DPG Conference Reports, Vol. 2, Issue 1
Conference on 'Emerging Realignments in Asia'
Viceregal Hall | Claridges Hotel | New Delhi | March 10, 2017
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DPG Conference on
“Emerging Realignments in Asia”
March 10, 2017

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Abstract of Proceedings and Power Point Presentations
Emerging Realignments in Asia

Note prepared by Sanjay Pulipaka based on the discussions at the DPG International Conference on ‘Emerging Realignments in Asia’ in New Delhi on March 10, 2017.

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The international conference Emerging Realignments in Asia captured the political realignments across Asia as well as the ideological realignments in India.

- The growing uncertainty in international politics received considerable attention. It was noted that the recent political developments in the United States (US) are generating anxiety amongst US allies about its future foreign policy. Given that the US is at the core of the hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia-Pacific, ambiguous statements from the US President have generated immense anxiety in countries, from Japan to Southeast Asia.

- The keynote speaker noted that an appropriate response to uncertainty is to focus on the ‘certainties’, such as the India-Japan partnership and its impact in the region. Strengthening of such certainties will lay the foundations for a rules based and liberal regional and global order.

- Scholars outlined the immediate causes for growing uncertainty. These include the Trump administration’s ill-prepared transition; ambiguity about new appointments in the US administration; and repeated emphasis on an ‘America-first policy’ which seems to be coming at the expense of allies. They also noted that the withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) generated a credibility crisis for the US while creating opportunities for China. It was also argued that the current uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific is also a consequence of the failure of previous US administrations to ensure a genuine rebalance.

- As a consequence of this uncertainty, there is a growing perception about the weakening of liberal international order. Further, scholars referred to the emergence of an ‘illegal-order’, which is manifest in the failure to abide by international law by some countries. The growing preference for a purely transactional approach, devoid of any values, was also cited as one of the reasons for the decline of the liberal international order.
- There was considerable discussion on balance-of-power in the region. The scholars noted that the Indo-Pacific ‘region’ is not a watertight compartment. The growing convergences between Russia, China and Pakistan on the western frontiers of the Indo-Pacific will have an impact on the overall balance of power in the region. The scholars mapped multiple balance of power scenarios, ranging from a Sino-centric Indo-Pacific to more multi-polar frameworks involving the region’s emerging powers.

- Balance-of-power politics a century ago was informed by the power-play that preceded the First World War, wherein all the powers were located in the European continent. As a consequence, a slight shift in the ‘balance’ impacted every other nation in Europe in equal measure. The scholars pointed out that the context of the current balance of power politics in the Indo-Pacific is qualitatively different. While the security context for India and Japan has deteriorated, the security dynamic for the US, in relative terms, did not witness a similar decline. Scholars noted that the fluidity in the context of balance of power is being further accentuated by the US dual policy of containment and engagement, which provided space for the rise of China. It was also pointed out that US policies (including by giving access to markets and technology) actually enabled the rise of China on the mistaken presumption that it would be a "responsible stakeholder".

- Some of the scholars noted that ‘who to balance’ is not being defined by objective facts. Instead, it seems to be a choice made by policymakers. For instance, Trump’s reiterations on the necessity to balance China, instead of Russia, is receiving considerable resistance from the entrenched policy making establishment in the US. It was suggested that while the Cold War ended in 1991, some policymakers in the US continue to see global politics through the bipolar lens dating back to 1971. This is also preventing the US from deploying a robust economic component to contain/restrict space for China in the Indo-Pacific region. It was noted that there is a growing failure of the US, a major power, to devote an unwavering focus on the rise of China. Scholars noted that the diversions of US policy (such as unchanged focus on Russia as the principal adversary) are providing enough space for China to create its hegemony and a ‘modern-day tributary system’ in Asia.

- How should other countries respond to this dynamic?

  (a) Ensure continued US presence by engaging the US through multiple frameworks – trilateral, quadrilateral and other alliance frameworks.
(b) Exchanging notes on developing best practices on responding to grey-zone violations.
(c) Promoting democratic and transparent decision-making processes.
(d) Strategic use of official development assistance (ODA) in a manner that benefits trilateral partners and other democratic countries.
(e) India and Japan must work together with ASEAN on regional security issues.
(f) Identifying and strengthening convergences in a ‘rest of Asia’ approach.

❖ The growing debate on ‘globalisation’ also figured prominently during the discussions. Three important questions were raised in this regard: (i) If there is retreat of globalisation, what will the impact be on global supply chains in Asia? (ii) Is the concept of globalisation changing into more digital phenomena? (iii) If so, what specific data-privacy, intellectual property rights (IPR), and skill-development policies should be adopted?

❖ Speakers pointed out that in the context of a growing threat to globalisation, the following approaches need to be factored in:

➢ The way liberal market economy states treat market and non-market economies such as China should be differentiated.
➢ There should be careful and selective liberalisation.
➢ There should be greater focus, not just on trade, but also on services facilitation agreements.
➢ TPP could perhaps be operationalised without the US, but the door can be kept open for later US participation.

❖ Some scholars also opined that the current wave of economic nationalism can be a transient phenomenon. The youth across the world seem to have greater preference for globalisation. Therefore, the process of globalisation might again gain momentum in a few years. Scholars noted that changing ‘templates’ on globalisation may help in continuing the process.

❖ It is interesting to note that all through the discussions, there was no reference to India’s ‘non-alignment’ or ‘strategic autonomy’. The discussion primarily revolved around scaling-up the intensity of strategic partnerships that create a stable regional balance to support a rules based order in Asia on the principles of "no hegemony, no containment and no condominium."
PROGRAMME
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DPG International Conference
“Emerging Realignments in Asia”
New Delhi
March 10, 2017
Venue: Claridges Hotel

Programme

March 10, 2017, Friday

0900-0930 Registration

0930-1000 Opening Session
Chair: Mr. Siddharth Shriram, Chairman and Managing Trustee, DPG [5 minutes]
Welcoming remarks by Ambassador H.K. Singh, Director General, DPG [5 minutes]
Opening Keynote Address by H.E. Amb. Kenji Hiramatsu, Ambassador of Japan [20 minutes]

1000-1015 Coffee Break

1015-1145 Session 1: Regional Powerplay
Chair: Ambassador Nalin Surie, Director General, ICWA [5 minutes]
Speakers:
India: Prof. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research [12-15 minutes]
Japan: Prof. Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University [12-15 minutes]
Russia: Dr. Feodor Voitolovsky, Deputy Director for International Politics, IMEMO [12-15 minutes]
Politico-Military Assessment: Brig. Arun Sahgal, Senior Fellow, DPG [10 minutes]
Discussion: Q&A [30 minutes]

1145-1315 Session 2: US, China and Multipolar Asia
Chair: Ambassador K.S. Bajpai, Chairman-Emeritus, DPG [5 minutes]
Speakers:
India: Amb. Biren Nanda, Senior Fellow, DPG [12-15 minutes]
US: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, CSIS [12-15 minutes]

Australia: Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy [12-15 minutes]

Discussion: Q&A [40 minutes]

1315-1415 Lunch (all participants and attendees)

1415-1545 Session 3: India and Japan in the new Asian Great Game

Chair: Ambassador H.K. Singh, Director General, DPG [5 minutes]

Speakers:

India: Sanjay Pulipaka, Senior Consultant, ICRIER [12-15 minutes]

Japan: Prof. Ken Jimbo, Assistant Professor, Keio University [12-15 minutes]

Vietnam: Ambassador Nguyen Van Tho, former Deputy Foreign Minister and Senior Advisor, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam [12-15 minutes]

Discussion: Q&A [40 minutes]

1545-1600 Coffee Break

1600-1730 Session 4: Retreat of Globalisation and Asian Geoeconomics

Chair: Dr. A. Didar Singh, Secretary General, FICCI [5 minutes]

Speakers:

India: Dr. Arvind Virmani, Distinguished Fellow, DPG [12-15 minutes]

Japan: Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University [12-15 minutes]

Indonesia: Ambassador Dino Patti Djalal [12-15 minutes]

Discussion: Q&A [40 minutes]

1730-1745 Concluding Session

Chair: Ambassador H.K. Singh, Director General, DPG

Rapporteur’s Conference Summary: Sanjay Pulipaka, Senior Consultant, ICRIER [10 minutes]
Emerging Realignments in Asia

Welcoming Remarks by
Amb. H.K. Singh
Director General, DPG
Welcoming Remarks by Amb. H.K. Singh, Director General

• Welcome: Our guests from abroad, distinguished Chairs and Speakers, participants.

• This is DPG’s first international conference of 2017, focused on some of the most pressing global and regional issues of the day which are elaborated in the concept note. Let me briefly mention just a few:

  - The brave "end of history" presumptions of the 1991 “unipolar moment” have long dissipated. The global order is once again witnessing transformative change, which has accelerated since the global financial crisis of 2008. An element of disruption is inevitable in this process, so we can expect the global system to remain under stress for some time.

  - Geo-economic drivers have been in ascendance since 1991, but after 25 years of uneven gains from globalisation, the liberal economic order is under pressure in advanced western democracies, while the post war liberal order itself stands weakened under the watch of its protagonists.

  - China’s rise to great power status, enabled by the US-led liberal order based on what now appear to be mistaken assumptions, has been unchecked and unprecedented. This is perhaps the first time in history that a new global power has risen without being significantly challenged.

  - However, China’s unilateralist assertions and coercive pressures to advance its “core interests” post-2008 have triggered a return to strategic contestation and the re-ascendance of geo-politics in Asia.

  - The direction of US policy under the Trump Administration will unquestionably be different from the recent past as both domestic and external policies are redefined. After a period of progressive global retrenchment and relative decline, this is perhaps a “what went wrong and how to fix it” moment for the US. In Asia, the perception of US weakness has grown. It is important to note that there is no sign thus far of a US withdrawal from Asia, where its commitments towards allies and partners have been reaffirmed. A stronger focus on defence capability and security issues seems likely under the new Administration.
With Asia central to the ongoing global power flux, the strategic challenge is to manage overlapping and sometimes conflicting interests and make progress towards multipolar stability. The key principles for a positive outcome remain “no hegemony, no containment, no condominium.”

Our conference sessions today will focus on the intense regional power play, or new Asian Great Game, in which major and emerging powers are currently engaged. We look forward to hearing from our invited international experts from Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, Russia and the US to help us understand how matters are likely to progress.

In the fourth session, our eminent Speakers will address the retreat of globalisation and its likely impact on Asian geo-economics and trade pacts. These issues are of great importance as they will determine the future direction and leadership of the global economic order.

Finally, Japan and India, as maritime democracies book-ending the Indo-Pacific, have a major role to play in securing regional progress and stability. It is, therefore, my pleasure to welcome Ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu, the Ambassador of Japan, to this opening session. A distinguished diplomat and strategist, Ambassador Hiramatsu is a veteran of the Foreign Policy Bureau of Gaimusho. He has played a central role in the drafting of Japan’s National Security Strategy in 2014, as well as in the preparation of Japan’s new landmark legislation on its enhanced role in regional peace and security. Since his arrival here in November 2015, Ambassador Hiramatsu has been making significant contributions to advance the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, which we greatly appreciate and welcome.

Mr. Ambassador, you have the floor to deliver your opening keynote address.

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Opening Keynote Address by
H.E. Amb. Kenji Hiramatsu
Ambassador of Japan
"What is Certain in an Age of Uncertainty"
Keynote Address by Ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu
At DPG International Conference "Emerging Realignments in Asia"
on March 10, 2017
Ambassador H.K. Singh,
Mr Siddharth Shriram.
Distinguished guests and speakers,

It is a great honor for me to deliver the keynote address at this important and timely conference. I would like to first congratulate and express my sincere appreciation to the Delhi Policy Group for the excellent arrangements for this seminar, and for their hospitality. I would also like to recognize the great efforts of DPG members who have worked hard to prepare for this seminar, particularly in conceptualizing its substance.

I am sure this seminar, which is aptly titled “Emerging Realignments in Asia”, will provide us with useful insights into the source of uncertainty and unpredictability of this precarious world.

Today, I will dwell on the sense of “certainty” in an age of uncertainty. As we all know, this is a critical moment for Asia and the world at large. Every day we hear about the “uncertainty” or “unpredictability” of the world affairs. Be it BREXIT, South China Sea, or the ballistic missile launch by North Korea... we never know what will happen tomorrow.

In my nearly 40 years as a diplomat, I haven't felt the kind of unprecedented degree of changes in international situations as witnessed in recent years, and it's further escalating.

Nevertheless, I confess that I feel very happy about my current job. This is because what I commit here every day is something I can feel “certain” in this age of uncertainty. That is: Strengthening Japan-India partnership; Supporting Japanese business in India; Forging ties between the people of the two countries. These are sincere efforts to create “certainty” which the people of the two countries can rely on towards the future.
To put it in other words, for the very reason that we are living in an age of uncertainty, Japan and India cherish our relationship, the relationship between the 2 oldest and the largest democracy in Asia. We share civilizational links, fundamental values and strategic interests, as well as respect for the rule of law and liberal international order.

Therefore today, as the Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of India, I will talk about 5 statements that I believe are certain in this increasingly changing world.

1. The Indo-Pacific region will be the centre of gravity in the years to come.

This is the first “certain” point I wish to make today. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific region is blessed with opportunities encompassing the fast growing region including India, and Africa with full potentials. This is where the magic of the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa should take place. At the same time, this region faces several challenges including attempts to change the status quo by force and influx of radical elements, to name a few.

Prime Minister Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” is Japan's response to such challenges and opportunities. It was announced at TICADVI or the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development last August in Kenya. In essence, this strategy regards the Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region as one big strategic domain (Indo-Pacific), and aims to improve inter- and intra-region connectivity and to promote fundamental values such as freedom, openness and rule of law. The strategy is also a statement of intent that Japan is ready to play a greater role in the Indian Ocean region with the banner of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.”

In his speech, Prime Minister Abe said, and I quote: “Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.” “Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity.”

As you must be aware, we can find close affinity between this Strategy and Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” Policy. In fact, our two Prime Ministers have “recognized the potential for deeper bilateral cooperation and synergy between” our respective Strategy and Policy during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan last November.
Japan and India are conscious of the common responsibilities we must bear in the maintenance of the liberal order in this part of the world and it is only natural that our national strategies converge.

2. Strong India is Japan’s interest. Strong Japan is India’s interest.

We’ve been saying this for nearly a decade. Recently an American official used a very similar phrase to describe the US-India relationship but I think it is our original creation.

Prime Minister Modi said that Japan and India enjoy spiritual ties, and there are great complementarities between the two countries. Japan has capital, innovation and technologies. India has vast human resources especially talented young people. India is now going through a very dynamic economic growth. We are hoping that this growth will continue for the years to come.

Our two leaders also enjoy mutual respect and confidence. They meet regularly and have visited each other’s countries many times. We have the Special Strategic and Global Partnership. I think our partnership is the only one which is special, strategic and global at the same time. Every time I join meetings between the two Prime Ministers, I feel that they are developing a closer relationship, and the degree of shared strategic views and insight between them is unprecedented. At the same time, Our Partnership has generated tangible outcomes such as high speed railway and civil nuclear cooperation, among others. I really feel that the relationship has entered into a new era.

I would like to highlight some of our bilateral and trilateral cooperation. One is connectivity agenda – not only connectivity between India and neighbouring countries but also connectivity within India. We are very happy to cooperate with the Indian Government to support projects in India’s northeast region to connect this very important region with other parts of India and with neighbouring countries. We are also working very closely with the Indian Government to support connectivity projects in countries such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh among others.

Defence and Security cooperation is also important. On Wednesday, Foreign Secretary Jaishankar and Defence Secretary Mohan Kumar and their Japanese counterparts, Akiba and Manabe met in Tokyo and had the fourth “2+2” Sub-cabinet Meeting. They discussed a wide range of areas of cooperation including
defence equipment and technology, counter-terrorism, maritime security, peace keeping operations, cyber and space.

Trilateral cooperation with the United States, Australia or even quadrilateral cooperation is also making a progress. Japan, India and the United States have started Director General level discussion in 2011. I led a delegation for four times since its inception. Under the President Trump’s administration, we would like to start trilateral cooperation as soon as possible to deepen our joint commitment in this region. We also have trilateral Malabar Exercise. The dates of this year’s joint exercise will be announced in due course.

This leads to my third statement of “certainty”

3. The unshakable Japan-US Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, prosperity and freedom in the Asia-Pacific region.

This is an excerpt from the first Joint Statement which the Trump Administration issued with a foreign government, i.e. on the occasion of Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the United States last month.

I am aware that there may be a certain skepticism about the continuity of the United States presence and commitment to Asia under President Trump.

From Japan’s perspective, it was very important to speak and share our thoughts at the earliest with the new U.S. administration. After the election, my colleagues in Washington DC worked day and night to realize the meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President-elect Trump in N.Y. as well as the two-day summit in DC and Florida last month.

One of the outcomes was the very robust Joint Statement about our alliance I mentioned earlier.

Japan and India alone cannot make this region peaceful and profitable. We need countries like the United States. During the two days Prime Minister Abe spent together with President Trump, they had very extensive and wide-ranging discussions to include not only security issues but also economic agenda. I am sure that they formed a bond of friendship, trust and confidence during the course of two day meetings.
Japan-US alliance will continue to be a linchpin and cornerstone of our relationship and of the entire security and safety of Asia-Pacific region. I can easily say that this is common goods for this region. As the Joint Statement says, “The United States and Japan will further enhance cooperation with allies and partners in the region.” India is the first country which should be mentioned.

The document also says that “The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to act in accordance with international law.” I think this is a very clear and important message to the world.

With regard to North Korea, the two countries strongly urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. However, on February 12, when the two leaders were staying in Florida, North Korea launched a ballistic missile which had a range of 500 km. The press conference was organized at midnight of the day. At the conference, Prime Minister Abe said very clearly that this launch of a ballistic missile was intolerable and North Korea should strictly abide by the UNSC resolutions. President Trump said “I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, which is a great ally, 100 percent.”

After this, North Korea did it again. They launched four ballistic missiles on Monday. They implied that the potential target was US Forces in Japan. Indeed, we are facing a very real and imminent threat. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, will be visiting Japan next week. I’m sure we will have in-depth discussions to address this issue.

To sum up, we had a good start with the Trump administration and we were reassured about US commitment to the region. We will continue to work with them on this assurance. I heard that Prime Minister Modi and President Trump had a very good telephone conversation. Based on that, we would like to have more robust trilateral cooperation between Japan, India and the United States.

My fourth point is:
4. Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law. And the rule of law for all of us.

This is the title of Prime Minister Abe’s keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014. I was the Director General responsible for this speech which emphasized the critical importance of the rule of law for the coexistence of big countries and small countries as well as the continued prosperity of the future generations.

Nowadays we talk about “balance of power” much more frequently. The ‘realist’ way to look at the world seems prevailing. Today’s seminar addresses ‘regional powerplay’, ‘new Asian great game’, ‘retreat of globalisation and Asian geo- 6 economics.’ I think all of those are the reflection of the reality and something which must be discussed extensively.

At the same time, I would say, as classic theories of international relations argue, we cannot neglect the impact of values, ideologies and laws in international affairs. Even in the age of the “Emerging Realignments in Asia,” I believe this simple statement should be taken for granted, i.e. “all countries must observe international law”.

International law prescribes the order, particularly order governing the seas. Its history is very long, stretching back to the days of ancient Greece. By Roman times, the seas were already kept open to all, with personal possession and partitioning of the sea prohibited.

Ever since what is known as the Age of Exploration, large numbers of people have come together by crossing the seas, and marine-based commerce has connected the globe. The principle of freedom on the high seas came to be established, and the seas became the foundation for human prosperity.

As history moved on, the wisdom and the practical experiences of a great many people involved with the sea, accumulated into common rules. This is what we now know as the international law of the seas.

This law was not created by any particular country or countries, nor was it the product of some sort of group. Instead, it is the product of our own wisdom, cultivated over a great many years for the well-being and the prosperity of all humankind.
Today, the benefits for each of us lie in the seas from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans being made thoroughly open, as a place of freedom and peace.

All of us should find one common benefit in keeping our oceans and skies as global commons, where the rule of law is respected throughout.

Prime Minister Abe proposed in his speech mentioned earlier the “three principles” of the rule of law at sea.

The first principle is that states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law.

The second is that states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims.

The third principle is that states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means.

These principles are very simple. And yet they must be emphasized. India’s adherence to the rule of law is worthy of admiration. One example is India’s compliance with an arbitral decision regarding a longstanding sea boundary dispute with Bangladesh. India accepted the ruling which was not entirely in their favour. People around the world praised India for its sense of responsibility for the peace and prosperity of the region.

Japan will continue to work with India and other like-minded countries to see a day when all of us individually uphold these principles exhaustively.

Finally, I will conclude my remarks with the fifth statement.

5. Japan always keeps its promises, standing ready as a partner for India to become a Leading Power.

I don’t think this statement needs any explanations. What I have spoken today supports this statement. Japan and India are best partners to navigate together in this unpredictable world. They complement, stimulate and enrich each other. This is a certain formula for growth and prosperity in years to come.

Thank you very much for your kind attention. I hope the seminar will be a great success.

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Session 1: Regional Powerplay
Chair's Opening Remarks by Ambassador Nalin Surie
Director General
ICWA
New Delhi, 10 March 2017

The subject of our Session is “Regional Powerplay” in the context of the overall title of today’s conference which is ‘Emerging Realignments in Asia’. We have two speakers from India and one each from Japan and Russia.

While I cannot prejudge what our distinguished panelists will focus on, it is my hope that in their presentations they will address the issue of the emerging realignment in Asia in totality and not simply in terms of the Asia Pacific. For us in India, it is as important to look to the west of India in the Asian context as it is to Look East.

While the South China Sea issue remains on the agenda, a new more disturbing and disquieting element has emerged in Northeast Asia namely the recent missile test by the DPRK and the responses of both the DPRK and China to the deployment by the United States of the THAAD missile system in the Republic of Korea. Japan cannot remain indifferent to this. The impeachment today morning of President Park by the Constitution Court in Seoul has only added to the complexity of the situation.

There now appears to be greater clarity about the US position on East and Southeast Asia under the new Trump administration. But it is still very much work in progress. The US stance on the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, West Asia etc. though has yet to be clearly articulated. Also, its position on relations with Russia is still not clear. It would, therefore, be very useful for us to hear from our Russian colleague not only about the future of Russia-US relations but also of the role that Russia intends to play in Asia in the coming years. Are Russia’s recent moves towards Asia, including in Afghanistan, part of a secular trend or only a probing operation?

No discussion on emerging realignment in Asia and regional power play can be complete without an effort to better understand the role that China intends to play. In his recent report to the National People’s Congress last week on 5 March 2017, Premier Li Keqiang provided clear pointers to Chinese policy. He said that China will push ahead with the Belt and Road initiative and work to
increase complementarity between the development strategies of China and other countries along the routes; China is preparing to face a more complicated and graver situation in the world that could cause instability and uncertainty; that China will move faster to develop into a strong maritime country and will resolutely safeguard its maritime interests; that China will accelerate the building of over land economic corridors and maritime cooperation hubs. He also stressed that China would continue to protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese.

On the purely military side, Li Keqiang made it clear that China will boost military training and preparedness so as to ensure that the sovereignty, security and development interests of China are firmly and effectively safeguarded; that China will strengthen maritime and air defence, border control and effectively organize operations to counter terrorism, safeguard stability, provide escort in the high seas etc. He also made it clear that China will offer constructive proposals for addressing global hotspot issues and will improve the mechanisms and capacity for protecting China’s rights and interests overseas.

In effect, Chinese activism in Asia will continue to be unrelenting.

The first IORA Summit has just concluded in Jakarta and has adopted a Concord (7.3.2017). This is a significant development. In the words of the V.P. of India who attended the Summit, this is a “milestone document that underscores the criticality of maritime safety and security”. In this Concord, the 21 member countries have, inter-alia, committed to "ensuring that countries in the region can exercise freedom of navigation and over flight in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS, as constitution for the Oceans". This commitment will have a bearing on issues of regional powerplay that extends beyond the Indian Ocean region to the entire Indo-Pacific.

Any discussion on regional powerplay would also need to address the broader economic issues at play in Asia. The decision of the United States to withdraw, under the Trump administration, from the TPP brings back into focus the issue of the various free trade arrangements under discussion. In this, I include the RCEP, the FTAAP and other regional and sub-regional arrangements in Asia. I have already spoken of the Chinese intention to persevere with their maritime and over land initiatives under OBOR on the basis of seeking greater complementarity.
Like Japan and the ROK, the United States is a major economic partner not only in Southeast and East Asia but also in the Gulf region and in Australia. Its investment interests in South Asia are growing. Similarly, substantial investibles are available with the Gulf countries, with India and several ASEAN countries. There are also serious European economic interests in Asia. An effort would have to be made to reconcile the different trade and investment interests involved with a view to ensuring that the economic dynamism of Asia is not only sustained but strengthened.

With these few words, let me ask our distinguished panelists to make their respective presentations. They will speak for about 12-15 minutes each so that we have around half an hour left for discussion.

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Abstract by
Professor Brahma Chellany
Professor of Strategic Studies
Centre for Policy Research
Abstract by Professor Brahma Chellany, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research

Session 1: Regional Powerplay

Abstract of remarks by Prof. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research

The “Asian Century” faces impediments, which include China’s territorial revisionism in East China Sea, South China Sea, the Himalayas and over Himalayan rivers. North Korea is another challenge.

Fault lines are emerging. There is a widening gap between economics and politics. FTAs are no guarantee of stable relations among estranged neighbours. Second, there is no security framework and consultation mechanisms are weak. Third, there is a history problem, with the past imperiling the present.

There is competition for natural resources, like in the Senkaku and Spratly islands where the surrounding seas are rich in resources. Claims and disputes are being driven by a military dimension.

There are four possible scenarios:

We are seeing the rise of a Sino-centric Asia with China enforcing its own Monroe doctrine. China supports a multipolar world, but wants a unipolar Asia (opposite of the US). But can China really enforce such a doctrine in Asia? China is rising but rest of Asia is also rising. Despite its military built-up, China cannot impose itself on peer rivals and neighbours. Japan’s geopolitical rise is a response. Japan is developing its own A2/AD in the East China Sea to keep China inside the first island chain.

Can China become a US peer rival without allies? The more its power grows, the fewer are its allies. Relations with North Korea are withering. Pakistan is China’s only ally but apart from its use in containing India, it is a dubious ally to love.

China is pursuing OBOR to bring regional states under its influence, offering rapacious financing to impose a debt trap. Sri Lanka is an example.

The second scenario is the US continuing as a security anchor. Can the US recoup its credibility after weak-kneed policies under Obama? The Scarborough Shoal
was taken and seven artificial islands constructed by China under the watch of Obama, without any cost. The pivot to Asia was more rhetorical than real.

The third scenario for the region is a constellation of Asian states to ensure equilibrium through a web of strategic partnerships among them, creating stability.

The fourth scenario can be Asia with many resurgent powers such as Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Korea, Australia and India, which are militarily independent but are close strategic friends of the US.

We have to wait and see which of these scenarios will prevail, but it is significant that all of Asia’s emerging powers are US allies or partners.
Abstract and Presentation by
Yuichi Hosoya
Keio University
Japan and the Rise of Illiberal International Order in the Asia-Pacific

In the last five years, we have seen a new trend in international order. That is the rise of illiberal international order which seems to deny the rule-based international order.

In 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea regardless of the criticism coming from international community on its illegality. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague denied Chinese territorial claims in the South China Seas. These developments undeniably eroded the rule-based liberal international order. Newly elected U.S. President Trump declared that the U.S. would become unrivaled nuclear power with its modernization.

Japan’s approach to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific is based more on non-military tools. First, Japan has been assisting capacity building of coast guards in the ASEAN countries. Second, Japan has been keen on consolidating the rule of law in this Asia-Pacific. Third, it has enhanced its security partnership with leading powers in the Indo-Pacific region such as India, Australia, and Republic of Korea. These should contribute to revitalize the rule-based international order as well as stability in the region.

***
1. Structural Changes in International Order in the Asia-Pacific

Followings are the main sources of structural change in regional order:

- **The Rise of China**: The rise of China and its assertive military activities in the East and the South China Seas have radically changed strategic relations in the region.

- **The Trump Administration**: The US administration under President Donald Trump has been presenting new directions of U.S. foreign and security policy.

- **Nationalism and Populism**: The spread of both nationalism and populism in many countries in the region make diplomatic solution based on rational compromises more difficult than before.

- **The Decline of Liberal International Order**: Today, the liberal international order faces the greatest challenge in our time.
2. The Crisis in American Alliances

*Trump’s foreign policy will possibly affect American alliance system:*

- **Values and Norms**: President Trump has shown no interest in values and norms which bind American alliance system. Trump’s grand bargaining with Russia and China will possibly damage the vital interest of American allies.

- **Regional Stability**: American alliances have been the main source of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. However, as President Trump will possibly show no particular interest in regional stability or rule-based liberal international order in the region, we will see more unpredictability.

- **War**: If the U.S. would abandon some of its own traditional military commitments, that would result in instability, unexpected confrontation, or possibly an unwanted war.
3. Japan’ Response to Structural Changes

- **More Proactive Contribution to Peace**: Japan’s government under Prime Minister Abe must play a larger role in bringing regional stability.

- **Balancing**: Abe’s Cabinet is now enhancing its friendly relationships with India and Russia, as both China and the U.S. are taking a new course on their foreign policy.

- **Enduring Value of the Alliance**: Japan should continue to enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance by encouraging the new U.S. administration to learn the increasing value of the alliance, as there is no alternative to it.

- **Enhancing Japan’s Partnership with India and Australia**: Japan must further enhance its economic, political and security cooperation with like-minded democracies such as India and Australia together with Japan’s alliance partnership with the U.S.

- **Regional Cooperation**: Japan should use the China-Japan-ROK trilateral summit meeting as a tool for reassuring both China and the ROK on the importance of better cooperation.
Presentation by
Dr. Feodor Voitolovsky
Deputy Director for International Politics
IMEMO
EMERGING BALANCE OF POWER IN INDO-PACIFIC REGION

DR. FEODOR VOITOLOVSKY

NEW DELHI, 2017
SHARE OF WORLD GDP, %, 2030

GDP – PPP 2009
Source: IMEMO’s Statistics

China: 24.4%
US: 15.6%
EU: 14.9%
Russia: 3.7%
Others: 41.4%

Source: IMEMO’s Statistics
## DYNAMICS OF US – CHINA TRADE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports from US to China</strong></td>
<td>69,5 (6.6%)</td>
<td>91,8 (7.2%)</td>
<td>103,8 (7%)</td>
<td>110,6 (7.2%)</td>
<td>121,7</td>
<td>123,6</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imports from China to US</strong></td>
<td>309,5 (19.3%)</td>
<td>382,9 (19.5%)</td>
<td>417,3 (18.4%)</td>
<td>444,4 (19%)</td>
<td>440,4</td>
<td>468,4</td>
<td>483,2</td>
<td>462,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnover</strong></td>
<td>379</td>
<td>474,7</td>
<td>521,1</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>562,1</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>599,2</td>
<td>578,5</td>
</tr>
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*Source: United States Census Bureau [http://www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov)*
• All figures are in billions of current USD
### DYNAMICS OF US – INDIA TRADE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports from US to India</strong></td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>19,2</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>22,1</td>
<td>21,8</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>21,4</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imports from India to US</strong></td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>36,1</td>
<td>40,5</td>
<td>41,8</td>
<td>45,3</td>
<td>44,7</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnover</strong></td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>38,7</td>
<td>57,6</td>
<td>66,6</td>
<td>63,6</td>
<td>66,8</td>
<td>66,1</td>
<td>68</td>
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- **Source**: United States Census Bureau [http://www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov)
- **All figures** are in billions of current USD
# DYNAMICS OF US - RUSSIA TRADE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports from US to Russia</strong></td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>8,3</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>5,7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imports from Russia to US</strong></td>
<td>18,1</td>
<td>25,7</td>
<td>34,6</td>
<td>29,3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23,6</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td>14,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnover</strong></td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>31,6</td>
<td>42,9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38,1</td>
<td>34,3</td>
<td>23,3</td>
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*Source: United States Census Bureau [http://www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov)*

- All figures are in billions of current USD
### MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF LEADING MILITARY POWERS (IN BILLIONS OF USD)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>666.3</td>
<td>690.9</td>
<td>687.0</td>
<td>655.3</td>
<td>633.3 (640)*</td>
<td>620.5 (610)*</td>
<td>631 (596)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>114.7 (177)*</td>
<td>132 (199)*</td>
<td>145 (214)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>67.7 (88)*</td>
<td>70.1 (84,5)*</td>
<td>53 (66,4)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>38,7*</td>
<td>46*</td>
<td>49,6*</td>
<td>47,2*</td>
<td>47,4*</td>
<td>50,9*</td>
<td>51*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All figures are based on open official sources (in current USD)

*Figures according to «Trends in world military expenditure» SIPRI Yearbook, 2016 (in current USD)
Abstract and Presentation by
Brig. Arun Sahgal(Retd.)
Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
Regional Power Play: Politico-Military Assessment

Today’s Asian scenario is riddled with competing strategic and politico-economic imperatives. The emerging contours of the prevailing situational dynamics are marked by US retrenchment and perception of weakness in relation to its adversaries. China is attempting to seize this opportunity to enhance its geopolitical space and test the limits of American strategic engagement by hardwiring its periphery through economic, political, military, connectivity initiatives. These signals indicate towards a destabilizing turning point in the Asian power game. Scenario is unstable but NOT yet critical. The complexity of the challenge lies in managing overlapping and sometimes-conflicting interests of both major and emerging powers.

The criticality of the emerging scenario of power play lies in how US will shape its Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and deal with the growing Chinese assertive and bellicose behavior, marked by creeping maritime expansion and warnings to major and other regional players not to get involved in the 'big power's' play. On the other hand what will be the new American administrations Asia-Pacific policy? Will enhanced US military posture and economic pressures force China to tone down its bellicosity and address adverse trade balance by opening up its economy? Similarly, how will the major powers in Asia like India and Japan shape their regional strategies to deal with the incremental Chinese challenge.

Importantly the US-China impasse has led to the collapse of ASEAN centric regional security architecture and institutional setup in dealing with hard security issues. A marked shift from economic cooperation to strategic distrust is resulting in a new model of big power relations, based on contestation and leveraging of strategic space, which is likely to lead to tensions and jockeying for power. The presentation outlines three probable scenarios that can be conceived to be evolving out of this ongoing power flux in the Asia-Pacific Region, namely: a) An Assertive China, b) Assertive US and supporting Major Powers, c) Major Powers and US as offshore balancer.

***
REGIONAL POWER PLAY: POLITICO – MILITARY ASSESSMENT

PRESENTATION BY
BRIG ARUN SAHGAL, PhD
SENIOR FELLOW, DPG
INTRODUCTION

- The ongoing power flux, in Asia is marked by strategic competition between Eurasian heartland and Indo-Pacific Rimland.

- Scenario is marked by perception of US retrenchment and relative weakness in relation to adversaries.

- China is attempting to seize this geopolitical space in its revitalization quest, by hardwiring and expanding its periphery thru economic, political, military and connectivity initiatives.

- Its intention is to test the limits of American strategic engagement and attempt to reshape the existing balance of power in its favor and impose a China centric Asian order.
INTRODUCTION

- Eroding US role and growing Chinese economic and commercial heft backed by assertive military posturing particularly around its maritime claims is creating disarray among the ASEAN countries.

- Present trends indicate a destabilizing turning point in the Asian power game, particularly as it becomes harder for US to portray itself as guarantor of regional security.

- Complexity of challenge lies in managing overlapping and sometimes conflicting major and emerging power interests.

- Prevailing strategic balance is becoming increasingly unstable but has NOT yet reached critical proportions.
ASIAN POWER PLAY
EMERGING EURASIAN BLOC
INDO - PACIFIC RIMLAND (UNDER STRESS)

*Boundaries in this map are inaccurate
US–China competitive dynamics for Asian dominance is at the heart of prevailing flux.

Each side is attempting to preserve (in case of US) or carve out (in case of China) its respective spheres of influence.

The dynamics at play in case of the US could include:

- Attempts by Trump administration to put China on notice for seeking strategic gains in Asia at American expense.
- Enhancing US military presence in Asia–Pacific and leveraging it through calibrated military posturing, to reassure allies and strategic partners.
- Hold China accountable for trade mercantilism and currency manipulation in its attempts to dominate American and global markets.
- Pressuring China to open its markets to address growing US-China trade deficit amounting to nearly $ 300 billion.
ASIA – PACIFIC REGIONAL POWER PLAY

- Chinese perspective on the other hand is shaped by its emergence as the prime regional economic and military power with the ability to:
  - Enhance its political and economic influence along its strategic periphery initially in the continental domain.
  - Addressing its maritime vulnerability, through creeping claims in the SCS and ECS, by leveraging its enhanced naval power.
  - Establishing a favourable Asian Order, especially as the existing regional configuration of power precludes effective containment strategies.
  - Sino–Russian détente is seen as helping China to expand its geo-political and geo-economic space from Eurasia to the Asia-Pacific.
Impact on major and other regional Actors:

- Chinese bellicosity and assertiveness is creating friction and discord among major Asian players.

- Chinese brinkmanship and territorial ambitions are driving Japan towards a more robust self defence posture and bilateral strategic partnerships with major players like India and Australia.

- Concerned by increasing Chinese coercive pressure, India is being forced to build strategic partnerships as also to develop credible military and strategic capabilities.

- Coalescing of these trends could help create counterbalance to China and stable regional architecture.
ASEAN

- The US – China impasse has led to the near collapse of ASEAN centric regional security architecture and the failure of ASEAN institutions in dealing with hard security issues.

- Resultantly, regional actors are attempting to strengthen bilateral security frameworks with major powers and a game of hedging and rebalancing is at full play.

Other Issues

- The expanding strategic gap and China’s aggressive behavior is posing multiple long term security challenges, leading to substantial increase in military budgets.

- More importantly, strategic collusion between China and Pakistan and China and DPRK is exacerbating regional nuclear threat and proliferation challenges.
PROBABLE SCENARIOS

· Shift from economic cooperation to strategic distrust is resulting in a new model of great power relations, based on contestation and leveraging for strategic space.

· Following scenarios can be conceived:
  · Assertive China. Economically and militarily strong China seizes the opportunity in the face of a wavering US to extend its influence both in continental and maritime domains, including the IOR, creating what can be called a ‘modern day tributary system’.
PROBABLE SCENARIOS


- Major Powers and US as Offshore Balancer. In this competitive scenario, China in concert with Russia attempts to leverage peripheral and maritime influence. Maintaining balance of power will depend upon major power ability to stand up to the challenge by leveraging US support. Insecurity, tensions and jockeying for power will prevail.
• Denial of accommodation of others’ interests by China will cause instability and encourage major powers to adopt balancing strategies.

• On the other hand, China’s strategic restraint will largely pre-empt balancing motives. Beijing should join the US and major regional powers to sustain an order based on norms and rules from which China has itself benefited for almost a half century.

• Asian architecture must be based on broader multi-polar stability in the Asia-Pacific.

• The US needs to recalibrate its regional policies under the Trump administration to inject robust confidence and resonance into its posture.

• To create a rules-based order, major powers need to act as stakeholders through engagement rather than confrontation.
THANK YOU
Session 2: US, China and Multipolar Asia
Abstract and Presentation by
Amb. Biren Nanda
Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
The United States, China and Multipolar Asia

China has consistently pursued its core goals of asserting control over territories and waters that it deemed historically, to be a part of the country. China has also sought to reestablish its traditional influence over its neighborhood including Southeast Asia.

China’s strategic agenda seeks to ensure the maintenance of an environment conducive to economic growth; access to resources and markets and to defeat attempts at encirclement.

The US enabled China’s rise through giving access to markets and technology and China reciprocated through mercantilist trade practices, IPR violations and technology theft. There was the absence of efforts at power balancing, containing or hedging against China’s rise. FDI into China came from countries most affected by China’s rise.

After the GFC the US dominance of global affairs was an immediate casualty and China began to test limits of the US strategic presence in Asia. China considers the current period to be one of great strategic opportunity and has acted aggressively with her neighbors over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. China has also sought to create new international financial institutions as an alternative to the Bretton Woods system. China has promoted strategic projects like the OBOR, CPEC and the Maritime Silk-road. China projects a benign image in its official pronouncements, but its actions bear a disregard of core interests of others.

How are US and other powers in multipolar Asia responding to the Chinese challenge? The US rebalance to Asia, a revitalized Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the steady rise of India are shaping responses to the Chinese challenge. The Russian pivot east is veering towards China to the exclusion of other Asian powers. ASEAN centric regional security architecture has been stymied by the impasse between the US and China and ASEAN unity has cracked under Chinese pressure.
India has addressed its security dilemma by moving closer towards the United States. India and Japan are strategically acting in concert to encourage China towards a greater recognition of multi-polarity in Asia.

The strengthening of the US economy and military under President Trump will increase the US military heft in Asia. Trump’s currency and trade policies are also likely to disrupt the Chinese economic model. He is also likely to confront China in its creeping aggression in the region. This contended scenario between China and the United States will likely continue for a decade. China and the US will be the major power powers in maritime Southeast Asia and the US will likely limit Chinese efforts at coercion, unilateral assertion and dominance in the region. As a consequence China will have to curb its aggressive assertions and play the role of a constructive partner in the upholding of rules based order in the region.

***
UNITED STATES, CHINA AND MULTIPOLAR ASIA

by Amb. Biren Nanda, Senior Fellow, DPG
CHINAS CORE GOALS SINCE 1949
Since 1949 China has been engaged in a drive to regain its rightful place in the world and this drive has two components:

1. **The drive for unity** – control of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and China’s assertion of historical claims over territories and waters on China’s periphery.

2. **The drive to restore China’s traditional influence** on her neighborhood including Southeast Asia.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC AGENDA IN ASIA

- Maintain a stable political and security environment, conducive to China’s economic growth.
- Maintain and expand trade routes transiting Southeast Asia including dominance in the South China Sea
- Gain access to regional energy resources and raw materials
- Develop trade relationships for economic and political purposes
- Isolate Taiwan
- Gain influence in the region to defeat perceived attempts at strategic encirclement or containment
THE US ENABLED CHINA’S RISE
US ENABLED CHINA’S RISE

- US enabled China’s rise after 1971 in the context of the cold war.

- Logically, the US should have changed its policy when the cold war ended in 1991.

- However, the US continued giving China unprecedented market access and access to technology in the hope that China would be a responsible participant in the liberal rules-based order.

- Instead, China with its non-free market economy resorted to mercantilist trade practices, restricted market access and indulged in IPR violations, cyber espionage and technology theft.
GEOECONOMICS TRUMPED GEOPOLITICS IN EAST ASIA SINCE THE 90S

- Multinational firms willing to do whatever it took to enter the China Market.
- Absence of efforts at power balancing, containing or hedging against China’s rise
- Cross border production networks benefitted East Asian countries but made them less resilient to Chinese pressure
- China’s support to Southeast Asian countries in 1997 made China a major player in Asia.
- FDI into China came from countries most affected by China’s Rise.
- Cumulative effects of these developments generated major geopolitical consequences for Asia and the World.
RETURN TO THE IMPERATIVES OF GEOPOLITICS IN EAST ASIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

- China has transitioned from a softer approach towards regional territorial disputes to a muscular and assertive policy particularly in the South China Sea, accompanied by a massive buildup of naval power.

- The US pivot to Asia belatedly focused on meeting the strategic challenge posed by China’s rise.

- Chinese pressure broke ASEAN unity on the South China Sea Issue from 2012 onwards.
CHINA SAW A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE PERCEIVED DECLINE OF US POWER AFTER THE ONSET OF GFC
After the Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) US dominance of world affairs was an immediate casualty and China began to test the limits of American strategic presence in Asia.

China began to act aggressively with her neighbors over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.

The expanding strategic gap with China and China’s aggressive behavior pose multiple long term security challenges for countries in Asia.

The strategic collusion between China and Pakistan and China and the DPRK exacerbates security challenges for India and Japan.
CHINA’S NEW “ACTIVE” DIPLOMACY

- China perceives the current phase of relative decline in US Power as a period of great strategic opportunity.

- China has become increasingly assertive on the world stage in particular on its so-called “core” interests.

- China has played the lead in creating new financial institutions like the BRICS Bank and the AIIB as an alternative to the institutions that are part of the Bretton Woods System.

- China has promoted its strategic agenda along its periphery through the OBOR and Maritime Silk Road Projects.
China nominally recognizes ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN centric Regional Security Architecture, but includes CICA, SCO, the Six Party Talks, the Xiangshan Dialogue and other forums in its conception of the New Security Architecture.

- It advocates that Asia should be left to Asians.

- China’s New Security Architecture has **Three Objectives**

1. To dilute US influence over the strategic discourse in the region.
2. To advocate partnerships with China as an alternative to alliances.
3. To reverse the reputational damage to China on account of its creeping aggression and muscle flexing in the South China Sea.
China claims to seek a peaceful international environment to pursue its development and emphasizes cooperation and mutual benefit between countries.

- China calls for trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and common prosperity.
HOW DOES THE COMFORTING RHETORIC OF CHINESE DIPLOMACY MEASURE UP TO REALITY?

- China has done little to allay the concerns of her neighbours. While paying lip service to negotiating the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea China has shown little interest in concluding the negotiations.

- China rejected the PCA ruling on the Philippines’ complaint on points of law related to sovereignty and territorial claims in the Spratlys and has proceeded with militarization of reefs in the Spratlys.

- China has made coercive territorial assertions in the East China Sea where it claims the Senkaku Islands.

- China continues to project territorial claims along its border with India and has made periodic excursions into Indian territory.
RECENT FAILURES OF CHINESE DIPLOMACY

- Muscle flexing by China after the PCA ruling caused considerable reputational damage to China’s image as a law abiding nation.

- South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system was linked to Beijing’s failure to restrain the DPRK from flexing its nuclear muscle. Now China is pursuing unofficial sanctions in order to impose costs on South Korea.

- Chinese aggressive activity near the Senkaku Islands had a major impact on the Japanese decision to reinterpret the constitution to allow collective self defense under the alliance with the US.
THE RESPONSE TO CHINA’S ASSERTIONS OF POWER
THE US ROLE

- The US rebalance to Asia, a revitalized Japan under Prime Minister Abe and the steady rise of India are beginning to shape responses to the Chinese Challenge.

- Middle and small powers in Asia are counting on the support of the US to strengthen their defense capabilities.

- The Maritime Security Initiative launched by the US is a laudable step that will help create stronger independent partners capable of defending themselves.

- The United States has strengthened cooperation with allies as well non allied partner countries like India.
RUSSIA’S PIVOT EAST

- Russia’s pivot east is veering towards China, to the exclusion of other Asian powers, big or small. The ruling elites in Russia, however, remain Eurocentric.

- The comfort of this convergence has created strategic room for China’s expanding geo-political and geo-economic dominance, from Eurasia to the Asia Pacific.

- Designed to construct a Russia-China strategic entente, with common goals and agendas, encompassing both economic and political components.

- While progress on deepening the economic drivers seems to have stalled, there is ongoing intensification of Russia-China diplomatic, defense and military-to-military ties.
FAILURE OF REGIONAL EFFORTS TO BUILD EFFECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

- ASEAN centric Regional Security Architecture has been stymied by the impasse between the United States and China.
- ASEAN cohesion has collapsed under relentless Chinese pressure.
- Consensus based decision making in the ASEAN centric security institutions has failed in dealing with hard security issues.
- Regional States are now engaged with strengthening bilateral security frameworks with each other and with major powers.
- The growing dependence of Southeast Asian countries on China has diminished their capacity to stand up to China.
India is developing pragmatic, interest based partnerships that advance a favorable balance of power and ensure India’s rise.

In practical terms, India has addressed its security dilemmas by moving closer to the United States and by strengthening security partnerships with key regional powers, especially Japan.

The US is today India’s key partner across various domains. The India US Joint Strategic Vision for the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific now has a roadmap for implementation.
THE KEY TO DIFFUSING TENSIONS IN THE REGION

- As India strengthens its Act East balancing in East Asia, we can hopefully encourage China towards a greater recognition of multi-polarity in Asia.

- In the interest of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia, China needs to be sensitive to the concerns and interests of her Asian neighbors.

- As Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed to President Xi Jianping of China on the sidelines of the G20 summit, India and China should respect “each other’s aspirations, concerns and strategic interests”.
The India Japan Relationship plays a decisive role in balancing Asia.

Japan should continue to support India’s economic rise.

To be effective, India-Japan ties must expand strategically in all areas—economic, security and defense.

Only by acting strategically and in concert can we encourage China towards a greater recognition of multi-polarity in Asia.
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE PORTEND?
WHAT IS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LIKELY TO DO?

- The US economy will gain from tax and regulatory reform as well as investments in infrastructure.
- The strengthening of America’s military will add considerably to the United States military heft in Asia and Europe.
- Pressuring China on trade and currency issues will disrupt the Chinese economic model and impose some costs on US Industry as well.
- The US is more likely to confront China’s creeping aggression in Asia and China may have to back down from its current assertive behavior.
Regional stability has hitherto been built on the role of the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Asia Pacific.

Presently there is increasing contestation between the US rebalancing strategy and the growing maritime and territorial interests of China.

This contended scenario is likely to continue for the next decade.

Small and middle powers in the region will therefore have to engage in power balancing to protect themselves against any potential adverse consequences of China’s rise.
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR EAST ASIA?

It is possible to discern Four Strategic Trends

- First, power asymmetry and economic interdependence between China and East Asia will continue to grow.

- Second, China and the US will be the major power powers in maritime East Asia and the US will likely limit Chinese efforts at coercion, unilateral assertion and dominance in the region.

- Third, China will likely modify its behavior and play the role of a constructive partner in upholding the rules based order in the region.

- Fourth, many small and middle powers in East Asia will continue to look at the US as the principal security guarantor.
THANK YOU
US, China and Multipolar Asia

The growth of Chinese power continues to cause anxiety in most countries in the Indo-Pacific region. China has provided no clarity about its long term intentions and ambitions, and poses challenges to some aspects of the rule-based order. Most countries continue to look to the US to balance China’s rise. But no country wants to see US-China conflict, and none wants to be forced to choose between the United States and China. The election of Donald Trump has introduced enormous uncertainty into US foreign policy, which has exacerbated regional concerns about US commitment and staying power. Trump’s policies are still evolving, but there are impulses that are cause for concern, including lack of interest in multilateralism, support for trade protectionism, focus on security challenges in the Middle East, little discussion of values, and an absence of grand strategy to manage China’s rise. It is still early days, however, and it is therefore premature to draw certain conclusions. Policy reviews are underway on specific issues, including policy toward North Korea and the South China Sea. As time passes, the Trump administration is likely to strike a new balance with China between engagement and deterrence, and between cooperation and conflict. US allies and partners need to be patient, but also use available opportunities to communicate their concerns, preferences, and initiatives to the Trump administration.

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Abstract and Presentation by
Professor. Carlyle A. Thayer
Emeritus Professor
Australian Defence Force Academy
Australia: Trump’s USA, China and Multipolar Asia

Since Federation in 1901, Australia’s most important strategic ally was also its largest trading partner. This is no longer the case. The U.S. remains Australia’s main ally but China is Australia’s largest trading partner. Successive Australian governments have had to adjust to this geo-strategic reality. The current government argues there is no ‘China choice’ because Australia can successfully manage its relations with the United States and China. Prior to Trump’s election Australian government officials pragmatically declared they would work with whomever was elected. Australia’s strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific has become even more complex due to the uncertainties surrounding the Trump Administration’s political-diplomatic, economic and foreign-defence-security policies. Australia is wary that Trump may call for an increased Australian military commitment in Syria and being drawn into a Sino-U.S. confrontation in the South China Sea. This presentation discusses the challenges and opportunities for Australia by the Trump’s America First policy, protectionism and economic nationalism, economic relations with China, and alliance commitments (Japan, South Korea and Australia). At a time of heightened uncertainty the Turnbull government continues to promote multilateral trade arrangements, improving defence-security ties with Japan and Indonesia, and meeting its alliance commitments to the United States. Relations with India appear to be a work in progress.
Australia: Trump’s USA, China and Multipolar Asia

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Presentation to International Conference on Emerging Re-Alignments in Asia
sponsored by the Delhi Policy Group
The Claridges Hotel, New Delhi
March 10, 2017
Outline

1. Strategic Uncertainties
2. China’s Rise
3. America First
4. Alliance Management
5. South China Sea
6. Challenges and Opportunities
7. The Way Ahead
Introduction

- 1901-1960s Australia’s most important strategic ally was its largest trade partner
- 1960s Japan overtook the US
- 2008 China overtook Japan
- China’s rise has exacerbated strategic uncertainty
- Australia does not have to choose sides, it can manage both relations
The Trump Administration

• New strategic uncertainties
• America First policy
  – Economic protectionism
  – Foreign policy unilateralism
  – Depreciation of US leadership role
• War against the ‘Islamic State’
• US push for market access to China/One China
  – A double edged sword
Strategic Uncertainties: China’s Rise

• Slower economic growth, economic stability
  – Australia’s economy has benefitted
• Growing military power projection
• South China Sea and artificial islands
• Refashioning EA/Indo-Pacific regional order
  – From TPP to RCEP
  – How to give China space?
• Confront or collude with Trump?
Strategic Uncertainties: America First

• Who do you go to in Washington?
  – Trump’s inner circle, pecking order in The White House, role of the National Security Council
  – Do the Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence speak for Trump?

• Trump’s style of governance
  – addiction to tweeting
  – Unclear and blurred lines of authority
Strategic Uncertainties: America First

• Market access to China – balanced trade?
  – Currency manipulator, higher tariffs?
• Economic protectionism
  – Withdrawal from TPP
  – US has FTAs with six TPP signatories
  – Australia pursues TPP without the US
  – Australia mulls TPP with China
• Review of international conventions
Strategic Uncertainties: Alliance Management

- Trump’s campaign tweets on allies
- Taiwan’s president calls President-elect
- Trump-Turnbull phone call 10 Nov 2016
  - US Navy build up, Australia’s naval ship building
- Trump-Turnbull phone call 2 Dec 2016
  - Obama deal to resettle refugees
  - ‘worst deal ever’ and ‘worst call by far’
  - Is this the way to treat a long-standing ally?
Strategic Uncertainties: Alliance Management

- Trump and One China policy negotiable?
- Ambassador Joe Hockey follow up
- Japan’s Prime Minister visits Sydney
- China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Canberra
- Foreign Minister Julie Bishop in Washington
- Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo visits
- Head of CIA to visit Canberra – Five Eyes
Strategic Uncertainties: South China Sea

• China dispatches *Liaoning* and H-6 bomber
• Rex Tillerson confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
  – Written response to Senator Ben Cardin
• James Mattis confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Forces Committee
• Sean Spicer, Press Secretary, weighs in
• Secretary Mattis’ comments in Tokyo
South China Sea  Australia’s Response

• Former Prime Minister Paul Keating on Tillerson: ‘ludicrous’
• Former CDF Sir Angus Houston does not support U.S. freedom of navigation (FON)
  – Defence Minister Marise Payne ‘constructive contribution’
• Labor Opposition supports U.S. FON
• Foreign Minister Julie Bishop - neutral
Strategic Uncertainties: Challenges and Opportunities

- US engagement and leadership
- China-US strategic competition
- North Korea ballistic missiles and nuclear proliferation
- Militarisation of South China Sea
- Multilateral free trade mechanism — RCEP or FTAAP?
- ANZUS Alliance — shared interests and values?
The Way Ahead

• Australia full court diplomatic press to engage the United States

• Enhanced engagement with the Indo-Pacific
  – Trilateral US-Japan-Australia
  – Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and India
  – Quadrilateral US-Japan-India and Australia?
  – Enhanced bilateral engagement with China

• Multipolar or multi-nodal/multilateral
Australia: Trump’s USA, China and Multipolar Asia

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Email: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au
Session 3: India and Japan in the New Asian Great Game
Chair's Opening Remarks by
Amb. H.K. Singh
Director General
Delhi Policy Group
Brief introduction of Speakers.

The India-Japan partnership has been built progressively over the past 15 years and promoted by all Governments on both sides. However, the intensity of engagement has reached an entirely new level under Prime Ministers Modi and Abe, reflecting the close affinities among them and imparting strength and resilience to both countries.

- A comprehensive architecture has been created for strategic partnership, security cooperation, defence collaboration and high technology access.
  - India and Japan have just held the annual Two-Plus-Two Dialogue in Tokyo

- Cumulatively, Japan is today India’s foremost economic partner (ODA, FDI, job creation)

- We are jointly pursuing “strategic economic relations’ to accelerate India’s economic rise: infrastructure corridors, urban and high speed rail, public and private investment (approx. $50 billion over five years)
  - There remains, however, a hiatus on trade policy issues. CEPA utilization remains low (ROO issue)

- Progress on defence ties despite framework agreements being in place, has been slow. Lack of past experience on this front has played a role, but there is also a definite need to strengthen domestic constituencies for more robust defence technology and trade cooperation.

- There is nascent cooperation on regional connectivity and joint third country initiatives.

- On sharing the net security burden across the Indo-Pacific maritime littoral, there is policy convergence but insufficient content. Both India and Japan need to step up this area of cooperation for regional reassurance.
• Similarly, the India-Japan-US Trilateral has potential but lacks meaningful content.

• Finally, there is need to intensify our joint efforts to bolster the role of institutions like the EAS in fostering a rules-based order and a stable regional security architecture.

• In this session, we are privileged to welcome not only our speakers from Japan and India, but also Ambassador Nguyen Van Tho from Vietnam. We look forward to hearing his views on the role India and Japan can together play in bolstering security and prosperity in South East Asia.

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Abstract and Presentation by
Sanjay Pulipaka
Senior Consultant
ICRIER
India, Japan and Asian Multipolarity

It has become clichéd to talk about power-shift in global politics. However, defining the power-shift is becoming increasingly difficult. Broadly, Asia is witnessing triple dynamic viz., increasing multipolarity, growing interconnectedness and intensification of territorial/maritime disputes. Asia is not only witnessing the rise of China, but it is also witnessing the rise of the others. With the relative decline of the US and growing perception about its commitments in the Indo-Pacific region, important countries in the region are taking a “rest of Asia” approach. The emerging economies of Asia are characterised by integrated supply chains. While China’s Belt and Road initiative is grabbing global headlines, others are also implementing numerous connectivity projects. There is increased economic interconnectedness, growing physical connectivity and yet territorial/maritime disputes have grown in intensity. It is indeed ironic that the large economies are locked into, what seems to be, intractable conflicts. For instance, China (the second largest economy) has a territorial dispute with Japan (third largest economy). China and India (recently the fifth largest economy) also have a contested boundary. The Southeast Asian countries are experiencing intense anxiety due to the South China Sea dispute. The proposed presentation will locate the India-Japan bilateral relationship in this evolving Asian geopolitical context. The presentation will also map the policies of India and Japan that are aimed at strengthening the Asian multipolarity.

# The views expressed are personal
India, Japan and the Asian Multipolarity

Sanjay Pulipaka, Senior Consultant, ICRIER
How Do We Define…

- How do we define the world that we are living in?
  - Post-Cold War
    - Reference Point: The Cold War: 1945-1989
  - Polycentric
    - Diffusion of power into various sites
      - States + international Organisations
  - Multipolar
    - State-Centred
    - Demands for reforming the Security Council in the United Nations
Power-Shift

- It has become clichéd to talk about ‘power-shift’ in global politics
- Liberal approach to international politics
  - Greater economic interactions will result in peaceful relations between nation-states
    - The experience in the Asia-Pacific region has been to the contrary
- Simultaneous and variable rise of various multiple powers.
- India
  - GDP: $ 2.09 trillion in 2015; appx 7% growth rate
  - Largest democracy; strong military; and substantive cultural footprint.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Millions of US Dollars</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>73,891,889</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>21,419,615</td>
<td>28.99</td>
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<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>20,076,819</td>
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<td>North America</td>
<td>19,593,077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>5,293,793</td>
<td>7.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>3,141,081</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2,689,862</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1,590,036</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Domestic Capacities

- In 2015-16: Japan is the 11th largest trade partner of India
  - Imports: $ 9.850 billion
  - Exports: $ 4.662 billion
  - Total Trade: $ 14.512 billion

- April 2000 to December 2016: Japan is the Third largest investor
  - Japan: $ 25.215 billion
  - Mauritius / Singapore

Structural Shifts in Indian Economy

- Maruti-Suzuki Model
- India hopes to leverage Japanese investments and technology in various sectors such as high-speed trains, industrial townships, and economic corridors.
  - Localisation of high-speed train technologies, with spill-over impact on other industries, will be a key objective for India
Policy Convergences

- India’s ‘Act East’: India has expanded the area of engagement from Mongolia to Fiji
  - In 2014, Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) institutional framework was launched

- Japan’s and Southeast Asia:
  - PM Abe’s proactive engagement
  - Japanese investment to ASEAN nations 20.1 trillion yen ($180.9 billion) till 2015

- South China Sea Dispute:
  - “India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS”
  - References in various Joint Statements
    - (India-Bangladesh Maritime Dispute)
Policy Convergences

- India and Vietnam have upgraded their partnership to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’
  - US $ 100 million Line of Credit for defence procurement and to sell high-speed patrol boats / sale of advanced weapon systems

- In 2014, Japan-Vietnam: “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.”
  - “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.”
  - Six patrol vessels to boost maritime security

- India hosted Myanmar’s president Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Aung Sang Suu Kyi in quick succession. Positive role in transition process.

- Japan’s engagement of Myanmar has been robust. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and investment in critical infrastructure.
Convergence on Connectivity

- The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project
- Japan’s ODA funds: India is one of the biggest recipient
- Northeast India
  - Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025 (December 12, 2015): “..improvement of road network connectivity in northeastern states of India.”
  - Probably, JICA is the only external agency that is working in Northeast India (excluding multilateral agencies)
  - Construction of approximately ten highways in Northeast Indian states such as Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Manipur
- The Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B)
  - Focus on transportation network and Energy Projects: Jamuna Railway Bridge Construction Project (Trans-Asian Railway); The Cross-Border Road Network Improvement Project; Kalna Bridge: overland traffic between Dhaka and Kolkata; 600-megawatt coal-fired power plant in Matarbari & strengthen Dhaka-Chittagong power grid (0.01 per cent per annum and 40 years)
Convergence on Connectivity

- Japan and Indian Ocean Littoral Africa
  - Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visit to Kenya in 2016: (1) “Japan-Africa Public and Private Economic Forum”; (2) Japan Africa relationship will be determined by three modifiers of “quality,” “resilient” and “stable”; (3) “Union of two free and open oceans and two continents” (Free and Open Indo-Pacific)

- India and Indian Ocean
  - Seychelles, Mauritius: maritime domain awareness
  - Project Mausam: reinvigorate cultural ties
  - India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi 2015
  - International Solar Alliance
Multipolarity

1. Leverage strategic partnership to enhance domestic capacities in manufacturing
2. Become proximate to global and regional powers
3. Develop the capacities of friendly countries in the region (e.g., Vietnam) and strengthen the bilateral relationships at the societal level
4. Work to strengthen trilateral frameworks of engagement
5. Expand the areas of engagement (Pacific island states/Indian Ocean Littoral Africa)
6. Reiterate the necessity of rule-based regional order
Next Steps

- **Trilateral Frameworks of Engagement**
  - Identify specific connectivity projects for *expeditious* implementation

- **China Economic Slowdown and Market Economy Status**

- **Russia-China coordinating their strategies – Pakistan**
  - Will powers such as the US and Japan recalibrate their policies on Pakistan

- **‘Rest of Asia’ approach**
  - Exchanges notes on development projects – India’s immediate neighborhood

- **India and Japan partnership is bringing in greater stability in Asia**
  - Need to scale up security and defense cooperation
  - More investments Japanese investments in India – sustain India’s rise
Abstract and Presentation by
Professor Ken Jimbo
Assistant Professor
Keio University
India and Japan in the new Asian Great Game

India and Japan shoulder greater responsibility in three following domains of new Asian great game: 1) managing change of balance of power in Indo-Pacific region, 2) maritime security challenges in East/South China Sea, Malacca Straits and Indian Ocean connected SLOCs, and 3) rising competition in the geo-economic sphere in Eurasian Continent.

As the emerging features of Trump administration’s Asia policy is remain unclear, it is essential for regional partners to navigate the United States to remain credibly engaged in the region. India and Japan should support the operational access of the U.S. military presence in wider region through joint exercises and regular strategic consultations. India and Japan should also cultivate bilateral security cooperation through mil-mil exchanges and research/production/transfer of defense equipment.

Further upgrading of cooperation on maritime security to secure the seamless access to SLOCs are critical to India and Japan. Regional enhancement of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Common Operating Picture (COP) is the key. Cooperation among Japan-India-Australia navies and law enforcement agencies as well as capacity building of ASEAN littoral states should be further promoted.

India and Japan should also champion rule-based liberal international order in both political and economic domain. Both countries should promote high-quality, transparent and cost-effective investment for rising demands of infrastructure in Asia. India and Japan should address to emerging mass middle-class population in Asia great example of effective democratic governance.

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India and Japan in the New Asian Great Game

Ken JIMBO, Ph.D
Associate Professor, Keio University
Senior Research Fellow, The Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)
Geopolitical Recession (cf. Eurasia Group, 2017)

Strategic Environment (Europe)
- Re-emergence of Russia
- Inflow of Refugees
- Terrorism in Major Cities

Strategic Environment (Asia)
- Re-emergence of Russia
- DPRK’s Nuclear Program
- Rise of China
- US Rebalancing Strategy

Russia’s ‘hybrid’ intervention in Crimea, East Ukraine and in Syria; Massive refugee inflows, and Terror alert in major European cities.

China’s maritime expansion strategy, gray-zone challenges in East/South China Sea; DPRK’s nuclear and missile development programs

Geography of Trans-Pacific/Atlantic security is more confined in both regions

→Emerging strategic vacuum in Eurasian theater
The Return of Geopolitics (cf. W.R. Mead)

- Reemergence of Russia
  - Annexation of Crimea
  - Syria Intervention
  - Refugee Inflows in Europe
- Rise of China
  - DPRK Nuclear/Missile Developments
  - Expanding A2/AD Environment
  - East China Sea Gray-Zone Challenges
  - Reclamation and Militarization in South China Sea
- Iran’s Expanding Influence
  - Yemen Intervention
Expansion of Geoeconomics

Source: Merics Website
Shift in Global Power Balance

Military Expenditure of U.S., China and Japan (2010-2030 Projection)

Unit: Million USD (Currency Rate as of 2012)

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013 (Modified)
China’s Growing Military Capability

4th Generation Fighters (AF)

- Su-30: 97 (2005)

Subtotal: 810

Large Scale Military Forces

Destroyers / Frigates (Navy)

- 1992: Su-27 IOC
- 2001: Su-30 IOC
- 2005: J-10 IOC
- 2016: J-15 IOC

Submarines (Navy)

- 1992: 0
- 2001: 0
- 2005: 45
- 2016: 52

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016
Military Expenditure of Emerging States in Asia (2010-2030 Projection)

Unit: Million USD (Currency Rate as of 2011)

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013 (Modified)

India will be No. 2 Military Power (next to China)

ASEAN6 and Korea will significantly increase the military budget (excluding the case of unified Korea)

ASEAN5 > KOR (2028)

ASEAN5 > JPN (2025)

KOR > JPN (2024)

ASEAN6 > JPN (2021)

ASEAN6 > AUS (2012)

IND > JPN (2015)

ASEAN6 > JPN (2021)

The Shift in Global Power Balance
2-2 China’s Occupation in SCS (after reclamation)
(As of 17 Dec. 2015)

Since 2013, China has conducted runway extension works at Woody Island in the Paracel Islands.
Since 2014, China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works in seven features in the Spratly Islands and has built infrastructure including runways and ports.

Structures on features etc.
- : China
- : Taiwan
- : Vietnam
- : Philippines
- : Malaysia
※ Thin dash lines are basically 200NM lines from coasts.

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense Website
4-2 Possible Impact of Building Runways in Spratly Islands

It is argued that the runway constructions on Fiery Cross Reef and reportedly on Subi Reef and Mischief Reef would lead to an increase in China’s air force presence in the SCS.

- Fiery Cross Reef with a runway and support facilities would enable China to forward-deploy various aerial platforms (incl. fighters, bombers and UAVs).

- Generally speaking, its ramifications potentially include:
  1. China’s improved air power-projection capability over the entire SCS (especially, significant improvement in China’s ISR and other mission capabilities in the central and southern portions of the SCS);
  2. enhanced air superiority over the SCS;
  3. improved “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities” against U.S. military presence and its intervention during contingencies; and,
  4. possible declaration of an “SCS Air Defense Identification Zone” in the future.

- Reclamation is also being done at large-scale features such as Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, and the runway construction in each feature is pointed out.

- It leads some observers to suggest that China’s air force presence will consequently increase.

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense Website
“Gray-Zone” Situations
“Gray-Zone” Situations

Source: Japan Coast Guard

- No. of vessels identified within the territorial sea
- No. of vessels identified within the contiguous zone (total/month)

As of November 30
Operational Scope in the Gray-Zone

“Gray-Zone” Situations

Peacetime Patrolling, ISR, Communication Mechanism

Law Enforcement (type1)

Law Enforcement (type2)

Defense Mobilization Act (Article 76)

US-Japan Joint Operations (Article 5)

Escalation Level
Operational Scope in the East China Sea (Northeast Asia)

- **Gray-Zone Coercion**
  - **Challenges**: “swift and robust responses are required...even when an armed attack against Japan is not involved” (U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline, 2015.4)
  - **Strategies**: “Seamless response in all phases of a conflict” (reject ‘role-sharing’ model and enhance U.S.-Japan alliance dynamics)

- **Low-Intensity Conflict**
  - **Strategies**: Dynamic Joint Defense Force (NDPG, 2013); Seamless Escalation Control; Bilateral CBMs (Japan-China Maritime/Air Communication Mechanism)

- **A2/AD Challenges**
  - **Strategies**: Counter-A2/AD capability (JOAC: operational access), missile defense, enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options
Operational Scope in the South China Sea (Southeast Asia)

- **Gray-Zone Coercion**
  - Strategies: **Cost-Imposing Strategy** “how bad behaviors might be met with appropriate and effective penalties or costs” (CNAS, 2014)

- **Low-Intensity Conflict**
  - Strategies: **Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO)** “FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary’s actions. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis” (US JCS, *Joint Operational Planning*, 2011)

- **A2/AD Challenges**
  - Strategies: **Counter-A2/AD capability** (operational access), enhance resiliency, develop dispersal options → Guam, Philippines, North and West Australia Basing Options
Japan’s New Direction in Regional Security I
Defense and Security Networking

**Joint Military Exercises**
- **Cobra Gold** (2005 - )
- **Malabar** (2007-, invited)
- ARF DiREx (2009-)
- Pacific Partnership (2010-)
- Kakado (2010-)
- Pacific Reach (2010)...hosted in SIN
- Balikatan (2012-)
- Japan-Philippines Joint Training (2015-)
- **Malabar (JPN becomes permanent member since 2015-)**

**Bilateral Defense Cooperation**
- Singapore (2000-)
- Thailand (2001-)
- Australia (GSOMIA 2012/def trnsfr 2013)
- Vietnam (2004-)
- Philippines (2006/def trnsfr 2016)
- Indonesia (2007-)
- Cambodia (2009-)
- Korea (2009 / GSOMIA 2016)
- **India (2014/GSOMIA 2015/def trnsfr 2015)**

**Multilateral Forums**
- **ARF (1994-)**
- Tokyo Defense Forum (1996-)
- Chief of Defense Dialogue (1998-)
- Shangri-la Dialogue (2001-)
- **ADMM Plus (2010-)**
- Japan-ASEAN Defense Dialogue (2009-)
- Japan-ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (2014-)

**‘Strategic Partnerships’**
- **India (2000-)**
- Japan-ASEAN (2003-)
- Indonesia (2006-)
- Vietnam (2009-)
- Philippines (2009-)
Japan’s ‘Strategic Use of ODA’ (2012)

...the U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies and partners in the region to build their capacity with training and exercises. The Government of Japan, for its part, plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal states with patrol boats.

*Joint Statement of US-Japan SCC, April 27, 2012*

**Project Finance for Major Infrastructure**

- ASEAN's critical infrastructures such as airports, ports, roads, power generation stations and electricity supply, communications, and software development are important, and often highly compatible, components of their security sectors.

**Enhancing Public Private Partnership (PPP)**

- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) & Japan Bank of International Credit (JBIC): credit guarantees, viability gap funding
Japan’s New Direction in Regional Security III Capacity Building

• MOD Capacity Building
  Starting from FY2012, the Ministry of Defense will embark on an assistance program for security capacity-building in ASEAN countries in such fields as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counter-piracy operations. Although the current budget is rather small, it is expected to expand over the longer term.

• Defense Equipment Transfer to ASEAN Coastal States?
  Philippines: “Agreement on Defense Equipment Transfer” (February 29th, 2016)
    10 Patrol Vessels (200t, 40M) to PH Coast Guards (2016-18)
    Leasing of 5 TC-90 King Air Planes (2017?)
    Potential P3-C transfer? (unknown)
  • New legal framework to finance defense transfers? (cf. “Defense ODA?”...in progress)
  • Japan is also considering exporting patrol vessels, aircraft and multi-purpose support ships to enhance ASEAN's maritime security capabilities.
1. Managing Change of Balance of Power in Indo-Pacific Region
   - Support U.S. operational access in Indo-Pacific strategic theater
   - Enhancement of US-India-Japan (+ Australia) security cooperation
   - Capacity Building of Asian littoral states (Philippines, Vietnam etc)

2. Securing SLOCs of East/South China Sea, Malacca, and Indian Ocean
   - Enhanced MDA: shared intelligence -gathering capabilities at sea
   - Common Operating Picture: grayzone challenges and escalation management
   - Enhancing regional cooperation mechanisms at EAS and ADMM Plus
   - Strategic Financing: Japan’s ODA, JBIC’s credit guarantees, India’s infrastructure investment should be coordinated

3. Rule-Based International Order
   - Regional free trade and investment mechanisms (post-TPP?)
   - High-quality, transparent, and cost-effective infrastructure investments in Asia
   - Democratic governance promotion (at the age of “democratic recession”)
Abstract by
Amb. Nguyen Van Tho
Former Deputy Foreign Minister and
Senior Adviser, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
India and Japan in the new Asian Great Game

The Indo-Pacific region is undergoing sea structural changes especially after the Global Financial Crisis. The rise of China is clearly a key agent that rocks the board and triggers tectonic changes the regional and international strategic landscapes. China’s military build-up created a lingering question across the region about its strategic intents. Though the US is still the largest economy and military power on earth, its ascendency in many places in Asia is challenged. The US is no longer able to dictate regional politics and contain China in the traditional way. Uncertainties associated with the rise of China and the US’ responses have caused regional countries to look for different types of security assurances.

In that context, Japan and India, as key players in the region, should work together to engage constructively with both the U.S and China; to encourage those two great powers to behave responsibly in certain ways which ensure the peace, stability and prosperity across the region. At the same time, India and Japan should take a more active role in facilitating a region-wide discussion about the prospective regional security architecture that is based on rules not on power.

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Session 4: Retreat of Globalisation and Asian Geoeconomics
Retreat of Globalization: Asian GeoEconomics

Dr. Arvind Virmani

https://sites.google.com/site/drarvindvirmani/
https://www.facebook.com/arvindvirmani2
http://dravirmani.blogspot.in/
https://sites.google.com/site/chintan1997reg/
Introduction

- Post GFC World economy
  - Relative Impact: China/US, India/US

- Opportunities: Economic & Strategic
  - China-India Gap: Past, Current, Future

- Globalization Backlash & possibilities
  - Market vs Non-market economies
Challenge to Globalization

- Post-GFC Great Depression not Great recession
- Supply side to Demand
- Fiscal vs Monetary Policy
- Hold the Fort vs Pushing on with Globalization

- Economic Duality: Globalised sectors vs Domestic oriented
Post GFC Economic Duality

- Within Every County
  - Globalised Sectors (GS): Slow growth
    - World: Metals, Hydro carbons
  - Domestically Driven (DD): Gr varies w Factors, Policies
    - India: GS(LrgLstdCos), DD(double drought, DM)
- Across countries: Varying ratio of
  - Domestically Driven/Globalised Sector (DD/GS)
  - Determines Potential Growth (Ind>Ch; US>EU, Ja)
- Causes: China Over Investment, Excess capacity
  - Initially: +DC Govt. Expenditure
Indian Growth Relative to China

- Indian Growth
  - Not a future promise that never materializes
  - Acceleration has already happened (2003-2007)
  - India’s Growth rank 2003-12: T1
  - Contribution to World Growth : T2
  - India-China Growth differential: F1
- Well positioned to maintain into future
  - Closing India-China gap: Real GDP,
  - Economic Power Gap (& $ GDP)

March 2017
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**T1: Per Capita GDP Gr 2003 to 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Avg10y</th>
<th>rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Avg10y</th>
<th>rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Azerbaijan(-4)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Macao, China(-1)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkmenistan(-6)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Armenia(-1)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mongolia(-2)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Angola(-3)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Moldova(-10)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Panama(-1)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Georgia(-10)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ethiopia(-3)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## T2: Contribution To World Aggregate Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>-5.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F1: PcGdpGr(India-China)

-10%  -8%  -6%  -4%  -2%  0%  2%  4%

GrRtPpp: India-China
Linear (GrRtPpp: India-China)
F2: Closing the Gap with China

India/China: VIPP, GDPppp & GDP$

- GDPppp: India/China
- VIPP: India/China
- GDP$11: India/China
Globalization

- Worldwide backlash against Intellectual-academic-abstract approach to liberalization (US, UK, Euro)
  - TTP: Concentrated benefits losses for all others (IPR)
  - Earlier Liberalization: Concentrated losses, diffuse benefits
- Trump junking of TPP: Real vs Psychological effect
- IPR: Socially provided monopoly rents (cost)
  - Benefits proved in only one industry: Drugs
  - Ambiguous/uncertain in Electronics
  - Enforcement of existing IPRs in letter & spirit
Market vs Non-Market Economies

- Chinese leadership of Free & open system?
  - CCP led non-market China Inc
  - Net export, investment-infra led growth
  - Private sector = Public Sector (min, maj)
  - FDI (inward/outbound): Technology

- RECP: Non-market China derives asymmetric benefit, except where its FP-NS objective

- Careful selective liberalization:
  - TFA=>Service Facilitation Agreement (SFA)
Market vs Non-Market Economies

- President Trump Threat against China
- US-China Trade war
  - CAD: Export, Import Substitution
  - US will be wounded, China will get septic shock
  - India: Little direct effect, positive indirect
  - Rest of Asia: Higher direct
- US war against Market Economies/WTO
  - Disastrous for World growth recovery
Conclusion

- Economic Opportunity: DCs in India
- Strategic Opportunity: Economic Power
- Faster rise of Indian power & Japan, US backing
  - Can moderate China’s flaunting of Global rules
  - Reduce perceived risk for ASEAN countries from resisting China’s aggressiveness
- US Strategic Commitment to India?
  - New concert of middle democratic powers: Japan, India, France, Others(Australia)
- Globalization: Depression + rent seeking(special interest groups) => Worldwide backlash
  - Paused worldwide for 5-10 yrs.
  - Focus should be on solving identified problems
    - Bilateral (India-Japan, India-Aus)
    - Pluri-lateral: IORA (connectivity), India-ASEAN, Japan-BBIN
  - Services facilitation Agreement (SFA)
Abstract and Presentation by Professor Yorizumi Watanabe
Keio University
Retreat of Globalization and Asian Geo-economics

It seems that Mr. Trump has placed protectionism at the heart of the US economic policies. Both the departure of the US from the TPP agreement and the unwinding of the NAFTA arrangement have been upsetting the business communities across the region of Asia-Pacific.

Some argue that the RCEP, the 16-country framework for the East Asian free trade area, could replace the fading TPP. However, the RCEP could have been effective only as long as the TPP were implemented by the 12 nations including the US.

Those countries outside the TPP would have accelerated velocity in restructuring their old-fashioned state-owned enterprises including those producing excessive amount of steel. As the TPP seems now put into the deep freeze, the RCEP likewise has lost its template if not a model for making new trade-related rules as well as its locomotive steam for trade liberalization within the East Asia.

In the absence of the US presence in the architecture of trade and investment in Asia-Pacific, Japan should work together with other TPP participants to keep the door open to the US while preparing for coming-into-force of the “TPP-One” agreement without any significant amendment to the agreed text as well as the market access deals with a view to defending against the creeping protectionism in the region.

***
DPG International Conference on
EMERGING RE-ALIGNMENTS IN ASIA
Retreat of Globalization and Asian Geo-economics
--- A Japanese View ---

Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe
Keio University
March 10 2017
NAFTA
USA
Canada
Mexico
CAFTA
MERCOSUR
Allianza del Pacifico
East Asia
ASEAN+3 (JCK)
+India+Australia+NZ
RCEP
ASEM
Japan
EU
EPA
EU
Trans-Atlantic
TTIP
APEC
TPP
FTAA
NAFTA
USA
Canada
Mexico
CAFTA
MERCOSUR
Allianza del Pacifico
East Asia
ASEAN+3 (JCK)
+India+Australia+NZ
RCEP
ASEM
Japan
EU
EPA
EU
Trans-Atlantic
TTIP
APEC
TPP
## Membership and Economic Importance of the Mega-FTAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCK FTA</td>
<td>6,619</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14,280.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCEP</td>
<td>10,470</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>19,929.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>9,545</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>26,593.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIP</td>
<td>15,602</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>32,686.5</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>36,890</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>69,899.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University
Japan’s FTA/EPA Strategy
— a pivotal centre between TPP & RCEP —

East Asia
RCEP

- JCK FTA
- ASEAN+6 ⇒ RCEP
- integration-oriented approach
- trade facilitation to CLMV

Bilateral
EPAs (15)

Pacific rim
TPP
JPN-CND
EPA/FTA

FTAAP

- NAFTA, Latin American countries
- rule-oriented approach
- high-level market access + rule-making
- regulatory coherence

Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University
Share of global GDP (2014)

- U.S. 22.3%
- EU 23.6%
- TPP countries 36.3%
- Non-TPP countries 63.7%
- China 13.3%
- Brazil 3.0%
- India 2.6%
- Russia 2.4%
- South Korea 1.8%
- Canada 2.3%
- Australia 1.8%
- Mexico 1.6%
- Japan 5.9%

SOURCE: World Economic Outlook Database April 2014
“Trump puts protectionism at heart of US economic policy” (F.T. Jan. 24)

• Executive order signed to withdraw from the TPP (Jan. 23)
• US Business leaders warned over offshoring jobs: border tax to be imposed
• John McCain: "(the TPP move is) a serious mistake. It will create an opening for China to rewrite the economic rules at the expense of American workers. And it will send a troubling signal of American disengagement in the Asia-Pacific region at a time we least afford it”
• Unwinding the NAFTA would hit Mexico hard, but Japan and the EU would be adversely affected as well
• Germany accused by Peter Navarro of “grossly undervalued” euro to “exploit” the US and its EU partners (Feb. 1)
• Navarro: “Germany was one of the main barriers to a US trade deal with the EU.” “the talks with the EU over the TTIP declared dead”
Trump opts for “bilateral trade deals”

• “bilateral deals” does not mean necessarily Free Trade Agreement (FTA): the only FTA Trump mentioned was the one with the UK

• “bilateral deals” with countries which run trade surplus with the US; e.g. Japan($68.6 billion), Mexico($58.4 billion), China ($365.7 billion)

• The deals could imply balancing trade account via political interventions by governments: “numerical targets” of auto imports by Japan until “reciprocity” to be achieved

• Revival of “procedural protectionism” of 1980’s by way of Section 301 type of “unilateralism” ⇒ ⇒ ⇒ WTO inconsistent
Japan-US Partnership in Job-creation and Trade

In case of Car Industries

Japanese car producers deploy 26 factories and 36 R&D centers in the US making 3.9 million passenger vehicles as well as 4.6 million engines and creating jobs for 1.5 million people.

Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University
Japanese Automakers Operate 26 Manufacturing Plants and 36 R&D Facilities in 17 States and DC

In the U.S. in 2015, Japanese automakers built

3.9 MILLION VEHICLES

and

4.6 MILLION ENGINES

As of 2015, JAMA Members’ manufacturing plants cumulatively invested

$45.4 BILLION

in the U.S. Economy
AMERICAN JOBS & THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY

87,788 DIRECT EMPLOYEES
375,143 NEW VEHICLE DEALERS' EMPLOYEES
1,043,000 INTERMEDIATE & SPIN-OFF
1,505,931 TOTAL AMERICAN JOBS

EMPLOYMENT 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Automakers</th>
<th>New Vehicle Dealers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>60,640</td>
<td>375,143</td>
<td>462,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D/Design</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters, Sales &amp; Others</td>
<td>22,062</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87,788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppliers</td>
<td>231,000</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>353,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spin-Off</td>
<td>409,000</td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>690,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>727,788</strong></td>
<td><strong>778,143</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,505,931</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. PARTS PURCHASED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Billions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$38.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$45.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$51.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$57.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$61.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75% of Japanese-Brand Vehicles Sold in the U.S. are Built in North America
Concluding Remarks: from a Japanese Perspective

- TPP/12 as a template for 21\textsuperscript{st} Century-type trade agreements
- TPP/11 to keep momentum for freer trade
- RCEP/JCK FTA for updating the production network in East Asia
- Japan-EU EPA: the only surviving inter-regional Mega-FTA to be concluded without further delay

⇒⇒⇒ to keep trade multilateralism embodied in the WTO
Thank you for Your Attention
-- Free Trade for a Better Future --
SPEAKERS’ PROFILES
## SPEAKERS' PROFILES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H.E. Amb. Kenji Hiramatsu</td>
<td>Ambassador of Japan to India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ambassador Hiramatsu was appointed as Ambassador of Japan to India in November 2015 and to Bhutan in February last year.

Prior to his appointment as Ambassador of Japan to India, he served as Deputy Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy from 2012 to 2015, where he was responsible for overall foreign policy making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity, he played a central role in Japan’s new landmark legislation for peace and security. He was one of the authors of the first National Security Strategy in 2014. He was also responsible for a whole range of issues related to the United Nations including the reform of the UN Security Council. Ambassador Hiramatsu also served as Director-General for Global Issues from 2011 to 2012 and was engaged in several important multilateral negotiations. He was a Prime Minister’s special envoy for climate change negotiations and contributed to establishing a new climate change framework.

After joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979, Ambassador Hiramatsu has dealt with a wide range of issues, which include national security, multilateral trade negotiations and global agenda such as development, climate change, health and women’s empowerment. He took important positions such as Deputy Director-General for Economic Affairs, Executive Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Director for Northeast Asia Division, where he was instrumental in realizing the historic visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to North Korea. His overseas postings include Paris and London.

Ambassador Hiramatsu graduated from Kyoto University. He is married and has three daughters.

|   | Siddharth Shriram         | Chairman-Delhi Policy Group    |

Born on January 18, 1945, Mr. Siddharth Shriram was schooled in Welhem School and the Doon School at Dehradun, graduated in English Literature from St. Stephens College, Delhi University and completed his formal education at MIT, USA, as a Sloan Fellow with a Master of Science in Management.

He has been employed in the past with DCM Ltd. and Citibank and now with Mawana Sugars Limited.
He created joint ventures with Honda Motor Company to manufacture small engines and automobiles and was the Chairman of Honda Siel Cars India Ltd till recently.

At present he is the Chairman of: Mawana Sugars Ltd., Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. and co-Chairman of: Usha International Ltd. He led Mawana and Usha to sponsor several sporting and healthful activities such as Golf/National Marathon/Frisbee. He plays Golf to a phony 9 (should be a 12) handicap and Bridge, and has held administrative positions in various sporting and industry associations. In 1994, at the founding of the Delhi Policy Group, he became its Managing Trustee.

3. **Ambassador K. Shankar Bajpai**

Chairman Emeritus

Ambassador K. Shankar Bajpai, Former Indian Secretary, External Affairs Ministry, and Ambassador to Pakistan, China and USA.


Speaks French, some German, in addition to English and Hindi.


4. **Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh**

Director General, Delhi Policy Group

Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1974-2010 and is a distinguished former career diplomat with extensive experience of geo-strategic and geo-economic issues as well as multilateral institutions, which underpin international law and commerce.
He has been India’s longest serving Ambassador to Japan (2006-2010), Ambassador to Indonesia and Timor Leste (2003-2006), Ambassador to Colombia, Ecuador and Costa Rica (1999-2002), and India's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva (1995-1999). He has held several significant assignments during his career, dealing with the United States, West Europe and the European Union and India’s immediate neighbours.

Ambassador Singh has contributed to the forging of the India-Japan strategic and global partnership, the intensification of India’s relations with Indonesia and ASEAN, the evolution of India’s revitalised Look East Policy and the shaping of India’s policy towards key neighbours and strategic partners. From 2011-2016, Ambassador Singh was Professor for Strategic Studies at ICRIER, a leading think tank in New Delhi, and has been associated with several public policy initiatives and Track II/Track 1.5 strategic dialogues involving major Think Tanks of India, Japan, Asia and the US. He has written and worked extensively on the ongoing transformation of India’s relations with the United States and Japan and their growing convergences in shaping Asia’s emerging economic and security architecture. He serves on statutory and advisory corporate boards and has been Senior Advisor at Dua Consulting since 2013.

In June 2016, Ambassador Singh assumed responsibilities as Director General, Delhi Policy Group, which is among India’s oldest independent think tanks focused on strategic issues of critical national interest.

An alumnus of St. Stephen's College, Delhi, where he studied (1967-72) and later taught (1972-74), Ambassador Singh holds an M.A. degree from the University of Delhi. His varied interests include civilisation and culture, the natural environment and sports.

Ambassador NalinSurie, Director General, ICWA

NalinSurie is Director General, ICWA (Sapru House, New Delhi.). He trained as an economist and completed his Masters from the Delhi School of Economics in 1972. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1973. He has served in Indian missions in Hong Kong, Brussels, Dar-es-Salaam, Thimphu, New York (as Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN), as Ambassador in both Warsaw and Beijing and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. At headquarters he has served both in the Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of External Affairs. In the latter his assignments included, on separate occasions, Head of the East Europe and East Asia Divisions and as Secretary (West).

NalinSurie is a seasoned diplomat who has extensive cross-sectoral experience on issues ranging across India’s northern neighbourhood, China, Eastern Europe, The European Union, Africa, Latin America, Canada, IBSA and the UN. During his career he also focused on India’s external economic relations and the international economy. He retired from the Indian Foreign service in August 2011 and was President of The Association of Indian Diplomats during 2014-15.

Since his retirement he functioned as an independent analyst on foreign affairs, security issues and international economic relations.

He is a life member of IDSA, New Delhi and former member of Chatham House, London.
He was appointed as Director General of The Indian Council of World Affairs on 24 July 2015.

6. **Prof. Brahma Chellaney**  
Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research

Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at CPR. A specialist in international security and arms control issues, Professor Chellaney has held appointments at Harvard, the Brookings Institution, the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, and the Australian National University.

He is the author of nine books, and has served as a member of the Policy Advisory Group headed by the foreign minister of India. Until January 2000, he was an advisor to India’s National Security Council, serving as convener of the External Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board.

Professor Chellaney is a frequent contributor to public conversation about international security on television and in print. He writes opinion pieces for the *International Herald Tribune*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Japan Times*, *Mint*, the *Economic Times*, and the *Times of India*. Professor Chellaney has a PhD in international studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University.

7. **Yuichi Hosoya, Ph.D**  
Professor of International Politics, Faculty of Law, Keio University

Yuichi Hosoya is professor of international politics at Keio University, Tokyo. He is also Senior Researcher at the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), and Senior Fellow at The Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Professor Hosoya was a member of the Advisory Board at Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) (2014–2016). He was also a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013–14), and Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities (2013), in which capacity he assisted to draft Japan’s first National Security Strategy. Professor Hosoya studied international politics at Rikkyo (BA), Birmingham (MIS), and Keio (Ph.D). He was a visiting professor and Japan Chair (2009–2010) at Sciences-Po in Paris (Institut d’Études Politiques) and a visiting fellow (Fulbright Fellow, 2008–2009) at Princeton University.

| 8. | **Prof. Feodor Voitolovsky**  
**Deputy Director for international politics, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)**  
Since 2003 Feodor Voitolovsky works for IMEMO and has gone through all steps of the academic career – has been a junior then senior research fellow, head of department. Since 2014 he has become deputy director of IMEMO for international politics. His works are mainly focused on US foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, US foreign policy and international security in Asia Pacific, US-Russia and US-China relations.  
Since 2012 he is editorial board member of World Economy and International Relations Journal.  
Corresponding-member of Russian Academy of Sciences. |
|---|---|
| 9. | **Brigadier Arun Sahgal**  
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group  
Arun Sahgal a retired Brigadier of the Indian Army is the Executive Director of the Forum for Strategic Initiative, a policy think tank focusing on national security, diplomacy and Track II Dialogues. He was previously the founding Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Indian Integrated Defense Staff (IDS), Head of the Center for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Services Institute of India, and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. His research comprises scenario planning workshops, geopolitical and strategic assessments related to Asian security, and issues concerning nuclear doctrine and strategic stability in South Asia.  
His publications include co-authored books and net assessments for the IDS, Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), and the Indian National Security Council (NSC), among other clients. He has been a member of the Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, under the NSC, and a consultant with DRDO. He recently finished a monograph on Strategic Stability in South Asia for Sandia Laboratories, USA. He conducts simulation and strategic games at IDS, the Ministry of Defense, National Defense College, College of Defense Management, and other international clients. He is member of many Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives. |
| 10. | **Ambassador Biren Nanda**  
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group  
Ambassador Biren Nanda served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1978 to 2015 and is a distinguished former career diplomat with extensive experience of working in East Asia.  
He has been India’s High Commissioner to Australia (2012-2015); Ambassador to Indonesia, Timor Leste and the ASEAN (2008-12); India’s Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo (2000-2004) and Consul General in Shanghai (1996-2000). Ambassador Nanda has also served in Indian Missions in Beijing, Washington DC and Singapore. He spent a total of ten years in China during his three terms as a diplomat in that country. His entire career as a diplomat was spent in East Asia with the sole exception of his Washington posting. |
During 2004-2008 Ambassador Nanda was posted in the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi as Joint Secretary (South) and was responsible for India’s relations with Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Ambassador Nanda contributed to the strengthening of the strategic partnership between India and Indonesia, the strengthening and diversification of India’s relations with Australia and helped reinvigorate India’s Look East Policy and the intensification of India’s ties with ASEAN and Pacific countries.

Ambassador Nanda retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2015. He has since participated in a number of Track 2 dialogues involving major Think Tanks of Japan, Australia and China. In July 2016, he joined the Delhi Policy Group as a Senior Fellow. The Delhi Policy Group is amongst India’s oldest independent think tanks focussed on strategic issues of critical national interest.

He is currently the co-Chair of the India Indonesia Eminent Person’s Group which is to draw up a Vision Statement 2025 for the Strategic Partnership between the two countries.

An alumnus of the St Stephen’s College, New Delhi, (1971-74) Ambassador Nanda holds an MA degree from the Delhi School of Economics (1974-76). His interests include travel, listening to Indian Classical Music and reading.

Bonnie S. Glaser
Senior Advisor, CSIS

Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Asia-Pacific security with a focus on Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia and a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum. Ms. Glaser has worked for more than three decades at the intersection of Asian geopolitics and U.S. policy. From 2008 – mid-2015 Ms. Glaser was a Senior Adviser with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, and from 2003 to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. Ms. Glaser has published widely in academic and policy journals, including The Washington Quarterly, China Quarterly, Asian Survey, International Security, Problems of Communism, Contemporary Southeast Asia, American Foreign Policy Interests, Far Eastern Economic Review, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, New York Times, and International Herald Tribune, as well as numerous edited volumes on Asian security. Ms. Glaser is a regular contributor to the Pacific Forum quarterly Web journal Comparative Connections. She is currently a board member of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, and a member of both the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of International Strategic Studies. She served as a member of the Defense Department’s Defense Policy Board China Panel in 1997. Ms. Glaser received her B.A. in political science from Boston University and her M.A. with concentrations in international economics and Chinese studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
| 12. | **Carlyle A. Thayer**  
Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Forces Academy |
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<td>Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra where he contributes to the National Asian Security Studies Program. He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy. He holds an A.B. from Brown, an M.A. (Southeast Asian Studies) from Yale, and a PhD in International Relations from The Australian National University. Thayer has held senior appointments at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, and the Australian Command and Staff College. He was the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (2005) and the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ohio University (2008). Thayer is the author of over 500 academic publications including: <em>Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation</em> (ASPI 2010) and “The Militarisation of the South China Sea,” in <em>Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016: Key Developments and Trends</em> (IISS 2016) released at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Since 2010 Thayer has presented papers on the South China Sea to 52 international conferences in Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Macau, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, United States and Vietnam.</td>
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| 13. | **Sanjay Pulipaka**  
Senior Consultant, ICRIER |
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<td>Mr. Sanjay Pulipaka is coordinating the East Asia Research Programme at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi. Previously, he was a Pavate Visiting Fellow at the University of Cambridge, UK, and a former Fulbright Fellow in the Conflict Transformation Programme, in the United States. Sanjay’s areas of interest include India’s foreign policy, Indian politics, East Asian security issues, India-US Relations, regionalism and other related domains. Further, he has been closely following the political transition in Myanmar and conducted field research in that country and in Northeast India. He has substantive publication record with two co-edited volumes, policy reports, numerous research papers and Op-Ed essays. Sanjay also has extensive work experience with think-tanks and civil society organisations in India. He has considerable work experience in strengthening participatory political processes, governance frameworks and platforms for wider consultation. He can be reached at <a href="mailto:spulipaka@icrier.res.in">spulipaka@icrier.res.in</a> and at <a href="mailto:sanjay.pulipaka@yahoo.com">sanjay.pulipaka@yahoo.com</a>.</td>
<td></td>
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| 14. | **Prof. Ken Jimbo**  
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University |
|---|---|
| Education: Ph.D. in Media and Governance (2005), Keio University  
Major/Specialization:  
| Current Position(s):  
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University |
Visiting Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA); Visiting Lecturer, National Defense Academy in Japan; Member, The Special Board of Inquiry for Examining "Japan's 21st Century Vision", Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy

Previous Position(s):

Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA); Visiting Lecturer, The Institute of Oriental Culture, The University of Tokyo; Director of Research, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Publications:


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<th>15.</th>
<th>Ambassador Nguyen Van Tho</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of birth:</td>
<td>13th January 1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place of birth:</td>
<td>PhuTho, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages:</td>
<td>English and Russian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital Status:</td>
<td>Married with two children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td>- MA in International Relations, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, Hull University, UK; - MA in International Relations, The Higher Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia - BA in English, Pedagogical University of Foreign Languages, Piatyorsk, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2015-now:</td>
<td>Ambassador; Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Vice Chairman of the Vietnam-China friendship Association</td>
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Aug 2007 - Jul 2008: Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); Chairman, Vietnam’s UNESCO National Committee

Dec 2005 - Aug 2007: Director General, Department of Policy Planning, MOFA

Jan 2005 - Dec 2005: Acting Director General, Department of Policy Planning, MOFA

Apr 2004 - Jan 2005: First Deputy Director General, Institute for International Relation, MOFA


Oct 1995 - Jul 2000: Deputy Director General (since Mar 1996), Department of Policy Planning, MOFA

Jul 1994 - Oct 1995: MA in International Relations, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, Hull University, UK


Jul 1989 - Nov 1992: Second Secretary, Viet Nam’s Embassy in China

Jul 1985 - Jul 1989: Expert, China Department, MOFA

Oct 1983 - Jul 1985: MA in International Relations, Academy of higher Diplomacy, Moscow - Russia

1977 - Oct 1983: Expert, China Department, MOFA

1977: Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

16.

Dr. A. Didar Singh
Secretary General, FICCI

Dr. A. Didar Singh, author and former civil servant of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) took over as Secretary General of FICCI from November 2012. He retired as Secretary to Government of India in the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (2009-11).

Dr. Didar Singh is also Secretary General of International Chamber of Commerce (IIC), India Chapter; Director General, Indian Council of Arbitration and Nominee Director, Invest India (a JV between FICCI and Govt. of India). He is presently member Governing Councils of St. Stephens Hospital and Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi.

Dr. Singh was member of the Global Agenda Council on Migration (2011-15) of the celebrated World Economic Forum (WEF) and has been conferred an Award for his service to the Indian Diaspora by GOPIO International (Global Organization of People of Indian Origin).
He functions as Chair of the Diaspora group of KNOMAD, World Bank. He was named as Distinguished Alumnus of the prestigious St Stephen's College in 2012 and was in July 2014 also awarded Honorary Doctorate (Delhi University) from the University of Birmingham, UK. He was recently appointed Member on the India-Indonesia Eminent Persons Group (EPG) by the Ministry of External Affairs, GOI.

Dr. Singh is an internationally known strategy expert in e-Commerce, Trade and Migration and has done several studies for international agencies, including the International Trade Centre; World Health Organization; and South Centre, Geneva as well as the Commonwealth Secretariat, London having lived and worked in the UK, USA and Switzerland. He has four books and several publications to his credit.

Dr. Singh has a Bachelors and Masters from St. Stephens College, Delhi; a Masters in Development Administration from Birmingham University, UK; and has the distinction of having done the first PhD in India on the Policy and Administration of e-Commerce (Panjab Univ, 2006). Dr. Singh has given talks and lectures in over 30 Institutions and countries around the world. He can be followed on Twitter at https://twitter.com/SecyGEN_ficci.

17. Dr. Arvind Virmani  
Distinguished Fellow, Delhi Policy Group

Dr. Arvind Virmani is Chairman of the Policy Foundation, President of the non-profit Chintan® (www.Chintanlive.org), is mentor (public policy & economics) to FICCI, Member of RBI Technical Advisory Committee on Monetary policy & of Governing Board of Forum For Strategic Initiatives (FSI) and The Center for Poliy Research (CPR).

He was earlier Executive Director, IMF and Distinguished Senior Fellow, School of Public Policy, GMU. He has been an advisor to the Indian Government at the highest levels for 25 years, including as Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance and Principle Advisor, Planning Commission. During this period he advised on a host of economic policy reforms, through numerous policy papers/notes, member of numerous committees and as Chair of committees on Public Debt management and Customs duty reform. He has served as Member, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Appellate Tribunal for SEBI Act, Chairman, Board of Trustees of SBI Mutual Fund, and Director on the Boards of several financial institutions [LIC, PNB, Allahabad Bank and UTI (Trustee)].

In between he directed the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) as its Chief Executive. He has published 33 journal articles and 20 book chapters in the areas of Macroeconomics, growth and finance, International trade & Tariffs and International relations. His books include, The Sudoku of India’s Growth, From Uni-polar To Tri-polar World: Multi-polar Transition Paradox, Propelling India From Socialist Stagnation To Global Power), Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction - A Policy Framework for India’s Development.
18. **Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe**

Following several appointments in Japan’s foreign service, specializing in international trade policy issues, Professor Watanabe has now brought those skills and experience to the senior academic post he has filled at Keio University since 2005.

Prof. Watanabe’s distinguished career has featured significant engagement in all the major bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations in which Japan has been involved in the past two decades. This included the role of policy advisor to relevant Ministries, and postings to Japan’s diplomatic missions in Brussels and Geneva.

He was Deputy Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan from 2002-2004 and served as Chief Negotiator for the Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Working Party on Russia’s Accession to the WTO. He was Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2004.

In addition, Prof. Watanabe has been appointed Statutory Auditor at Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus Co. Ltd since April 2015.

19. **Ambassador Dino Patti Djalal**

Founder, FPCI (Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia)

Dino Patti Djalal is a career diplomat and ambassador, best selling author, accomplished academic, youth activist, app designer (Itunes : “diplomat to do”), Presidential hopeful.

Dino Patti Djalal was born in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on 10th September 1965 into an Indonesian diplomatic family. As son of diplomat, he lived in Jakarta, Yugoslavia, Guinea, Singapore, Washington DC, New York, Ottawa and Vancouver. As a diplomat, he was posted to London, Dili, Washington DC.

Throughout his life, Dino Patti Djalal has had a mix of Islamic as well as western education. He went to Muhamadiyyah elementary and Al Azhar junior high school, and completed his high school in McLean, Virginia. Subsequently, he earned his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada); a Masters Degree in Political Science from Simon Fraser University (Vancouber, Canada), and a Phd in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (London, UK).

Dino Patti Djalal joined Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs in 1987. He quickly rose through the ranks, with postings in London, Dili and Washington DC. In 2002, he was appointed Director for North American Affairs. In 2004, when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began his term, Dino was appointed Special Staff of the President for International Affairs. In that capacity, Dino assumed many roles: Presidential spokesperson, foreign policy adviser to the President, speech writer. Dino kept this job for 6 years until 2010, making him the longest serving Presidential spokesperson in Indonesia’s modern history.

Dr. Dino Patti Djalal also served in the Board of Commissioners of PT Danareksa (2008 – 2010) an Indonesian state-owned company specialised in financial services.
From 2010 to 2013, Dino served as Indonesia's ambassador to the United States, where he succeeded in elevating bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Partnership.

In early 2014, Dino joined the Convention of the then ruling party PartaiDemokrat to select a Presidential candidate. Dino campaigned as an independent and was not a party member of PartaiDemokrat.

In June 2014, Dino was appointed Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, until October that year.

In 2012, Dr. Dino won the prestigious “Marketeer of the Year”, an award that was won by President Joko Widodo when he served as mayor of Solo. In 2010, Dr. Dino received BintangJasaUtama, the state’s second highest order of merit; and in 2014, he received BintangMahaputraAdiprapana, the state’s highest medal for meritorious service.

Dr. Dino has authored 9 books. Most well-known is "HarusBisa", a book about leadership, which became a national best seller in Indonesia with some 2 million copies sold, and translated into English, Mandarin, Korean, Russian, French, Arabic, Japanese.

Dr. Dino is also Chairman of the Board of Directors, World Resources Institute (WRI) Indonesia, and a member of Board of Governors of Institute for Peace and Democracy, based in Bali. He also founded Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) in 2014. Dr. Dino is also widely known as the father of Indonesian Diasporas, given his role in launching the first World Congress of Indonesian Diasporas in Los Angeles in 2012. Dr. Dino is a Guinness World Record Holder for the largest angklung ensemble, which he organized in 2011 at the National Monument in Washington DC. With over 250,000 followers, Dr. Dino has been called “the twitter ambassador”.

Dr. Dino is married to Rosa Rai Djalal and they are blessed with 3 children. They live in Jakarta, Indonesia.
PARTICIPANTS’ LIST
DPG International Conference
“Emerging Realignments in Asia”
(Venue: Viceregal Hall, Claridges Hotel, New Delhi)
March 10, 2017

List of Participants

1. Mr. Santosh Jha, Joint Secretary (Policy Planning), Ministry of External Affairs, GoI
2. H.E. Ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu, Ambassador of Japan to India
3. Ambassador K.S. Bajpai, Chairman-Emeritus, Delhi Policy Group
4. Mr. Siddharth Shriram, Chairman & Managing Trustee, Delhi Policy Group
5. Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Director General, Delhi Policy Group
7. Ambassador Biren Nanda, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
8. Brigadier Arun Sahgal, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
9. Dr. Arvind Virmani, Distinguished Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
10. Ambassador Nalin Surie, Director General, ICWA
11. Prof. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research
12. Dr. A. Didar Singh, Secretary General, FICCI
13. Ambassador Dino Patti Djalal, Founder, FPCI (Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia)
14. Prof. Yuichi Hosoya, Keio University
15. Prof. Feodor Voitolovsky, Deputy Director for International Politics, IMEMO
16. Ms. Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project
17. Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy
18. Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe, Keio University
19. Prof. Ken Jimbo, Assistant Professor, Keio University
20. Ambassador Nguyen Van Tho, former Deputy Foreign Minister; Senior Advisor, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
21. Mr. Sanjaya Pulipaka, Consultant, ICRIER
22. Ms. Chhaya Shriram, Trustee, Delhi Policy Group
23. Mr. Arjun Katoch, Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
24. Ambassador Sanjay Singh, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
25. Prof. Baladas Ghoshal, Secretary General, Society for Indian Ocean studies
26. Ambassador Ajai Malhotra, Former Ambassador of India to the Russian Federation
27. Lt. Gen. Arvinder Singh Lamba, Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
28. Lt. Gen. S.L. Narasimhan (Retd), Honorary Distinguished Fellow, CAPS/Member NSAB
29. Lt. Gen. Anil Ahuja (Retd.) former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy Planning & Force Development)
30. Ambassador H.K. Dua, former MP, Rajya Sabha
31. Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, former Director General, ICWA
33. Major Gen. Vinod Saighal, Executive Director Eco Monitors Society
34. Mr. Ajai Singh Sirohi, Head-Strategic Planning & Corporate Development, Toray International India Pvt. Ltd.
35. Cmde Lalit Kapur, IN. (Retd.)
36. Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja (Retd.)
37. Ms. Sumitra Chowdhury, Deputy Secretary (PP&R), Ministry of External Affairs
40. Col. Naveen Nijhawan, OSD (PP&R), Ministry of External Affairs
41. Ms. Eeshita Chib, Intern, Ministry of External Affairs
42. Brig. Pankaj Chib
43. Mr. Hideki Asari, Minister (Political Affairs), Embassy of Japan
44. Ms. Asako Omukai, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan to India
45. Mr. Akio Sugimoto, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan to India
46. Mr. Khairuddin Siregar, Embassy of Japan
47. Ms. Asha K.N. Assistant Advisor, Political & Defence Section, Embassy of Japan
48. Mr. Nguyen Duy Khanh, First Secretary, Vietnam Embassy
49. Mr. Dalton Sembiring, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Indonesia
50. Mr. M. Konishi, Sojitz India
51. Mr. S. Srinivasan, Sojitz India
52. Amb. Jaimini Bhagwati, Honorary Professor, RBI Chair Progressor, ICRIER
53. Mr. Jag S. Johal, CBA Capital Partners
54. Mr. Vikram Tuli
55. Mr. Vinod Chandiok, CMD, Grant Thornton India
56. Mr. Verma, Grant Thornton India
57. Ms. Gaurav Dutta, Research Associate, National Maritime Foundation
58. Mr. Gautam Jain, International Law student
59. Mr. Alok Vidyalankar (Partner), Dua Associates
60. Ms. Asuka Ono (Principal), Dua Associates
61. Mr. Ami Ranjan, Advocate, Dua Associates
62. Mr. Dinesh Mathur, Partner, Dua Associates
63. Brig P.D. Naidu, DACIDS, Directorate of Net Assessment
64. GpCapt D.P. Hirani, VSM, Directorate of Net Assessment
65. Mr. Amrit Singh Deo, MD, FTI Consulting (India)
66. Ms. Tanzoom Ahmed, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Groups
67. Mr. Shreyas Deshmukh, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group
68. Ms. Angana Guha Roy, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group

***
Photographs: Various Sessions