DPG Conference Reports, Vol. 1, Issue 1

Conference on “India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”

Viceregal Hall | Claridges Hotel | New Delhi | October 7, 2016

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Presentation by Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Director, Carnegie India

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Abstract of Proceedings and Power Point Presentations

The Delhi Policy Group (DPG) organized a Conference on “India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies.” on September 14, 2016. The event was attended by around 80 participants from think tanks and the strategic community.

At their last bilateral summit held in New Delhi on December 12, 2015, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe announced a multi-sectoral and action-oriented partnership for peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, reflecting the broad convergence of their nations' long-term political, economic and strategic goals. The “Joint Statement of India and Japan Vision 2025” issued at the summit also set out new and expanded principles for realizing a peaceful, equitable and rules-based order across the Indo-Pacific.

This marks a qualitatively new phase in the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, announced in 2014, with vast region-wide ramifications.

In advance of the forthcoming India-Japan bilateral summit to be held later this year, the Delhi Policy Group organised a one-day conference on "India and Japan Confluence of Maritime Democracies" in New Delhi on October 7, 2016. The Conference featured opening keynote addresses by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary and H.E. Mr. Kenji Hiramatsu, Ambassador of Japan. The Keynote address by Foreign Secretary was delivered under Chatham House rules. Conference Sessions covered the important issues of national security concerns and policies of India and Japan; India-Japan cooperation on regional and maritime security; India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation; role of India and Japan in forging a rules-based order for the Indo Pacific.

Genuine attempts were made at the conference to conceptualize new frameworks of cooperation, identify areas of collaboration for asymmetric responses, and the need for building domestic capacities among maritime democracies was also reiterated:

1. In terms of conceptual frameworks, the conference stressed not only the necessity of focusing on the contest between established powers but also on the collaborative relationships between rising powers (middle powers).
2. The scholars at the conference stressed on the need to break-free from continental security perspectives. The validity of strict dichotomies such as maritime and continental domains was also interrogated. Instead, senior scholars referred to need for focusing on littoral states, where land and sea intersect, and their role in defining the Asia-Pacific order.

3. The conference also sought to celebrate the maritime dimensions of India’s role in the immediate and extended neighborhood. More importantly, this conference sought to examine the role of democracies in the maritime domain.

4. Often China and the US are seen as the pillars that define the Asia-Pacific order. The discussion pointed to the necessity of focusing on ‘rest of Asia’ and its role in shaping the regional security architecture. Further, it was noted that the capacity of states, in the category of ‘rest of Asia’, to determine the trajectory of regional politics was constrained by the fact that regional organizations such as ASEAN have not been able to develop a genuine security component.

5. Moreover, the rest of Asia is constituted by states that have substantive diversity in their foreign policies. Many of these countries can be termed as swing states. While some (such as Pakistan) are bandwagoning with dominant powers (such as China), others are seeking balance in the evolving power dynamic. It should be recognized that Pakistan and North Korea are important nodes in Chinese power projection. This has implications for India and other Southeast Asian states. The developments on India’s western frontiers will have an impact on the balance of power in the larger East Asian region as well.

6. Given these security developments, maritime democracies may consider the following in their responses:

   - The grand strategy of maritime democracies should focus on creating an Open and Free Indo-Pacific.
As part of constructing an *Open and Free Indo-Pacific*, clearly defined cooperative projects should be operationalized in Myanmar and Eastern littoral states of Africa. There should be robust cooperation on Maritime security issues.

There is a need to develop a maritime security coalition constituted by reliable regional partners.

India is experiencing an economic blockade on its western frontiers and the Himalayas prevent easy trade. Since large amounts of trade happen through maritime domain, for all practical purposes, India is an island. Therefore, it is important for India to act accordingly.

India and Japan can work together to develop Andaman & Nicobar Islands (ANI) as a humanitarian and maritime response platform. India should also significantly enhance its capabilities in and around ANI.

Scholars noted that ODA constituted the biggest arsenal in Japan’s armour. Therefore, Japan should be more strategic in its deployment of the ODA.

We should not conceptualize the Trilateral frameworks in terms of immediate transactional outcomes. Instead a long-term perspective should be taken and we need to strengthen these frameworks. The identification of projects that can be implemented under the Trilateral Frameworks should assume priority. More importantly, the positive shifts in thinking around the evolving Trilateral Frameworks should be spread-out across all the levels of the policy-making apparatus in the three countries. This will ensure that progress made thus far will not be lost out due to political changes at the top.

As noted above, since Pakistan and North Korea are important nodes in the Chinese power projection, it is important for the partnerships among democratic countries to reflect on mechanisms needed to address the terrorism emanating from the Af-Pak region.

In conceptualizing regional frameworks and in responses to the evolving security threats, it should be noted that European experiences
will not be of much help. Similarly, there is need to evaluate the post-1989 assumptions on the emerging world order.

- It is important for India and Japan to continue to be the torch-bearers of globalization in Asia.

- The countries in the region should provide incentives to the US to enhance its engagement in the region as well invite more like-minded countries to coordinate their policies.

- The democracies should quickly decide as to whether they should create robust regional security institutions or whether to build a strong coalition of states.

- Maritime democracies should collaborate more in strengthening domestic defense manufacturing capacities with like-minded countries.
Programme
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DPG Conference

“India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”
(Venue: Viceregal Hall, Claridges Hotel, New Delhi)
October 7, 2016

Programme

0900-0930  Registration

0930-1015  Opening Session

Chair: Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, DPG
Inaugural Keynote by H.E. Amb. Kenji Hiramatsu, Ambassador of Japan [12 minutes]
Keynote Address by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary [20 minutes]
Discussion: Q&A [10 minutes]

1015-1030  Coffee Break

1030-1145  Session 1: National Security Concerns and Policies of India and Japan

Chair: Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, DPG [5 minutes]

Speakers: [12 minutes each]
Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi, Aoyama Gakuin University and Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo
Ambassador Biren Nanda, Senior Fellow, DPG
Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.), Senior Fellow, DPG
Discussion [35 minutes]

1145-1200  Coffee Break

1200-1315  Session 2: India-Japan Cooperation on Regional and Maritime Security Issues

Chair: Ambassador Nalin Surie, Director General, ICWA [5 minutes]

Speakers: [12 minutes each]
Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda, JMSDF (Retd.) Adjunct Fellow, JIIA
Vice Admiral Anup Singh (Retd.), Senior Fellow, DPG
Dhruva Jaishankar, Fellow, Brookings India
Discussion [35 minutes]

1315-1415  Lunch (all participants and attendees)
1415-1530  **Session 3: Advancing Trilateral Cooperation**

*Chair: Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, Keio University [5 minutes]*

Speakers: [12 minutes each]
- Hideki Asari, Minister (Political Affairs), Embassy of Japan
- Munu Mahawar, Joint Secretary (AMS), MEA
- Richard Rossow, India Chair, CSIS

Discussion [35 minutes]

1530-1545  **Coffee Break**

1545-1700  **Session 4: Panel Discussion: India, Japan and a Rules-based Asian Order**

*Chair: T N Ninan, Chairman, Business Standard [5 minutes]*

Speakers: [12 minutes each]
- Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, Keio University
- Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Director, Carnegie India
- Richard Rossow, India Chair, CSIS

Discussion [35 minutes]

1700-1715  **Closing Session**

Closing Remarks:
- Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, DPG
- Mr. Siddharth Shriram, Chairman, DPG
“India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”

Opening Remarks by
Amb. H K Singh
Director General DPG
Ambassador H K Singh in his opening Remarks stated that the title of the Conference was inspired by the speech Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave to the Parliament in July 2007 and his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs in September 2011.

Since 2014, summit meetings between Prime Ministers Modi and Abe have crafted a special strategic and global partnership, reflecting long-term political, economic and strategic convergences which have vast region-wide ramifications. With their dynamism, our respective Prime Ministers are leading a revitalized Japan and an aspirational India.

The regional environment which we confront today, is indeed daunting: First, there is the challenge of dealing with neighbors Pakistan and North Korea: failing military states practicing nuclear blackmail and terror threats as a matter of national policy. Second, there are China’s hegemonic assertions, unprecedented territorial claims, grey zone incursions and coercive pressures on those who don’t fall in line. Third, a Russia-China nexus is emerging. Fourth, the ASEAN that is in disarray, with its institutions like the EAS largely ineffective. Fifth with the leadership change in the US underway, it will take time for the impact on the US rebalance to Asia to become clear.

As a result, there is growing geopolitical uncertainty and strategic competition across the region, increasing demands for the India-Japan strategic entente to ensure regional balance and stability, a need for both countries to enhance their security role and cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors and bolster maritime security across Indo-Pacific and finally the importance of working together to secure a rules-based regional security order and preserving the freedom of global commons under international law.

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“India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”

Inaugural Keynote Address by Ambassador of Japan
H.E. Kenji Hiramatsu
Inaugural Keynote by H.E. Mr. Kenji Hiramatsu,
Ambassador of Japan to India,
At the Opening Session of
“India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”
Organized by Delhi Policy Group
7th October, 2016

Dr. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary,
Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Ten years have passed since Prime Minister Abe made a speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” at the Indian Parliament in 2007. Given the recent development of strategic and economic environment of the region, the approach to combine the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and view them as a whole has become more and more relevant today.

Japan and India are the two major democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. The two countries have the will, ability and responsibility to contribute to peace, stability, prosperity and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific.

Against this background, today’s conference is held at a very timely moment. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Singh for the effort he devoted to organizing this conference.

Prime Minister Abe announced the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, known as TICAD VI, in Nairobi in August this year. This strategy is an evolution and development of the idea he stated in the “Confluence of the Two Seas.”
The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” envisions a broad region which encompasses two oceans – the Pacific and Indian Oceans, to include not only Asia but also Africa. This aims to improve connectivity through free and open Indo-Pacific to promote stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.

India is located at a geographically and strategically key position in the Indo-Pacific. This position enables India to play an active role in this region. Japan on its part has long been and will continue to be a provider of security in the region based on its security policy, “Proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.” The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and a platform for global cooperation. Japan is also a provider of capital, goods and know-how which help this region to be an economic powerhouse.

The bilateral relationship between Japan and India was elevated to the Special Strategic and Global Partnership when Prime Minister Modi visited Japan in 2014. When Prime Minister Abe visited India last year, the two Prime Ministers decided to develop this partnership into an action-oriented partnership. They announced “Japan and India Vision 2025” and pledged to work for peace, security and development of the Indo-Pacific region.

Under the renewed and enhanced partnership, Japan and India will be able to promote the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” In Japan-India Summit meeting in Vientiane last month, Prime Minister Abe stated that he hoped Japan and India would coordinate closely to make this concept a reality.

Let me then elaborate the way our two countries can cooperate in promoting the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

Japan and India agree that assuring maritime security across the Indian and Pacific Oceans is a prerequisite to economic prosperity
in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The two countries have shared values and views including the rule of law, the importance of international law in particular UNCLOS, peaceful resolution of disputes without use or threat of use of force, freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in international waters. Japan and India should be united and raise the voice in international arena to ensure that these values and views will prevail in this region and across the globe. I am happy to see Japan and India are on the same page in this regard.

Under this shared value and views, the two countries are closely cooperating in various ways to ensure maritime security in the region. When Prime Minister Abe visited India last year, it was decided that Japan would participate in the India-U.S. Malabar Exercises on a regular basis. This year, the Malabar Exercise successfully took place in the Sasebo Port and the maritime area east of Okinawa in June. To further develop dialogue and exchanges between the two countries on maritime security, the second Japan-India Maritime Affairs Dialogue was held in November last year. In addition, when the Defense Minister of Japan visited India in July this year, the two Defense Ministers agreed to explore the setting up of a Maritime Strategic Dialogue between the two Defense Ministries. The two countries also contribute to anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in their respective capacity. I am pleased to note our cooperation in maritime security domain is progressing steadily.

Improving connectivity of the Indo-Pacific will lead to stability and prosperity of the region. Japan recognizes the importance of enhancing its cooperation with India to augment connectivity in India and the region. I believe that it will benefit all the relevant parties if Japan and India explore ways to coordinate in supporting infrastructure development in Indian neighbors such as Myanmar or Sri Lanka for example. I hope concrete joint projects will be implemented in the future.
India has historically a strong connection with Africa, especially with countries located on the east coast and Prime Minister Modi is promoting active diplomacy toward Africa. There is a vast potential for bilateral cooperation between Japan and India in the development of African countries. Developments of infrastructure, business environment and human resources as well as promotion of trade and investment are among the possible areas of cooperation. When Japanese companies expand their business in Africa, it would be useful for them to collaborate with Indian companies. Exploring ways to facilitate matching of Japanese and Indian companies should be on our agenda. I would like to press ahead this agenda vigorously.

Beyond this bilateral context, it is also important to strengthen coordination and cooperation with other partners for the peace and stability of the region. A Japan-India-U.S. Trilateral dialogue among the Foreign Ministers of the three countries was held for the first time in New York last year. I firmly believe the strategic value of this trilateral and welcome recent positive developments. We look forward to continuing high level exchanges among the three countries with a view to creating tangible results. The result-oriented approach is also the key in this cooperation. With regard to regional frameworks, Japan strongly supports India’s membership of the APEC as it would contribute to the economic integration in the region. We expect India to play further active role in the East Asia Summit. I hope to have more policy coordination between India and Japan together with other likeminded countries of EAS. As a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Japan is keen to see how this association evolves.

While Japan and India as well as our partner countries are determined to contribute to peace and stability of the region, they also face challenges. Unilateral action to change the status quo by force or coercion is a great concern for all of us. The arbitration
award in the case between the Philippines and China for the South China Sea issue will be an important test case to judge whether the rule of law prevails in the region. Japan and India must continue to make clear that this award be complied with for the sake of the rule of law.

Another challenge is the threat of terrorism. Japan strongly condemns the terrorist attack on the Indian Base in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, and extends its sincere condolences to those who lost their lives and their bereaved families, and expresses its heartfelt sympathy to those who were injured. Japan condemns terrorism in all forms regardless of its purposes, and strongly reiterates that no act of terrorism can be justified. Japan expresses its solidarity with India in the fight against terrorism.

North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes are serious security threats in the region, too. Japan, India and other major powers should be united in urging North Korea to fully comply with its international obligation and abandon its nuclear weapons. We also expect India’s continuous support for Japan on the abduction issue.

This conference is very timely and relevant given the strategic and security environment surrounding the two countries and the region today. I expect that discussions of this conference will contribute not only to further deepening the bilateral relationship but also to promoting peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

Thank you very much.
“National Security Concerns and Policies of India and Japan”

Chair’s Opening Remarks by

Amb. H K Singh,
Director General,
Delhi Policy Group
In his opening remarks the Chair, Ambassador H K Singh said that rising Asia is at the center of an ongoing global power flux. The period of a relatively stable security environment post-1991 has dissipated; geopolitical uncertainty and strategic competition prevail. China is testing the limits of American strategic presence in Asia, demanding preemptive withdrawal to accommodate China’s hegemony. An expanding strategic gap with China is posing multiple security challenges for both India and Japan. Chinese claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the PLA Navy’s forays into the Indian Ocean Region, China’s nuclear proxies and its grand strategies pose a challenge for Japan and India in shaping a regional response to China, contributing to a stable balance of power and limiting China’s ability to dominate Asia. Hopefully we can also count on a continuing US rebalance to Asia as we cope with this challenge. At the same time, forces of extremism and terrorism are bouncing back.

Our nations have been responding to these challenges: India through pragmatic engagement with regional powers and differentiated strategic partnerships; and Japan through proactive contribution to peace, comprehensive defense architecture, more effective alliance arrangements with the US and an enhanced regional role under new security laws. We realize that PM Abe faces the challenge of strengthening domestic foundations to support more robust national defense and security measures - which would enjoy India’s unstinting support.

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Presentation by

Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi
Aoyama Gakuin University and Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Tokyo
National Security Concerns and Policies of Japan

Tsutomu Kikuchi, Ph.D

Professor, Aoyama-Gakuin University

&

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Outline of the Presentation

1. Security challenges facing Japan

2. How has Japan been addressing the challenges?
1. Security Challenges

(1) Japan facing the most serious security challenges in the post-war era.

(2) Japan struggling to be a more relevant and reliable security player in Asia.
(3) Security Challenges posed by China
1) The re-emergence of China: causing more soul-searching, internal debates and policy changes in Japan than anywhere else in Asia

1) Japan’s active engagement to China since its normalization in 1972.

2) Japan’s expectation: making China a responsible partner within the existing international order.

1) But, China taking more assertive policy toward Japan as well as the region.

5) Causing a deep sense of loss and concerns
2, Japan’s Responses

(1) Self-Help and the alliance with the United States
1) Self-help: enhancing capability to defend Japan

2) Alliance with the US: Japan needs more firm US commitment to the defense of Japan.

3) Divided politics in Washington and US public against military engagements overseas.

4) Japan needs to do more to make the US government and people believe that Japan is a reliable ally of the US.
(2) Japan taking the initiatives to enhance the alliance with the US

1) Adoption of the new security registrations
2) Reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution over the collective self-defense right.
3) Revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline

(3) Demonstrating to the US government and people that Japan is ready to take more responsibility and risks with the United States.
(2) Japan Moves Southward

1) Strengthening defense and security relations with “the rest of Asia”

2) “The rest of Asia” refers to the major countries (and regional institutions) other than the US and China.

Why is “the rest of Asia” so important for Japan?

1) Contrary to a conventional view, the future of Asia largely depends on how “the rest of Asia” will respond to the challenges facing the region.

2) We must look beyond the US-China relations.
(3) Asia’s Future scenarios:

From US hegemony, China’s regional dominance, G2, to Cold-war type of confrontation:

None will happen.

1) Neither the US nor China can sustain a regional order alone.
   • The US is no longer a full-fledged regional hegemon.
   • China is not a full-fledged rising power.
   • Both the US and China have a lot of vulnerabilities and constraints internally and externally.

2) Neither G2 nor the cold war type of the US-China confrontation will emerge
   
   The huge gaps of policy preferences on the one hand,
   The deepened economic linkages and dense policy mechanisms between two on the other hand
(3) The Importance of “the rest of Asia” for the future of Asia

1) Many major countries having substantial economic, political and military powers

2) Having political will and capability to play a substantial role in Asia. Not pawns in the US-China competition

3) The US and China in regional production and distribution networks (economic life lines). Neither the US nor China dominates the networks. They need support of “the rest of Asia.”

4) Having substantial bargaining powers in the “great game” over the future of Asia.
(4) US and China competing over “the rest of Asia”

1) US Pivot/Rebalance Policy
   new security and economic partnerships with “the rest of Asia”

2) China
   “periphery diplomacy”
   “AIIB (Asia Infrastructure Development Bank)”
   “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”

3) “The rest of Asia” will have an enormous impact on the future of Asia:
   “Swing States” in Asia’s geopolitics?
(5) Strengthening the capacities of “the rest of Asia”

1) The Problem: Asians are too much preoccupied with mindset of seeing the future of Asia only from the perspective of the US-China competition.

2) Japan has been pushing the Asian countries to be freed from the mindset.
   *enhancing efforts to share the international rules and norms with “the rest of Asia,” especially those embedded in the UNCLOS.
   *Taking the initiatives to enhance institutional capacities (especially in the maritime domain) of “the rest of Asia,” especially those of the ASEAN countries
* Enhancing maritime law enforcement capability (supporting coast guards)
  * SDF gradually expanding joint military exercises with “the rest of Asia”

(6) India as the key partner of Japan’s “Move Southward” strategy to enhance the relations with “the rest of Asia”
  * sustaining global rules and norms
  * cooperation to enhance institutional capacity of “the rest of Asia”
  * encouraging China to become a responsible player
Thank you for your attention
“National Security Concerns and Policies of India”

Presentation by

Amb Biren Nanda
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
Very few countries in the world are beset with as many hostile or uncomfortable neighbors as India. With its two neighbors China and Pakistan, it has a post-independence history of wars and the relations with them continue to be adversarial. The strategic collusion between Pakistan and China in terms of military and nuclear cooperation has further vitiated India’s external security environment. To the credit of Indian policy makers, India has been able to meet the challenge posed by the two nuclear capable countries, both at military and diplomatic levels.

India faced a relatively stable international security environment in the period after 9/11. After the global financial crisis of 2007-08, American dominance of world affairs was an immediate casualty. China began testing the limits of American strategic presence in Asia and the national security environment for India underwent a change. Chinese troops made aggressive incursions across the LAC and began creeping aggression and occupation of land features in the Spratlys in the South China Sea.

The gradual but steady rise of India, a revitalized Japan under PM Shinzo Abe and the US rebalance to Asia are major strategic developments which are presently shaping responses to the challenge posed by China to the status quo and the post World War II order in the region.

For a majority of the countries in East Asia, however, there remains the belief that the US and its alliance system as well as its new security relationships with regional powers are here to stay, checking the tendency to capitulate to Chinese hegemony for the present.

The expanding strategic gap with China has begun to pose multiple security challenges for India in a number of areas. These include the disputed border, the military balance with China, the creation of border infrastructure, Beijing’s policy of arming Islamabad and Beijing’s efforts to block India’s rise through initiatives like its opposition to India joining NSG. Beijing has also expanded its Naval presence in the Indian Ocean and established security partnerships with countries, which were once part of India’s traditional sphere of influence.

India has addressed its security dilemma by moving closer to the United States while maintaining its existing security partnerships with key powers. India has also
forged closer strategic and military ties with major Asian countries including, Japan, Australia and Indonesia and sought to enhance Trilateral Defense Cooperation between India, Japan and the United States.

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INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND POLICIES

Ambassador Biren Nanda
Senior Fellow DPG
FACTORS AFFECTING INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

- Geographical location
- Economic goals
- Aspirations for international status
- Threats that undermine India’s security
- The totality of India’s military, diplomatic, economic and social policies that will protect and promote India’s national security interests
INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

- Upholding Democracy, the rule of law and economic freedoms
- Civilian control at the policy level
- A strong deterrent capability
- A professional intelligence setup
- High technological capability
- An indigenous defense production capability
- Leveraging India’s geographical advantages for force projection and ISR in the Indian Ocean Region
- Combatting terrorism
CHANGING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

- Relatively stable international security environment after 9/11

- The Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) and the challenge to the US’s dominance of world affairs

- China begins to act aggressively with her neighbors

- The US rebalance to Asia, a revitalized Japan under Prime Minister Abe and the steady rise of India begin to shape responses to the Chinese challenge.
KEY CHALLENGES FOR INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

- Despite the US pivot to Asia the will of the US to confront China is being questioned

- The American ‘War on Terror’ and the grand American project to democratize the Middle East faces uncertain prospects.

- Forces of extremism and terrorism are bouncing back

- Dealing with the threat from Pakistan is a serious security challenge for India

- The expanding strategic gap with China and China’s aggressive behavior on its periphery is posing multiple security challenges for India
INDIA’S RESPONSE

- The Regional Security Architecture comprising of ASEAN centric institutions has failed to tackle hard security issues.

- India has addressed its security dilemma by moving closer to the United States

- India has also strengthened security partnerships with key regional powers including Japan

- India’s geographic location endows it with an opportunity to play a critical strategic role in ensuring maritime safety.
WHAT CAN INDIA AND JAPAN DO TOGETHER?

- Strengthen bilateral defense ties through joint exercises; counterterrorism, anti-piracy and HADR exchanges

- Promote cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian Navy on securing safety of SLOCs.

- Operationalize the cooperation in defense equipment and technologies

- Enhance Trilateral Defense Cooperation between India, Japan and the United States.
THANK YOU
“National Security Concerns and Policies of India”

Presentation by

Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.)
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
This presentation focused on the deteriorating Indian security environment as a consequence of Pakistan's proxy war and cross border terror. As a result a perception is gaining ground that a radicalized Pakistan is structurally incapable of normal relations with India.

Other major security concerns include Sino–Pak collusion and the growing Chinese economic and military imprint manifesting in the China–Pakistan economic corridor. Additionally control over Gwadar has facilitated Chinese outreach to the Indian Ocean.

The political situation in Afghanistan is fast deteriorating owing to Pakistan's stepped up interference post the withdrawal of a majority of US forces and stepped up Taliban violence.

China on the other hand while continuing its provocative activities in the South China Sea has stepped up its military moves in the Tibet Autonomous Region, with attempts at ratcheting up border tensions through incursions along the Line of Actual Control.

China has embarked upon a calibrated policy of Indian encirclement. It is attempting to woo India's Eastern neighbors thru economic and infrastructural assistance and attempting to create land bridges thru these countries to link landlocked SW China with the IOR, as part of its Maritime Silk Road strategy. Attempt is also being made at drawing in Russia and Iran into the insidious emerging Sino–Pak collusive strategic orbit.

The Nuclear challenge posed by the two collusive partners acting in tandem is another key challenge, particularly the attempts at creating a strategic military alliance against India.

The common security challenge of India and Japan thus centers upon dealing with an assertive China, security of maritime littorals and SLOC's for unimpeded maritime access.

Within the deteriorating security backdrop; threat mitigation and the efforts to meet common challenges, require both countries to develop credible military capability and dissuasive deterrence, underscoring the need for closer defence and technology cooperation.

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India’s National Security Concerns

Brig Arun Sahgal, (Retd)
Senior Fellow DPG
Outline

• Prevailing Scenario
• India’s strategic concerns
• Nuclear Factor
• Commonality of Threats and Challenges
• Implications for India – Japan Relations
Prevailing Scenario

• Perceptible deterioration in India’s security environment. Vitiated by cross border terror and inflaming of insurgency in J&K.
• Attacks in Uri and Pathankot attempts at internal destabilization to derail Indian economic development and progress.
• Pakistan structurally incapable of normal relations with India, becoming increasingly radicalized and continues to be state sponsor of terror.
• Sino – Pak military and economic collusion under CPEC and moves within POK resulting in China emerging as third party to the J&K dispute.
• Lease of Gwadar port and Chinese footprints in IOR enhance PLAN’s presence in the Arabian Sea.
Prevailing Scenario

• Pakistan is emerging as the fulcrum of Chinese IOR outreach.

• Pakistan moving from US “renteer” to Chinese “client” state. Attempts at creating strategic military alliance against India.

• Enthused by Chinese support and US draw down; Pak has stepped up activities in Afghanistan incl; support to Taliban and ISIS.

• Critical political and security situation prevails in Afghanistan – serious probability of state failure & emergence of radical Islamic space.
**Prevailing Scenario**

- Rise in Chinese bellicosity and continuing provocative moves post arbitration verdict.
- Along with force projection and joint exercises in SCS, Chinese also undertaking offensive maneuvers in its “Western Theatre” North and East of India.
- Unabated infrastructure development and upgrading of defense posture in Tibet.
- Increase in border intrusions including in settled areas.
- Increasing footprint in Southern Asia; attempting to draw states in its economic and mil sphere; Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
- To overcome Malacca dilemma and create assets in IOR attempting to develop SLB’s (economic hubs) connecting Indian Ocean to Chinese mainland.
Prevailing Scenario

• OBOR and MSR are clearly articulated Chinese designs to increase its sphere of influence and enlarge strategic space.

• Importantly Russia has been drawn into emerging Sino – Pak collusive strategic orbit; Russia designs of Greater Eurasia as counterpoise against US and West.

• Attempt is also being made to induct Iran within this Russian orbit, in bid to dominate Western Quadrant.
India’s Strategic Concerns

• As a consequence, India today faces a difficult crisis driven security scenario.

• India’s strategic concerns; centre around growing friction with Pakistan, Chinese continental and maritime forays and strengthening Sino–Pak collusion.

• Key concerns are:
  – Vitiated regional scenario, resulting in war like situation.
  – Heightened insurgency and cross border terror.
  – China’s pressing coercive leverage given by favourable military assymetry, infrastructure developments in Tibet and boundary dispute.
India’s Strategic Concerns

– CPEC and One Belt, One Road, bold eco-geostrategic initiative attempt at isolating India.
– Extending Chinese footprint in IOR thru initiatives like MSR as China’s dependence on trade and resources grows; an emerging area of friction.
– India’s growing trade and energy dependence obliges India to prevent extraneous influences and ensure freedom of navigation, putting onus on SLOC security.

• Security concerns and geo political flux make it imperative to invest in credible military and strategic capabilities as also to seek strategic partnerships with Japan and US.
Nuclear Factor

- India faces twin nuclear threat from its neighbours *acting in military and strategic collusion*.
- Both Pakistan and NK are *Chinese nuclear proxy*, feeding each other’s and Chinese programmes.
- Chinese support has allowed Pakistan to develop TNW and *incorporate them as part of conventional deterrence* undermining regional strategic stability.
- Reports of growing NK-Pak relationship a serious concern.
- China’s MRBM have the capability to hit Indian heartland. India’s reach to Chinese East Coast can only be with IRBM and above.
- Scenario further vitiated by China’s rapidly modernizing arsenal and NK nuclear gamesmanship impacting Strategic stability in Asia-Pacific.
Population Density
Commonality of Threats and Challenges

• Developments in Af – Pak, growing Chinese footprint in the region and linkages with West Asia – creating zone of influence extending from Persian Gulf to IOR.

• SLOC security and unimpeded access to markets, an imperative. Chinese belligerence in SCS and forays in IOR require collective and coordinated response.

• Ensuring secure maritime corridors thus a criticality and common India – Japan interest.

• Unresolved disputes and emergence of Sino – centric Asia could create a serious potential for conflict. ECS, SCS and IOR are possible triggers.
What do These Imply for India – Japan Security Partnership

• Threat mitigation; is a common challenge. Even as Japan’s security is largely subsumed by US – Japan alliance and India’s security stand alone.

• Threats underscore the necessity for both to develop *credible military capability & dissuasive deterrence*.

• Imperative for both to *upgrade military capabilities & foster close defence cooperation*.

• Equally important for both *to be net security providers* across Indo-Pacific to preclude hedging by smaller regional actors.
Thank You
“India-Japan Cooperation on Regional and Maritime Security issues”

Chair’s Opening Remarks by

Amb. Nalin Surie
Director General
Indian Council of World Affairs
Amb Nalin Surie began his remarks by asserting that the India-Japan Vision 2025 statement adopted by Prime Ministers Abe and Modi last December was part of an important evolution not only in India’s security perspective and dynamics but also a recognition by major players of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and India’s role in it. The Abe-Modi statement was preceded by the India-US Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region issued in January 2015 by President Obama and PM Modi. Irrespective of whether one speaks of the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific, the important objective has to be to build a regional security architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and ensures equal security for all.

The Abe-Modi statement reaffirms that close cooperation between India and Japan is the key to achieving peace and stability in the region. At the same time they recognize the importance of working with other partners to discuss the regional peace and security agenda. The Indo-US statement clarifies that a closer partnership between the United States and India is indispensable to promoting peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. That statement also underlines the importance of regional and global growth. This is also an element in the India-Japan statement. Another important common element is the need to develop connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region.

Given the above perspective, it is useful from India’s point of view to consider where exactly it figures in Japan’s scheme of things. Japan’s 2016 White Paper on the Defense of Japan is an important reference point in this regard. First, the bigger picture: the White Paper notes that a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized; security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region (such as ‘gray-zone’ situations) including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious; the presence of US forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability; the international community today faces complex, diverse and broad security challenges and destabilizing factors including in the maritime domain and that developments in science and technology have important spillover effects on the military.
Specifically with regard to India, the White Paper states that, India, which is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. It argues that the Modi administration has recently also attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean and has deepened collaboration with other countries to strengthen such cooperation. It believes that India recognizes that strategic economic factors impose upon it an increasingly larger responsibility and (hence) it has in particular been focusing on modernizing its naval and air forces.

The principal threats to Japan, which India shares, have been identified as the proliferation of WMDs, the threat of terrorism and increasing risks regarding the global commons such as the oceans, space and cyberspace. Hence, the importance for countries sharing these strategic interests, to address them in a coordinated manner. India is indeed listed in the White Paper among such countries. It is clarified that Japan will strengthen cooperation with India in joint exercises in a wide range of areas such as maritime security. Finally, India has been described as an extremely important country, geopolitically, for Japan.

The discussions in this session will undoubtedly provide us greater insight into why India-Japan cooperation on regional and maritime security issues has become so important in the present geopolitical and geo-strategic context in the Indo-Pacific. The need of the hour is to enhance and front load bilateral cooperation on these matters. Such cooperation is not simply a response to short term considerations but must become an important constituent of a broader Asian security architecture that encompasses the Indo-Pacific. It is necessary to take into account the broader geographical context since what happens on the western periphery of the Indian Ocean and in the wider Gulf region will impact not only South Asia but the entire Asian continent and the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, developments in Southeast and East Asia will have serious implications for the rest of the Indo-Pacific.

The recent Yogyakarta Message “Towards the future of the IORA” issued on 15 September 2016 calls inter-alia, for the establishment of an I-O regional architecture; for economic development and enhanced connectivity. Japan is a dialogue partner of IORA.

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“Chain of Maritime Security Coalitions”

Presentation by
Admiral Hideaki Kaneda (Retd.)
Adjunct Fellow, JIIA
DPG Conference
“India and Japan: Confluence of Maritime Democracies”

Session 2
“India-Japan Cooperation on Regional & Maritime Security Issue”

Chain of Maritime Security Coalitions
…Composing Seamless Maritime Security Coalitions through Indo-Pacific Region…

October 7, 2016
VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda
Adjunct Fellow, JIIA
China’s Hegemonic Maritime Expansion

Coercive & unlawful expansion toward “Strong Maritime Power”

Attempts to change Status Quo by coercion at sea & air domain

Rapid maritime/air force build-up to accomplish A2/AD posture

“One Belt One Road” plan, setting “String of Pearls” in IP region

Repeated Intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters around Senkaku

Fortified SCS by deploying military systems on disputed landfills

Such stance causing serious concern to regional & int’l community
Ensuring Stable Seas in the IP

Existing risks of free access to Sea and Air

Growing risks of incidents and possible escalation at Sea and Air

Unilateral actions trying to change “status quo” by China

Open and Stable Seas as basis for maintaining stability of SLOC

Sea must be governed by int’l maritime law, such as UNCLOS

Required regional Collective Maritime Security cooperation

Creating Maritime Security Coalition essential for stable SLOC

Composing seamless Chain of Coalitions through Indo-Pacific
Collective Maritime Security Cooperation

* Majority of regional maritime players seeks for establishing collective maritime security cooperation, which should be less restrictive but more free and flexible

* They are building firm confidence through exchanging official dialogue and security information, while conducting cooperative maritime drills, among regional maritime forces with mutual need

* They have already sought for collective maritime security cooperation for non-traditional maritime threats such as HA/DR or anti-piracy activities, gradually stepping up for traditional threats

* They views Reliable Regional Maritime Powers (RRMP), such as Japan, Australia and India with the US, should work more positively at core roles for these missions
MSC : Maritime Security Coalition

* RRMP should be the key players in collective regional maritime security cooperation

* RRMP share not only wide range of common maritime interests but also universal maritime responsibility for ensuring region’s security and prosperity as “public goods” in Indo-Pacific region

* Majority of regional maritime players takes a position to counter or deny Chinese hegemonic maritime expansion in “Collective” manner

* It has been born and progressed the idea in majority of regional players that they should enhance and develop cooperation with RRMP in both traditional and non-traditional areas of maritime security, in the form of “non-alliance”, but mini-lateral “coalition of the willing”, to be called “Maritime Security Coalition (MSC)”
JAUS Coalition

* The US, as a “Super Maritime Power," has been building many alliances and partnerships with several maritime players of Indo-Pacific region, contributes to maintain maritime security

* **Japan-US alliance** has been playing critical roles for not only Japan’s defense, but maritime security in Asia-Pacific region ⇒ Alliance, SOFA, “2+2 Talks”, Defense Cooperation Guideline, GSOMIA, ACSA, Bi-Tri-Multi Exercises, etc.

* **Japan and Australia** also have been strengthening maritime security cooperation, building relationship as "quasi-allies“ ⇒ ”2+2 Talks”, GSOMIA, ACSA, Bi-Tri-Multi Exercises, etc.

* **Australia-US-Japan** deepening Japan-Australia-US **(JAUS)** maritime security cooperation for the region ⇒ “Naval Diplomacy” through out Oceania-Pacific Ocean
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Myanmar

“String of Pearls”

Anti-Piracy

Chinese “9 Exits” toward Outer Sea

2nd Island Line
1st Island Line
A2/AD

JAUS Maritime Security Coalition

Diego Garcia
Guam
Hawaii

① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨
JIUS Coalition

* **India and Japan** share common interests in extensive ranges of various security cooperation based upon int’l laws and norms, including protecting SLOCs through out Indo-Pacific region

⇒ ”Special Strategic & Global Partnership”, Tokyo Declaration,

⇒ Importance of **Japan-India-US (JIUS)** security cooperation


* **India and US** agreed “Joint Strategic Vision in Indo-Pacific”

⇒ Deepening Maritime Security and Defense Cooperation, Malabar EX, Logistic Agreement (LEMOA), P-8, C-17, Predator

* **India-Japan-US (JIUS)** increase security & defense cooperation

⇒ D/G level Security Talks, Malabar EX for India-Japan-US,

⇒ Possible “Naval Diplomacy” through out Indo-Pacific Ocean
Anti-Piracy

Chinese “9 Exits” toward Outer Sea

1st Island Line

2nd Island Line

JIUS Maritime Security Coalition

A2/AD
Chain of Coalitions

* Regional maritime players, no matter small or big, sharing common interests and ideas, could join in a mini-lateral MSC with RRMP, taking advantage of feature of each sub-region

* A single MSC should be a “mini-lateral” coalition including some RRMP, to avoid internal conflicts caused by many participants

* Formation of MSC should gradually go beyond a few coalitions to seek out layered seamless MSC network connecting through wider region

* Eventually MSC network must be seamlessly connected, in a multi-layered collective form as a “Chain of Coalitions”
String of Pearls

Anti-Piracy

Chinese “9 Exits” toward Outer Sea

1st Island Line

2nd Island Line

Diego Garcia

Guam

Hawaii

A2/AD

Chain of Maritime Security Coalitions in Indo-Pacific
“India Japan Cooperation on Regional and Maritime Security Issues”

Presentation by

Vice Admiral Anup Singh (Retd.)
Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
In the maritime commons, distances do not define “neighbourhood”. For all practical purposes therefore, India and Japan are maritime neighbours. Both rely on the seas for almost 90% of their respective trade volumes and face similar challenges.

The world’s most critical and risk-prone choke points happen to be located in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the South China Sea faces the risk of disruption by China’s actions. Therefore, there is urgent need to put in place cooperative mechanisms and capacity building initiatives for littorals of the region.

Looking at China’s expanding footprint in the region, its strategy for the far seas is clearly unfolding now. Its string of pearls that will serve as “places” for the PLA (Navy), with the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) providing it the legitimacy of “presence”, will soon be buttressed by Djibouti as an overseas base in the Indian Ocean.

India and Japan need to put in place their counters in terms of surveillance and patrol capabilities in the region so that China’s actions are unable to threaten our interests. As an example, the Andaman & Nicobar Islands require dual-use infrastructure to become efficient in connectivity, and establish facilities for constant surveillance and monitoring off the Malacca and Lombok Straits. Both countries also need to bolster capabilities of the friendly littorals in the region.

In sum, the Special Strategic Global Partnership (SSGP) between the two countries needs to witness concrete results and faster pace through:

1) Defence TOT, co-production, and sale of hardware to India.

2) Early conclusion of the White Shipping Agreement.

3) Reassurance of “Net-Security” provision, to like-minded littorals in the Indo-Pacific, through capacity-building and capability-enhancement initiatives.

4) Combined exercises and actions that bring home the message that only a rules-based international order must prevail, to establish good order and governance in the maritime common.

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(INDIA-JAPAN) MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION ACROSS THE INDO-PACIFIC
SECURITY OVERVIEW

- INDO-PACIFIC: CONFLUENCE OF TWO SEAS THEORY BY PM ABE IN 2007

- INDIA AS MUCH AN ISLAND NATION AS JAPAN, AND THEREFORE WE BOTH SHARE COMMON INTERESTS / DEPENDENCY ON THE SEAS

- WE BOTH ALSO FACE SIMILAR THREATS TO SLOCS AS WELL AS TO MARITIME INTERESTS
GEO-STRATEGIC CONSTRUCT

• **INDIAN OCEAN IS UNIQUE IN ITS GEOGRAPHIC CONFIGURATION: ACCESS IN TO / OUT ONLY THROUGH CHOKE POINTS**

• **CHOKE POINTS: CAPE, MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL, GULF OF ADEN, SUEZ, HORMUZ, MALACCA, SUNDIA, LOMBOK STRAITS, SINGAPORE STRAITS, AND SOUTH CHINA SEA ARE ALL CRITICAL TRANSIT ROUTES THAT BURDEN US WITH MARITIME SECURITY FOR GLOBAL ECONOMY**

• **ENERGY (OIL & GAS) LINES OF COMMUNICATION CRUCIAL (IN FACT THESE ARE STRATEGIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR JAPAN)**

• **SOUTH CHINA SEA: SENSITIVE FOR GLOBAL (INCLUDING INDIAN) TRADE**

• **BUILDING ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS, MILITARISATION BY CHINA CREATING A NEW STRATEGIC SCENARIO WHERE POWER PROJECTION BY CHINA WILL INTIMIDATE NEIGHBOURS/THREATEN GLOBAL ECONOMY**
ALMOST A BILLION TONS OF OIL MOVES WITHIN THE INDO-PACIFIC, EACH YEAR
THREATS

• TRADITIONAL
• NON-TRADITIONAL – BECOMING MORE PREDOMINANT THAN TRADITIONAL, BUT MORE TEDIOUS TO NEUTRALISE
• NEO-TRADITIONAL (EXTRA-REGIONAL PRESENCE)
  * CHINA IN IOR AFFECTS BOTH
  * SINO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE AND EXERCISE IN SCS – EVIDENCE OF STRATEGIC SUPPORT FOR CHINA’S DOMINANCE
NON-TRADITIONAL

• MARITIME TERRORISM
• PIRACY/ARMED ROBBERY
• GUN-RUNNING; DRUG SMUGGLING
• HUMAN TRAFFICKING/SMUGGLING
• NATURAL DISASTERS
NATURAL DISASTERS

• INDO-PACIFIC – WORST REGION IN THE WORLD WITH 80% OF ALL NATURAL DISASTERS STRIKING HERE, INCREASING INTENSITY/FREQUENCY

• TSUNAMI 2004, AND TSUNAMI 2011 ARE APT EXAMPLES APART FROM NUMEROUS CYCLONES ETC.

• BOTH NAVIES COULD REGULARLY EXERCISE HADR – INTEROPERABILITY AND SOPs
NEO-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGE  
(EXTRA-REGIONAL PRESENCE IN IOR)

CHINESE FORAYS IN TO THE INDIAN OCEAN
- NUC SUBMARINES
- CONVENTIONAL SUBS
- SURFACE FLOTILLA OFF CHRISTMAS ISLAND (AUSTRALIA)

WHILE ANTI-PIRACY MISSION CONTINUING OFF ADEN  
DESPITE DECLINE IN PIRACY MAY STILL BE CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE, CONTINUING WITH THREE SHIPS WITH ZERO INCIDENT RATE IS A DELIBERATE MOVE BY CHINA

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES – DJIBOUTI IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF PERMANENT PRESENCE/POWER PROJECTION IN AND FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN  
DUAL USE PORT FACILITIES – SRI LANKA, PAK
BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE

• CHINA WILL UTILISE ALL SUCH COUNTRIES WHERE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BEEN FUNDED/DEVELOPED, TO PARTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FACILITIES

• THE WHOLE PURPOSE IS OBVIOUSLY STRATEGIC, THROUGH MULTIPLE LINES OF COMMUNICATION

• TIME FOR INDIA AND JAPAN TO ESTABLISH CONGRUENCE IN DEVELOPING MARITIME INFRA IN SE ASIA – STRAT USE OF JAPAN ODA AND INDIA’S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY
• GREED FOR NATURAL RESOURCES INCLUDING FISH, HYDROCARBONS, RARE MINERALS

• ADDITIONAL AIM STRATEGIC SUPREMACY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

• ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS HAVE DUAL PURPOSE: ENFORCE JURISDICTION AND MILITARISE

• NEXT STEP WILL BE AN ADIZ

• IN SUM: CRAFT SOVEREIGNTY AND ENABLE POWER PROJECTION
ENDS, WAYS, MEANS

• LET US FINALLY OPERATIONALISE “ssgp”
  – HAPPY TO NOTE DISCUSSIONS ARE ONGOING FOR DEFENCE TOT AND SALES
  – WE WELCOME THE NEW SECURITY LEGISLATION

• SEAL THE WHITE SHIPPING AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY INDIA

• BRING HOME THE MESSAGE: ONLY A RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER MUST PREVAIL IN THE MARITIME COMMON NET SECURITY REASSURANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT FOR LITTORALS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
“India Japan Cooperation on Regional and Maritime Security Issues”

Presentation by

Dhruva Jaishankar
Fellow, Brookings India.
India and Japan today enjoy a close security partnership marked by deeper political consultations than ever, as well as regular military-to-military contacts, including joint exercises. This relationship developed as both countries saw a growing threat in China’s actions and orientation, particularly after 2008, resulting in radical national security reforms under Shinzo Abe in Japan and more aggressive diplomacy by India, particularly under Narendra Modi. The India-Japan partnership can be considered in three stages: a global partnership from 2000 to 2006, a strategic and global partnership from 2006 to 2014, and a special strategic and global partnership from 2014 to present. Today, there are still significant impediments to closer cooperation, including bureaucratic hurdles and Cold War-era mindsets in both Tokyo and New Delhi; a danger in investing too much in defence sales; and insufficient cooperation on Pakistan and North Korea. However, coordinating development projects and foreign assistance in third countries (including in Iran, East Africa, and South and Southeast Asia) and increasing contacts between amphibious ground and air forces (with U.S. assistance) offer areas to deepen cooperation on regional and maritime issues.
“Advancing Trilateral Cooperation”

Presentation by

Hideki Asari
Minister (Political Affairs)
Embassy of Japan.”
Three countries---Japan, India and the United States---are natural partners in the Indo-Pacific context, sharing interests in the free and open Indo-Pacific region as well as basic values such as democracy and rule of law. Three countries have made significant progress in their cooperation both on policy level, including an inaugural meeting of the trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in September last year, and on the level of practical cooperation where the three countries are engaged in the Malabar exercise and working on cooperation in the field of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and regional connectivity. The three countries are vested with capacity and will to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region, and there is much more room for enhancing the trilateral cooperation.
“Advancing Trilateral Cooperation”

Presentation by

Munu Mahawar
Joint Secretary (AMS)
Ministry of External Affairs, India.
The India-U.S.-Japan trilateral is a partnership for peace, prosperity and stability in the region. Trilateral Cooperation seeks to build upon the convergence in approaches of these three large democratic countries. It derives strength from strong bilateral partnerships between these three countries. Over the last two years, India and the US have made concerted efforts to capture the true strength and scale of their strategic, political and economic opportunities. The relationship has transcended beyond bilateral issues to collaboration for the betterment of the world at large. The Joint Strategic Vision reflects the common goals for the dynamic Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region, building on the congruence of India’s ‘Act East’ policy and the U.S. 're-balance' to Asia. For India, the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region is strategic to its security and economic interests. India’s role as a net provider of security in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region and first responder to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief in Indian Ocean Region is widely recognized. India looks up to its partners such as the US and Japan to bolster its capabilities in this regard. Maritime security cooperation is the most visible component of trilateral engagement among India, Japan and US. Other identified key areas of cooperation include regional connectivity and HA/DR. The focus is now to move beyond exchange of ideas and assessments to collaborate on concrete projects. Further, there is potential to expand the scope to cover other areas such as energy, Indian Ocean blue economy, counter-terrorism etc.

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“Advancing Trilateral Cooperation”

Presentation by

Richard Rossow
India Chair, CSIS.
When the U.S. first began working on the US India Japan trilateral, it was partly motivated by the belief that having Japan alongside the U.S. would make security cooperation easier than straightforward bilateral cooperation - a buffer against India's concerns about the dangers of direct engagement with a hyperpower. However, today the U.S. India bilateral relationship is moving ahead much faster than trilateral cooperation. With a U.S. leadership transition coming, it is time for introspection. Our leaders need to be very clear about the trilateral's role. If it is about signaling our shared interests to the region - particularly China - we can fairly judge it successful already. If it is about finding shared operational roles, there has been some modest success such as including Japan in Malabar and initiating cooperation in planning for HA/DR contingencies in Asia. If it is about shaping or creating regional institutions/ frameworks, there has not been tangible progress. For the U.S., the importance of the trilateral partnership must be consistently reiterated by our leaders, to make sure mid-level officials constantly seek creative ways to make the trilateral a real, living thing. For example, any time we look at creating a new bilateral program with India, we should take a moment to consider if it could, instead, be a trilateral program.
“India, Japan and a Rules Based Asian Order”

Presentation by

Dr C Raja Mohan
Director, Carnegie India.
That a rules-based order can be promoted in Asia’s maritime domain without a stable regional balance of power is a grand illusion. Principles that are not backed by power and laws that can’t be enforced are not worth much when it comes to security politics involving major powers. The present threat to the rules-based order comes from a rising power, which is betting that neither the current hegemonic power nor its own Asian neighbors are in a position to offer significant resistance to its new assertiveness. That belief can’t be altered by a strategy that merely exhorts the rising power to abide by the accepted norms. To be effective, those appeals must be backed by power and the capacity to counter violation of rules. Having under-estimated the intent and capabilities of a rising China, India and Japan have little time to lose in building a regional coalition that can help restore the military and strategic balance in Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

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“India, Japan and a Rules Based Asian Order”

Presentation by

Richard Rossow
India Chair, CSIS.
This has been a pivotal year for Asian security. China's aggressive expansionism has progressed faster than many U.S. security experts expected, and China's risk tolerance is higher than predicted. Key actions include China's placement of missiles on newly-created islands in the South China Sea, the creation of new pools of capital for infrastructure development across Asia, publicly-acknowledged cyber attacks and hacks against the U.S. government, and non-compliance with the UNCLOS dispute with the Philippines. These aggressive Chinese tactics have splintered alliances and shattered institutions such as the ASEAN, on which the U.S. had placed a great deal of hope as a method to ensure a balance of power across Asia. Now the next U.S. President will face a choice- whether to focus on strengthening and rebuilding institutions in Asia, or to focus energies on creating a "coalition of the willing"- tying together like-minded Asian democracies and finding meaningful ways to strengthen coordination. We will hopefully see a continued commitment to the U.S. rebalance to Asia. It will be critical for the next President to build support from Congress so we will not be constrained by deep budget-cuts.
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