, I am afraid at this point, have no time. The bureaucracy is too preoccupied with other things, so perhaps think tanks like DPG are the ones.

106. My third point relates to maritime awareness. Now we’ve had some kind of a maritime awakening. We were suffering from what was called sea blindness for many decades and then a certain set of disruptive developments like globalisation, the trauma of piracy, the exposure in 2008 of our coastal soft underbelly, and the spectre of the growing PLAN; all these combined and served to shake us out of our complacency. However, this maritime awakening or epiphany, or whatever you want to call it, is partial and incomplete. As I just mentioned, the lay person and most politicians would be surprised to learn that maritime power encompasses much more than a fighting navy. While the process of building a navy has received adequate attention, the other constituents have suffered severe neglect. Our ports and infrastructure are outdated and inefficient. Our shipping fleet has been stagnant for years and our merchant shipbuilding industry is almost wiped out, we don’t build any merchant ship. We don’t have a deep-sea fishing fleet, and we lack the technological capabilities to exploit our seabed resources. The trained manpower for all this is not available. A tiny country like Philippines sends a quarter of a million of seafarers to sea. That is a great money spinner for them. Our strength is only 50-60k. In this context
partnership between industry and the government and the navy would fulfil a vital national interest. Had we generated a maritime industry and maritime infrastructure, the industry itself, the auxiliaries and ancillary industry would not have only have generated employment but would also have strengthened our maritime capability. So, this represents a huge economic missed opportunity and has also served to undermine our maritime power. But someone in Delhi is dimly conscious that there is a void here because three successive governments have issued four maritime perspective plans, in 2003, 2005, 2012 and as recent as 2015. A common thread that runs through these documents is their ambitious concept, their unrealistic targets and total absence of a roadmap or monitoring process. Shipping is a neglected department of the Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways, one department is shipping, and out of a budget of 2.4 lakh crores, a pittance of 3% has been given to shipping. Here I might mention that China of course I've told you has embraced the maritime sector, even the UK just two years ago issued The National Strategy for Maritime Security signed by the ministers of Defence, Home, Transport and Foreign Affairs.

107. The fourth point is technological background. By a quirk of circumstances India has become a military and economic entity with great power aspirations before it has become a significant industrial or even a major trading nation. Thus, India finds itself in a very anomalous situation whereby we possess nuclear weapons, cutting edge space and nuclear industry, the world’s third or fourth largest armed forces, but we need to support their operational needs through the massive imports; we are the number one importer of arms in the world. Ironically the government owns a vast R&D and industrial complex dedicated to defence, which would be the envy of many nations, but the private sector has been kept out. And while we have strategic partnerships how much progress we make entirely depends on how much the bureaucracy lets go of the reins.

108. My final point relates to a higher defence organisation. Our Navy is the sixth largest maritime force in the world and continues to add many high-end assets to its inventory ranging from patrol aircraft to 4th generation fighters, indigenously built warships, submarines, aircraft carriers, a nuclear submarine building program is on the way. We aim to have 200 ships and 400 aircraft. While a growing economy should have eased the governments’ hands, a point that was made in the morning, our budget has hit an all-time low of 1.5% of GDP and within that, the navy’s share is only 15%. Budgets are
going to dwindle in real terms, the amounts may increase but you can buy less and less with it. Therefore, we need to prioritize our demands for weapons, hardware and manpower. Prioritization can only take place in an atmosphere where there is no discord, discussions can take place in a collegiate manner around a table and that will only happen when the defence services are integrated with the MOD and with each other, and we have a common head and single point of military advice for the Prime Minister, who will be a Chief of the Defence Staff. So, the fact remains is that the current dispensation has not been able to equip our armed forces for war and this fact has already eroded our combat capabilities. The failure to reform the higher defence organisation and evolve an equitable civil-military balance is going to have a very deleterious impact on our ability to effectively conduct a war in the 21st century environment.
SPEAKER PROFILES
DELHI POLICY GROUP

DPG Conference

“India’s Maritime Security Challenges”

New Delhi, June 5, 2017

Venue: Conference Room II, India International Centre (Main)

SPEAKERS’ PROFILES:

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC</td>
<td>Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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Admiral Sunil Lanba assumed Command of the Indian Navy as the 23rd Chief of the Naval Staff on 31 May 2016.

Admiral Lanba is a Navigation and Direction specialist who has served as the navigation and operations officer onboard numerous ships in both the Eastern and Western Fleet. His nearly four decades of experience include tenures at sea, ashore at various Headquarters, operational and training establishments as well as tri-services institutions. His sea tenures include command of INS Kakinada, a specialised Mine Counter Measure Vessel, INS Himgiri, the indigenous Leander Class Frigate, INS Ranvijay, a Kashin Class Destroyer and INS Mumbai, the indigenous Delhi Class Destroyer. He has also been the Executive Officer of the Aircraft Carrier INS Viraat and the Fleet Operations Officer of the Western Fleet.

Admiral Lanba’s career has been enriched with his vast experience at sea and in training, operational and tri-services tours of duty both within India and with international navies. He is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, College of Defence Management, Secunderabad and Royal College of Defence Studies, London.

As a Training Officer at the National Defence Academy, Directing Staff at the College of Defence Management and as the Commandant of the National Defence College, Admiral Lanba has been deeply engaged with professional training, shaping future leadership and skilling of the officers of the Indian Armed Forces. Whilst being part of the Flag Officer Sea Training organisation at the Local Workup Team (West), he sharpened the combat skills of ships of the Western Naval Command.

On elevation to Flag rank, Admiral Lanba has held several significant assignments in the Navy. He was responsible for transformation in training methodology for the future Indian Navy as the Chief of Staff, Southern Naval Command. The Admiral thereafter, took on the mantle of the Flag Officer Sea Training, where he ushered changes to enhance battle effectiveness of ships and rationalised combat manning onboard. Later, he took over Command of the vital Maharashtra and Gujarat Naval Area as
the Flag Officer Commanding Maharashtra and Gujarat Naval Area and implemented significant coastal security initiatives along with multiagency coordination mechanisms that have since ensured safe seas and coastal areas.

On promotion to Vice Admiral, he was the Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command and thereafter took over as the Commandant of the National Defence College. In his subsequent appointment as the Vice Chief of Naval Staff, the Admiral streamlined the framework for transformation of the Navy’s combat capabilities and infrastructure development as well as Tri-Service initiatives towards integration and jointness.

Prior to taking over as the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Lanba was the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Southern and Western Naval Commands, wherein he provided impetus to training and skill development, synergising combat operations, coastal security and safety, and infrastructure development along the Western Seaboard and in the Lakshadweep and Minicoy Islands.

The Admiral is a recipient of Param Vishist Seva Medal and Ati Vishist Seva Medal for meritorious service, and is also the Honorary Aide-De-Camp to the President of India. He took over as the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee on 01 January 2017.

2. Siddharth Shriram
Chairman-Delhi Policy Group

Born on January 18, 1945, Mr. Siddharth Shriram did his schooling from Welham School and the Doon School at Dehradun, graduated in English Literature from St. Stephens College, Delhi University and completed his formal education at MIT, USA, as a Sloan Fellow with a Master of Science in Management.

He has been employed in the past with DCM Ltd. and Citibank and is now with Mawana Sugars Limited.

He created joint ventures with Honda Motor Company to manufacture small engines and automobiles and was the Chairman of Honda Siel Cars India Ltd till recently.

At present he is the Chairman of Mawana Sugars Ltd., Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. and co-Chairman of Usha International Ltd. He led Mawana and Usha to sponsor several sporting and healthful activities such as Golf/National Marathon/Frisbee. He plays Golf to a phony 9 (should be a 12) handicap and Bridge, and has held administrative positions in various sporting and industry associations. In 1994, at the founding of the Delhi Policy Group, he became its Managing Trustee. In 2014, he became Chairman and Managing Trustee of DPG.
| 3. | **Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh**  
| Director General, Delhi Policy Group |

Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1974-2010 and is a distinguished former career diplomat with extensive experience of geo-strategic and geo-economic issues as well as multilateral institutions, which underpin international law and commerce.

He has been India’s longest serving Ambassador to Japan (2006-2010), Ambassador to Indonesia and Timor Leste (2003-2006), Ambassador to Colombia, Ecuador and Costa Rica (1999-2002), and India’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva (1995-1999). He has held several significant assignments during his career, dealing with the United States, West Europe and the European Union and India’s immediate neighbours.

Ambassador Singh has contributed to the forging of the India-Japan strategic and global partnership, the intensification of India's relations with Indonesia and ASEAN, the evolution of India's revitalised Look East Policy and the shaping of India’s policy towards key neighbours and strategic partners.

From 2011-2016, Ambassador Singh was Professor for Strategic Studies at ICRIER, a leading think tank in New Delhi, and has been associated with several public policy initiatives and Track II/Track 1.5 strategic dialogues involving major think tanks of India, Japan, Asia and the US. He has written and worked extensively on the ongoing transformation of India’s relations with the United States and Japan and their growing convergences in shaping Asia's emerging economic and security architecture. He serves on statutory and advisory corporate boards and has been Senior Advisor at Dua Consulting since 2013.

In June 2016, Ambassador Singh assumed responsibilities as Director General, Delhi Policy Group, which is among India’s oldest independent think tanks focused on strategic issues of critical national interest.

An alumnus of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, where he studied (1967-72) and later taught (1972-74), Ambassador Singh holds an M.A. degree from the University of Delhi. His varied interests include civilisation and culture, the natural environment and sports.

| 4. | **Air Marshal Naresh Verma, AVSM, VSM**  
| Director, India International Centre |

Air Marshal Naresh Verma is the Director, India International Centre since 1st July, 2015. Prior to joining the IIC, he was the Member of Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench from 1st December, 2013 to 30th June, 2015.

He was commissioned in the Indian Air Force on 30th December, 1972 and during 40 years of service in the Administration Branch of the Indian Air Force, he held several assignments in which he was responsible for Infrastructure Development, Project Management, Education, Legal Matters, Financial Management, Human Resource Management and Development, Welfare, Sports and Adventure. Some of his other notable
appointments are Chief Administration Officer at four premier Air Force Stations, Principal Director of Works at Air Headquarters, Head of Administration (SOA) of two Air Force Commands. He was promoted to the rank of Air Marshal and appointed first Director-General of Administrative Branch and later appointed the Air Officer Incharge of Administration of the Indian Air Force.

He is an alumnus of the reputed National Defence College, New Delhi. For his distinguished service he was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal by the Hon’ble President of India in 2001 and Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 2006. Air Marshal Verma was elected President of the Delhi Gymkhana Club in September 2011 and held that position for two years.

5. Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, Former CNS & Chairman COSC  
Distinguished Fellow, Delhi Policy Group

Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee in end-2006. An aviator by specialisation, during his 40 year career he commanded a carrier-borne fighter-squadron, a naval air station and four warships; including the aircraft-carrier INS Viraat. He has also logged over 2500 hours in fighters, patrol aircraft and helicopters.

In flag rank he commanded the Eastern Fleet, the National Defence Academy, the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command and the Western Naval Command. On staff, he served as the head of the Aviation and Personnel Branches of the Navy and as the Vice Chief of Naval Staff. During his tenure at the helm, the navy saw many initiatives being launched in the fields of doctrine, strategy, transformation and foreign maritime cooperation.

He is a graduate of the IAF Test Pilots School, Defence Services Staff College and the US Naval War College. During the 1971 War, he was awarded the Vir Chakra while flying with an IAF fighter squadron in the Punjab.

Post-retirement, he served two terms as a member of the National Security Advisory Board and was Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation. He served on the 1999 Arun Singh Task force as well as the Naresh Chandra Committee on national security reforms. He lives in Goa, and writes and speaks on strategic and security related topics.

6. Dr. Sanjaya Baru  
Consulting Senior Fellow for India; Director of IISS-India

Dr. Sanjaya Baru is Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institution of India and Consulting Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK. He was Director of the IISS Geo-economics and Strategy Programme (2011-15), and Media Advisor to the Prime Minister of India in 2004-2008. He is a former editor of leading Indian financial newspapers The Business Standard and The Financial Express, and associate editor of The Economic Times and The Times of India.

Dr. Baru has been a Professor at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, and a Member of India's National Security Advisory Board (1999-2001). He is the author
of Strategic Consequences of India's Economic Performance (2006), The
Accidental Prime Minister (2014), India and the World: Essays on Geo-
economics and Foreign Policy (2016), and 1991: How P V Narasimha Rao
Made History (2016).

7. **Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, PVSM, AVSM**

A veteran with over 40 years in the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Anil Chopra is a former Commander-in-Chief of both the operational commands of the Indian Navy i.e. the Western Naval Command, and the Eastern Naval Command; as well as a former Director General of the Indian Coast Guard. He has also commanded the Western Fleet, and the aircraft carrier, INS Viraat. As Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy and Plans), and earlier as Principal Director Naval Plans, he was extensively associated with the Navy’s Long-Term Force Structure and Financial Planning. As member of the apex Defence Acquisition Council for three years, he was involved with evolution of the Defence Procurement Procedure. He has also been a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. in Washington D.C. Vice Admiral Chopra is currently a Distinguished Fellow both at the Gateway House, Mumbai and VIF, Delhi and is also elected member of the Governing Council of the USI. He was a member of Shekatkar Committee appointed by the MoD in 2016 to examine India’s military capabilities and defence budget. In March this year he was appointed to the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which advises the NSC on security matters.

8. **Ambassador Nalin Surie**

Nalin Surie is Director General, ICWA (Sapru House, New Delhi.). He trained as an economist and completed his Masters from the Delhi School of Economics in 1972. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1973. He has served in Indian missions in Hong Kong, Brussels, Dar-es-Salaam, Thimphu, New York (as Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN), as Ambassador in both Warsaw and Beijing and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. At headquarters he has served both in the Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of External Affairs. In the latter his assignments included, on separate occasions, Head of the East Europe and East Asia Divisions and as Secretary (West).

Nalin Surie is a seasoned diplomat who has extensive cross-sectoral experience on issues ranging across India's northern neighbourhood, China, Eastern Europe, The European Union, Africa, Latin America, Canada, IBSA and the UN. During his career he also focused on India’s external economic relations and the international economy. He retired from the Indian Foreign service in August 2011 and was President of The Association of Indian Diplomats during 2014-15.

Since his retirement he functioned as an independent analyst on foreign affairs, security issues and international economic relations.

He is a life member of IDSA, New Delhi and former member of Chatham House, London.

He was appointed as Director General of The Indian Council of World Affairs on 24, July 2015.
Vice Admiral Satish Soni, PVSM, AVSM, NM

Vice Admiral Satish Soni retired from the Indian Navy on 29 Feb 2016 after 40 years of service.

He has held the appointments of Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Naval Command, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Commandant National Defence Academy and Chief of Staff Eastern Naval Command in the rank of Vice Admiral.

His sea appointments in junior ranks include commands of the Eastern Fleet, INS Delhi, INS Talwar and INS Kakinada.

His staff appointments include Naval Assistant to the Chief of the Naval Staff and tenures in the Directorates of Personnel and Plans.

He has been a visiting speaker in the College of Combat Mhow, Naval War College Goa, College of Defence Management, College of Air Warfare, Defence Services Staff College and other service training institutions.

He has also participated in various seminars organised by the National Maritime Foundation, United Service Institution of India and the India International Centre New Delhi.

A sword of honour of his batch, he has been commended by the Chief of Naval Staff and is a recipient of Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal and Nau Sena Medal.

Commodore Lalit Kapur
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group

An alumnus of the Doon School, Dehradun and the National Defence Academy, Cmde Lalit Kapur is a veteran with over 35 years of commissioned service in the Indian Navy. He has served on a wide variety of Western and Russian origin ships, been a member of the Fifth Indian Scientific Expedition to Antarctica (during which he pioneered a technique for survey of the Ice Shelf in the vicinity of Dakshin Gangotri); been India Defence Attaché at Muscat 1999-2002 and held a wide variety of seagoing assignments. He has served in the Defence Intelligence Agency as its first Deputy Assistant Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Defence Protocol and Foreign Liaison), where he was responsible for overseeing all foreign defence representatives in India, all Indian defence representatives abroad and military intelligence cooperation with friendly foreign countries; the Strategic Forces Command where he was responsible for strategic communications and the sea vector; and at Headquarters Offshore Defence Advisory Group, Mumbai, where he was responsible for all its operations. He has over 12 years of tri-service experience, 8 years of diplomatic experience and has achieved a ‘Distinguished’ grading in every course he has attended since 1980. The Commodore holds a Bachelors Degree in Science from Jawaharlal Nehru University as well as two Masters Degrees (both with Distinction); one in Defence Studies from Madras University and the other in Management Studies from Osmania University. He also holds an M Phil degree from Mumbai University. A prolific reader, his interests include International Relations, human resource development and military history. He writes professionally and has numerous published articles to his credit.
11. **Cmde C Uday Bhaskar, VSM**

Commodore C Uday Bhaskar is a veteran with 37 years of experience in the Indian Navy. After successful stints as the head of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), he is currently the Director of the Society for Policy Studies, an independent Delhi based think tank. He is also a life member of the United Services Institute (USI) and a member of the advisory panel of the India Habitat Centre (IHC); and a former Executive Council member of the India International Centre (IIC) in New Delhi.

Cmde Bhaskar was associated with IDSA from 1990, served as Deputy Director of the Institute from 1996 to 2004, and was thereafter the officiating Director till 2005. He was then appointed Member-Secretary to the Government of India's Task Force on Global Strategic Developments, which submitted its report to the Prime Minister of India.

Cmde Bhaskar has been the editor of Maritime Affairs and Strategic Analysis and has also served on the editorial board of Contemporary Security Policy. He has edited books on nuclear, maritime and international security related issues; and contributed over sixty research-articles to reputed journals, both in India and abroad, to the US Naval Institute Proceedings, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, as well as in books published by the US Naval War College, the Royal Navy Defence Studies and the BESA Centre, Israel.

Cmde Bhaskar writes regularly on strategic and international security issues for some of India’s leading English publications including The Indian Express, Hindustan Times, DNA, Dainik Jagran and other media platforms. He is the editor of United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security and Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives amongst other books.

He is a guest lecturer at the Indian National Defence College, New Delhi and the Foreign Service Institute, US State Dept, Arlington, Va. Cmde Bhaskar has lectured at the NATO College, Rome and has been a Visiting Scholar in International Security at the McGill University, Montreal, Canada under the aegis of the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies (CIPSS); as also a CICOPS Fellow, University of Pavia, Italy.

Cmde Bhaskar is recipient of the Vishist Seva Medal (VSM) and the Prime Minister’s Letter of Commendation. He currently anchors a weekly TV program on security issues for Rajya Sabha TV.

12. **Rear Admiral K Raja Menon**

Distinguished Fellow, IPCS

He is currently the Chairman of the task force on Net Assesment and Simulation in the National Security Council. Admiral Menon was a career Officer and a submarine specialist in the Navy. He commanded seven ships and submatines. He retired in 1994 as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations). He has participated in military CBM talks with the neighbouring countries and was in the first military delegation to Pakistan. after retiring he has authored three bookson Indian Defence Strategies. He was a member of the Arun Singh Committee to restructure the National Defence University Committee. He is a Visiting Lecturer at all institutes of higher study of the Indian armed forces and organized the Nuclear management course for Indian Service officers. He headed the DRDO funded study on Pakistani Ballistic missiles and their effect on Indian National
<table>
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<th>Security. He headed the Naval headquarters group that wrote the Indian Navy's Maritime Strategy 2015.</th>
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<td>13.</td>
<td><strong>Lt Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM &amp; Bar</strong></td>
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Lt Gen AK Ahuja superannuated from Army after nearly four decades of service. He has been the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy Planning and Force Development) and has commanded a Corps and a Division in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. He also has served as India’s Defence Attache’ in Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR and UN Military Observer Group in Angola. He is presently settled at Gurgaon.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
DELHI POLICY GROUP

DPG Conference

“India’s Maritime Security Challenges”
New Delhi, June 5, 2017
Venue: Conference Room II, India International Centre (Main)

List of Participants

1. Admiral Sunil Lanba, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, Chief of Naval Staff (plus 7 officers)
2. Mr. Siddharth Shriram, Chairman and Managing Trustee, Delhi Policy Group
3. Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, Delhi Policy Group
4. Lt. Gen. Aditya Singh, Senior Fellow (Honorary), Delhi Policy Group
5. Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM VrC, Former CNS, Distinguished Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
6. Ambassador Biren Nanda, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
7. Brigadier Arun Sahgal, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
8. Air Marshal Naresh Verma, AVSM, VSM, Director, India International Centre
9. Dr. Sanjaya Baru, Honorary Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research
11. Cmde C. Uday Bhaskar, VSM, (Retd.), Director, Society for Policy Studies & Honorary Fellow, NMF
12. Rear Adm. K. Raja Menon, Distinguished Fellow, National Maritime Foundation
13. Ambassador Nalin Surie, Director General, ICWA
14. Lt. Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & Bar
15. Vice Adm. Satish Soni, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd.)
16. Ambassador Leela K. Ponappa, Trustee, Delhi Policy Group
17. Ms. Chhaya Shriram, Trustee, Delhi Policy Group
18. Ambassador Deepak Vohra
19. Ambassador Ashok Kantha, former Indian Ambassador to China
20. Lieutenant Chetan Chauhan, Flag Lt to CNS
21. Vice Admiral Pradeep Kaushiva (Retd.)
22. Rear Admiral A.R. Radhakrishnan (Retd.)
23. Cmde Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, IDSA
24. Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, former Director General, ICWA
25. Mr. Ajai Singh Sirohi, Head – Strategic Planning & Corp Dev, Toray International India Pvt. Ltd.
26. Ms. Partha Dutta Roy, General Manager, Shin Maywa India
27. Mr. Sanjaya Pulipaka, Senior Consultant, ICRIER
28. Mr. Abhijit Singh, Head, Maritime Policy Initiative, ORF
29. Cdr M.H. Rajesh, Research Fellow, USI
30. Dr. Sanat Kaul, Chairman, International Foundation for Aviation, Aerospace and Development
31. Mr. Sripathi Narayanan, Consultant, PPR Division, MEA
32. Mr. Manpreet Singh, Consultant, PPR Division, MEA
33. Ms. Nithya Kochuparampil, Consultant, PPR Division, MEA
34. Rear Admiral Suraj Berry, NM, VSM, Assistant Chief of Personnel, Navy Headquarters
35. Vice Adm A.K. Chawla, HQ, Indian Navy
36. Cdr Sachin Sharma, Indian Navy
37. Capt M. Salklan, Indian Navy
38. Cmde Amol Y Thorat, IHQ, MoD (Navy)
40. Cmde K. Srinivas, NHQ, PDFM
41. Capt. D.K. Gupta, IHQ, MoD (Navy)
42. Dr. Amit Kumar, Fellow, ICWA
43. Mr. Lalit Bhatnagar, IHQ, MoD (Navy)
44. Mr. Anand Rao, CAPS
45. Capt. K.K. Sharma, IHQ, MoD (Navy)
46. Lt. Gulneet Singh, IHQ, Navy
47. Vice Admiral, R. Puri, Vivekananda International Foundation
48. Mr. Shreyas Deshmukh, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group
49. Ms. Angana Guha Roy, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group
50. Ms. Shulagna Pal, Intern, Delhi Policy Group
51. Ms. Netra, Intern, Delhi Policy Group
52. Mr. Viraj Tuli, Intern, Delhi Policy Group

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SELECTED PHOTOGRAPHS
India’s Maritime Security Challenges
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