



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power



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China Monitor

The DPG China Monitor features developments related to China during the month and is compiled by our research team comprising Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.), Senior Fellow and Sanket Joshi, Research Associate, from open-source reports and publications.

Cover Photographs:

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024. Source: [Official X Handle/Narendra Modi](#)

Family photo of the BRICS Leaders at the XVI BRICS Summit held in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024. Source: [Official X Handle/Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia](#)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin met on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024. Source: [Official X Handle/Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia](#)

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Contents

Abstract	1
Foreign and Security Policy	4
I. China-India Relations	4
II. China-South Asia Relations	6
III. China-United States Relations	7
IV. China-European Union Relations	10
V. China-Russia Relations	11
VI. China-ASEAN Summit.....	12
VII. East Asia Summit.....	13
VIII. Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).....	13
IX. BRICS Summit.....	14
Internal Developments	14
Key Developments and Addresses by Chinese Leaders	14
Trade and Economy	16
Defence and Security	17
Technology	18

Abstract

On October 21, 2024, India's Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, announced that India and China had agreed on patrolling arrangements at two points along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, leading to troop disengagement and resolution of issues that had risen in 2020. This announcement came just ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Kazan, Russia, for the 16th BRICS Summit. As of October 30, 2024, India and China are reported to have completed closely monitored disengagement at Demchok and Depsang, with the troops retreating to pre-April 2020 positions. Patrolling appears likely to be resumed at these points.

On October 23, 2024, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi formally met on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, their first bilateral meeting in five years. PM Modi again stressed the importance of border as he welcomed the recent agreement and emphasised the importance of "mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual sensitivity" in India-China relations. Both leaders called for stable, predictable, and amicable bilateral relations that would contribute to a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world.

On October 23, 2024, President Xi addressed the 16th BRICS Summit. He urged BRICS member-states to work together to advance global governance reforms and strengthen solidarity and cooperation between nations in the Global South. A Global Times editorial noted that the "BRICS family shines like a bright constellation in the vast night sky of globalisation", where countries have diverse historical and cultural backgrounds but share similar development visions and the pursuit of justice and fairness in the international order.

The 'Kazan Declaration' issued by BRICS, among other issues, expressed concern about the disruptive effects of unilateral Western sanctions on the world economy and emphasised the need for reform of the international financial system.

President Xi sent a congratulatory message to the annual Gala Dinner of the National Committee on US-China Relations (NCUSCR) on October 15, 2024. He emphasised that US-China relations should be guided by the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation, and both countries should work together as partners for the benefit of the world.

Notwithstanding, on October 28, 2024, the US Treasury Department finalised regulations that would restrict American investments in China in three key sectors which include semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum

information technologies, and certain artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The new rules seek to prevent US investments from being used by China to develop military-related technologies.

Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te delivered a National Day address on October 10, 2024, asserting that Taiwan (Republic of China) and China (People's Republic of China) "are not subordinate to each other" and "China has no right to represent Taiwan". Lai pledged to oppose annexation or encroachment on Taiwan's "sovereignty". Reacting sharply, China warned Lai that his provocative pro-independence stand would bring disaster to Taiwan's people and that his words would not change Taiwan's legal status as part of China.

To deter Taiwan "separatists", the PLA conducted a major military exercise titled "Joint Sword-2024B" around Taiwan on October 14, 2024. US and Canadian warships transited the Taiwan Strait on October 20, 2024, which China claimed undermined peace and stability in the region. China's Ministry of National Defence also expressed concern over US arms sales to Taiwan and urged the Pentagon to cease its "two-faced" actions on the Taiwan question.

A proposal by the European Commission to impose definitive countervailing duties on the imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China received the necessary support from the EU member-states on October 4, 2024. Beijing cautioned that the EU's protectionist policies violate WTO rules and "disrupt the international trade order", hindering China-EU trade and investment cooperation as well as Europe's green transition.

President Xi met Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 22, 2024. Xi reaffirmed that China-Russia relations are based on the principle of "non-alliance, non-confrontation, and no targeting of third parties" and urged the two sides to deepen their strategic coordination to maintain global strategic stability.

On October 18, 2024, China's Ministry of National Defence opposed the proposal of Japan's new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to establish an "Asian NATO". Beijing accused Japan of hyping up the "non-existent China threat" to divert the international community's attention away from its military expansion.

On October 10, 2024, Premier Li Qiang addressed the 27th China-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. He hailed the completion of negotiations on upgrading the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 as an important step in East Asian economic integration, and as a demonstration of the support of both sides for multilateralism and free trade. In light of this, Chinese state media

asserted that ASEAN had rejected the idea of an “Asian NATO” and that East Asia welcomes partners who promote peace and harmony, rather than those who create conflict or cause trouble.

China's GDP expanded by 4.6 percent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2024, reportedly at its slowest pace for six quarters as the property sector remained a major concern. The country's economy grew 4.8 percent in the first nine months of 2024, to around CNY 94.97 trillion (USD 13.33 trillion).

Foreign and Security Policy

I. China-India Relations

October 2024 was an eventful month for India-China relations. It started with India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addressing the Army Commanders Conference on October 11, expressing optimism about the resolution of India-China border standoff in eastern Ladakh, following positive diplomatic signals.¹ He, nevertheless, called upon the armed forces to be ready for any contingency.

On October 21, 2024, India's Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, in a press briefing, announced that India and China had arrived at an agreement to resume patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh "leading to disengagement". The announcement came ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Kazan, Russia, for the 16th BRICS Summit. He highlighted that the positive outcome was the result of extensive discussions that had taken place over the last several weeks, resulting in an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control as a precursor to "eventual disengagement and resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020".²

India's External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, speaking at a public event on October 21, echoed the remarks of the Foreign Secretary, terming this as a "positive development" which would create a basis for peace and tranquillity along the border areas. Elaborating on the accord, Dr. Jaishankar mentioned that the two sides had gone back to where the situation was in 2020, and with this the disengagement process with China in Ladakh has been completed. According to his understanding, the patrolling rights of 2020 will be restored. He termed this as a good and positive development, which was the product of patient and persevering diplomacy.³

On October 23, 2024, India's Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a formal meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan. According to Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, both leaders directed the concerned senior officials to take forward talks on resolving the border issue,

¹ "Rajnath: Cautiously optimistic about situation along LAC", [The Indian Express](#), October 12, 2024

² "India, China agree to patrolling along LAC leading to disengagement", [India Today](#), October 21, 2024

³ "Situation now as it was in 2020": EAM Jaishankar on India-China patrolling deal along the LAC", [The Times of India](#), October 21, 2024

while emphasising the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity on the border.⁴

PM Modi stressed that differences between the two sides should not disturb peace, while President Xi agreed that with maturity and mutual respect, India and China can have peaceful and beneficial bilateral relations. The meeting marked a significant development, as it was their first bilateral meeting in nearly five years.⁵

Key takeaways from the meeting were:

- Both sides agreed to advance peace efforts and find a mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.
- The meeting reviewed bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, covering regional and international developments.
- Special Representatives on the Boundary (National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi) will meet to oversee peace and tranquillity in border areas.
- Leaders acknowledged that stable relations between India and China will have a positive impact on regional and global peace.⁶

According to reports, the disengagement of troops from Depsang and Demchok and the removal of temporary structures has been completed on October 29, 2024. This will lead to the revival of traditional patrolling in these two disputed areas under agreed protocols.⁷ Patrolling in the other four areas where buffer zones have been created remains an issue.

Meanwhile, the latest satellite imagery indicates that China is rapidly constructing a settlement just 8.5 km from the northern bank of the Pangong Tso lake, with over 100 buildings already in place since work began in April 2024. Unlike typical Xiaokang villages, this site includes larger structures, probably intended for administrative use, and a helipad. The buildings are strategically nestled in a valley surrounded by towering peaks, limiting ground surveillance.⁸

⁴ "Modi, Xi discuss Ladakh border dispute, agree to advance peace efforts", [Business Standard](#), October 23, 2024

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Disengagement in Ladakh along India-China border to conclude by Oct 29: Report", [India Today](#), October 26, 2024

⁸ "Satellite Pics: China's New Base Near Pangong Lake 'Unlike Any Other Site'", [NDTV](#), October 14, 2024

II. China-South Asia Relations

On the sidelines of the SCO Meeting held in Islamabad on October 15-16, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chinese Premier Li Qiang held delegation-level talks. They exchanged views on the entire gamut of bilateral relations as well as matters of mutual, regional, and international importance. They reaffirmed mutual support on all core issues and expressed their commitment to the high-quality development of the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). They also emphasised the need for timely completion of all ongoing projects, for mutual benefit and for Pakistan's socio-economic development. The two leaders presided over the ceremony marking the completion of the new Gwadar airport and witnessed the exchange of important MoUs that will enhance cooperation in various fields. Sharif affirmed Pakistan's unwavering commitment to ensuring the safety of Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan.⁹

In an explosion near the Karachi International Airport on October 6, 2024, two Chinese nationals were killed. The Chinese Embassy described this as a "terrorist attack". In a statement, the separatist militant group Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed that the explosion was an attack carried out by them using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting Chinese nationals, including engineers.¹⁰

Chinese activity of constructing villages in territory deemed to be part of Bhutan continues. A report by 'Turquoise Roof' - a network of Tibetan analysts - highlighted that China has over the last five years constructed 22 villages and settlements in the area. Satellite imagery shows around 752 residential blocks, housing an estimated 2,284 family-sized units. These newly constructed villages are situated in high-altitude valleys and on steep ridges. A significant aspect of these constructions is their connectivity; all are linked by roads to Chinese towns, yet remain isolated from Bhutanese urban centres.¹¹

PLAN Task Group 83 berthed at Chittagong Port on October 12, 2024, starting the first goodwill visit in four years to Bangladesh and the first by a foreign naval fleet since the establishment of the interim government in Dhaka. The

⁹ "Pakistan, China resolve to deepen strategic cooperation", [Dawn](#), October 15, 2024

¹⁰ "Chinese embassy says citizens killed in Pakistan terrorist attack", [Nikkei Asia](#), October 7, 2024

¹¹ "China Has Constructed 22 Villages In Bhutan; Eyes Doklam For Strategic Supremacy Over India: New Report", [Eurasian Times](#), October 17, 2024

Chinese Embassy described this as an important development for deepening China-Bangladesh friendship and cooperation".¹²

III. China-United States Relations

President Xi sent a congratulatory message to the annual Gala Dinner of the National Committee on US-China Relations (NCUSCR) on October 15, 2024.¹³ He emphasised that US-China relations should be guided by the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation, and both countries should work together as partners for the benefit of the world.¹⁴ Xi underscored "reform and opening up" as a defining feature of China's modernisation, which would create more opportunities for US-China cooperation.¹⁵

Notwithstanding, on October 28, 2024, the US Treasury Department finalised regulations that would restrict American investments in China in three key sectors which include semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and certain artificial intelligence (AI) systems.¹⁶ The new rules seek to prevent US investments from being used by China to develop military-related technologies.¹⁷

Earlier, on October 8, 2024, during a phone call with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo reiterated Washington's concern over decreasing regulatory transparency in China, its non-market policies and practices, and structural overcapacity in several industries.¹⁸ Secretary Raimondo conveyed that the US's "small yard, high fence" approach (restrictions on high-technology trade with China) is intended to safeguard its national security in a targeted manner, while allowing room for healthy trade and investment.¹⁹ On his part, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao expressed concern over the US' semiconductor policy and restrictions on connected cars from China, and urged the US to clarify its national security

¹² "Chinese naval fleet makes historic visit to Bangladesh", [Dhaka Tribune](#), October 12, 2024

¹³ "Xi sends congratulations to Gala Dinner of National Committee on U.S.-China Relations", [People's Daily](#), October 16, 2024

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Treasury Issues Regulations to Implement Executive Order Addressing U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern", [US Department of Treasury](#), October 28, 2024

¹⁷ "US finalises rules to curb AI investments in China, impose other restrictions", [Reuters](#), October 29, 2024

¹⁸ "Readout of Secretary Raimondo's Call with Minister of Commerce of China Wang Wentao", [US Department of Commerce](#), October 8, 2024

¹⁹ Ibid.

boundaries in the trade and economic fields to maintain global supply chain stability.²⁰

Meanwhile, on October 1, 2024, Jay Shambaugh, US Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs, stated that sustained high-level trade dialogue had given China a “more nuanced understanding” of Washington's decision to increase tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs), lithium-ion batteries, semiconductors, solar cells, steel and aluminium, among other strategic goods.²¹ According to him, the Chinese side understands that the tariffs are narrowly targeted at strategic sectors, especially those in which the Biden administration is investing resources to develop US production.²² Moreover, the US has informed Beijing that the tariff increases are intended to persuade China to change its state-dominated economic policies and practices.²³ Due to this understanding, China has refrained from escalation or retaliation against US tariffs.²⁴

Even as Japan's newly appointed Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba floated the idea of creating an “Asian NATO”, the US Ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, called for the creation of a NATO-like trade bloc to tackle economic coercion by China.²⁵

On October 10, 2024, Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te delivered the National Day address. In a speech titled “Taiwan Together for Our Shared Dream”, Lai asserted that Taiwan (Republic of China) and China (People's Republic of China) “are not subordinate to each other” and “China has no right to represent Taiwan”.²⁶ He pledged to oppose annexation or encroachment on Taiwan's “sovereignty”.²⁷ Reacting sharply, China warned Lai that his provocative pro-independence stand would bring disaster to Taiwan's people and that his words would not change Taiwan's legal status as part of China.²⁸

²⁰ “Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held a phone call with US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo”, Ministry of Commerce PRC, October 9, 2024

²¹ “US-China talks helping avoid Chinese retaliation against Biden tariff hikes”, South China Morning Post, October 2, 2024

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ “US envoy to Japan pushes for Nato-like trade bloc to tackle China's economic coercion”, South China Morning Post, October 10, 2024

²⁶ “President Lai delivers 2024 National Day Address”, Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan), October 10, 2024

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “Beijing hits out at Lai's Double Tenth speech claim that mainland lacks authority over island”, South China Morning Post, October 10, 2024

To deter Taiwan separatists and their external supporters, the PLA's Eastern Theatre Command conducted a major military exercise titled "Joint Sword-2024B" around Taiwan on October 14, 2024.²⁹ During the drills, the PLA tested its joint real-combat capabilities, including "sea-air combat readiness patrol, blockade and control of key ports and areas, strikes against sea and land targets, and the seizure of comprehensive battlefield".³⁰ A South China Morning Post editorial cautioned that Lai is testing Beijing's patience with his inflammatory remarks and that the drills that blockaded Taiwan are a reminder of Beijing's red line.³¹ Nonetheless, Raymond Greene, the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (de facto US Ambassador) stated that the likelihood of war over Taiwan is "slim", given Taipei's military reforms and the presence of US forces in the region.³²

Following the PLA drills, US and Canadian warships transited the Taiwan Strait on October 20, 2024, which China claimed undermined peace and stability in the region.³³ Earlier, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence expressed concern over the US's approval of military assistance worth USD 567 million to Taiwan, and urged the Pentagon to cease its "two-faced" actions on the Taiwan question.³⁴ Adding to Chinese concerns, on October 26, 2024, the US State Department approved an arms sale package worth USD 2 billion to Taiwan, which includes the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS).³⁵

In his testimony to the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell cautioned that the "Cold War pales in comparison to the multifaceted challenges posed by China, especially in the Global South, and in the fields of trade and technology".³⁶ He urged the US to maintain a bipartisan focus on China and step up naval shipbuilding as well as the capacity of the defence manufacturing base.³⁷

²⁹ "Chinese PLA conducts "Joint Sword-2024B" drills surrounding Taiwan island", [Xinhua](#), October 14, 2024

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ "Editorial | Drills that blockaded Taiwan a reminder of Beijing's red lines", [South China Morning Post](#), October 15, 2024

³² "Chances of all-out war over Taiwan are 'slim', says US envoy", [South China Morning Post](#), October 28, 2024

³³ "Beijing's military says US-Canada Taiwan Strait transit undermines peace and stability", [South China Morning Post](#), October 21, 2024

³⁴ "US should stop "two-faced" actions on Taiwan question: Defence Spokesperson", [Ministry of National Defence PRC](#), October 9, 2024

³⁵ "US approves \$2 billion in arms sales to Taiwan including advanced missile defence system", [CNN](#), October 28, 2024

³⁶ "Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National Defence on September 26", [Ministry of National Defence PRC](#), October 8, 2024

³⁷ Ibid.

Chinese Ministry of National Defence described Campbell's comments as an "excuse for expanding US military power" and urged Washington to "abandon its Cold War thinking" that is intensifying confrontation and undermining China's strategic interests.³⁸

Among other developments, on October 24, 2024, the US issued an [AI National Security Memorandum to cut AI risks](#) and avoid strategic surprise by China.³⁹ This document provides direction on appropriately harnessing AI models and AI-enabled technologies in the US government while protecting human rights, civil liberties, privacy, and safety.⁴⁰

IV. China-European Union Relations

A proposal by the European Commission to impose definitive countervailing duties (tariffs) on the [imports of battery electric vehicles \(BEVs\) from China](#) received the necessary support from the EU member-states on October 4, 2024.⁴¹ Ten EU countries, including France and Italy, voted in favour of tariffs, while Germany, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia voted against them.⁴² Twelve member-states abstained from voting.⁴³ Following this, tariffs would be imposed on imports of Chinese BEVs by October 31, 2024, for five years.⁴⁴ China's Ministry of Commerce cautioned that the [EU's protectionist policies violate WTO rules](#) and "disrupt the international trade order", hindering China-EU trade and investment cooperation as well as Europe's green transition.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in a tit-for-tat move, on October 8, 2024, China imposed temporary anti-dumping measures on imports of brandy from the EU countries.⁴⁶

Amidst the [intensifying trade dispute](#), on October 11, 2024, Chinese Premier Li Qiang and European Council President Charles Michel met in Vientiane, Laos, on the margins of the 19th East Asia Summit. Premier Li maintained that China is a major partner of Europe in its green energy transition and urged the EU to

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ "US issues AI national security memo to avoid 'strategic surprise' by China and cut risks", [South China Morning Post](#), October 24, 2024

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "Commission proposal to impose tariffs on imports of battery electric vehicles from China obtains necessary support from EU Member States", [European Commission](#), October 4, 2024

⁴² "How EU governments voted on Chinese EV tariffs", [Reuters](#), October 4, 2024

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ "EU votes for tariffs on Chinese-made EVs in blockbuster trade row", [South China Morning Post](#), October 4, 2024

⁴⁵ "China urges EU to get back to right track of resolving trade disputes through consultations: commerce ministry", [People's Daily](#), October 5, 2024

⁴⁶ "China targets brandy in EU trade tit-for-tat after EV tariff move", [Reuters](#), October 8, 2024

develop a correct understanding of China's modernisation and formulate rational policies.⁴⁷ On October 25, 2024, China and the EU agreed to hold further technical negotiations to discuss alternatives to tariffs despite the EU's vote in favour of tariffs.⁴⁸

Among other developments, on October 11, 2024, China opposed a resolution adopted by the European Parliament that condemned Beijing's "human rights violations" in Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), Hong Kong, Macao, and the Chinese mainland.⁴⁹

V. China-Russia Relations

President Xi met Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 22, 2024, continuing the deepening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Xi reaffirmed that China-Russia relations are based on the principle of "non-alliance, non-confrontation, and no targeting of third parties".⁵⁰ He urged the two sides to deepen their strategic coordination in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS, and G20 to maintain global strategic stability and international fairness and justice.⁵¹

Earlier, on October 16, 2024, Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met in Islamabad, Pakistan, on the margins of the 23rd Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). They affirmed commitment of the two sides to supporting each other on issues affecting their core national interests, as well as to promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as supply chains, digital economy, and energy trade.⁵²

On October 15, 2024, Russia's newly appointed Defence Minister Andrei Belousov met with Gen. Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of China's Central

⁴⁷ "China's Li Qiang calls for 'rational' views in talks with EU chief Michel as trade row simmers", [South China Morning Post](#), October 11, 2024

⁴⁸ "EU and China agree to discuss possible alternatives to EV tariffs", [Nikkei Asia](#), October 25, 2024

⁴⁹ "China expresses strong indignation over European Parliament's resolution: Chinese FM", [Global Times](#), October 11, 2024

⁵⁰ "Xi says China, Russia find right way for neighbouring major countries to get along with each other", [People's Daily](#), October 23, 2024

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² "China willing to work with Russia to strengthen strategic coordination - Premier Li", [Xinhua](#), October 16, 2024

Military Commission in Beijing, deepening their military-to-military relations.⁵³

Meanwhile, on October 2, 2024, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Charles Brown expressed concerns about China and Russia's joint military activities in the Arctic.⁵⁴

Amidst the conflict in Ukraine, the US imposed sanctions on two Chinese companies that were "directly developing" weapons systems (drones) with Russian counterparts.⁵⁵ Although China's exports to Russia have increased, sanctions imposed by the West on Moscow have hampered its imports from Russia.⁵⁶

VI. China-ASEAN Summit

On October 10, 2024, Premier Li Qiang addressed the 27th China-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. In his remarks, Li emphasised China's commitment to the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness in its relations with ASEAN and urged the two sides to collaborate to build a more prosperous future for Asia.⁵⁷ To accomplish this, he called for the creation of a multidimensional connectivity network, the expansion of cooperation in emerging industries (AI), and the strengthening of people-to-people exchanges.⁵⁸ Premier Li hailed the completion of negotiations on upgrading the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 as an important step in East Asian economic integration and as a demonstration of both sides' support for multilateralism and free trade.⁵⁹ Reacting to this, Chinese state media asserted that ASEAN had rejected the idea of an "Asian NATO" and that East Asia welcomes partners who promote peace and harmony, rather than those who create conflict or cause trouble.⁶⁰

⁵³ "CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Youxia meets Russian Defence Minister", Ministry of National Defence PRC, October 15, 2024

⁵⁴ "We 'all need to pay attention' to China and Russia in Arctic, says top US commander", South China Morning Post, October 10, 2024

⁵⁵ "US sanctions 2 Chinese companies over drones used by Russia against Ukraine", South China Morning Post, October 18, 2024

⁵⁶ "China's Russia imports, hampered by payment sanctions, drop as exports swell", South China Morning Post, October 18, 2024

⁵⁷ "Full Text: Address by Chinese Premier Li Qiang at 27th China-ASEAN Summit", Xinhua, October 10, 2024

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ "What failure of 'Asian NATO' idea at ASEAN indicates: Global Times editorial", Global Times, October 12, 2024

Meanwhile, during his address at the [ASEAN Plus Three](#) (China, Japan, Republic of Korea) Summit, Premier Li called for the strengthening of "Asian consciousness" and promotion of "oriental wisdom" to advance a peaceful, open, and connected Asia of shared prosperity.⁶¹

VII. East Asia Summit

On October 11, 2024, Premier Li addressed the 19th East Asia Summit in Vientiane. He called on all parties to uphold the "[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence](#)" and create a better future for the region and the world at large.⁶² Major issues touched on by him included opposing bloc confrontation and the "small yard, high fence" approach, improving international governance, supporting ASEAN-centred open and inclusive regional security architecture, high-quality implementation of RCEP, and respecting the joint efforts made by China and regional countries in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.⁶³

VIII. Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

Premier Li addressed the 23rd Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Islamabad, Pakistan, on October 16, 2024. He called upon SCO member-states to [carry forward the "Shanghai Spirit"](#), which promotes peace, mutual trust, development, fairness and justice in the region.⁶⁴ The motto of China's presidency of the SCO for 2024-25 will be "Upholding the Shanghai Spirit: SCO on the Move".⁶⁵ During its presidency, Beijing plans to enhance strategic synergy between SCO member-states, enhance practical cooperation to boost regional trade, address issues related to terrorism and separatism, and enhance people-to-people exchanges.⁶⁶

⁶¹ "Remarks by H.E. Li Qiang Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the 27th ASEAN Plus Three Summit", [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC](#), October 10, 2024

⁶² "Remarks by H.E. Li Qiang Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the 19th East Asia Summit", [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC](#), October 11, 2024

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ "Remarks by H.E. Li Qiang Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the 23rd Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC](#), October 16, 2024

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

IX. BRICS Summit

On October 23, 2024, President Xi addressed the XVI BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. He urged BRICS member-states to work together to advance global governance reforms and strengthen solidarity and cooperation between nations in the Global South.⁶⁷ President Xi emphasised the importance of the BRICS countries remaining committed to peace, justice, innovation, high-quality green development, and harmonious co-existence between civilizations.⁶⁸ A Global Times editorial noted that the "BRICS family shines like a bright constellation in the vast night sky of globalisation", where countries have diverse historical and cultural backgrounds but share similar development visions and the pursuit of justice and fairness in international order.⁶⁹ A report in the South China Morning Post underscored the importance of BRICS cooperation in maintaining global stability, promoting multilateralism, and challenging the Western-led world order.⁷⁰

The 'Kazan Declaration' issued by the BRICS group, among other issues, expressed concern about the disruptive effects of unilateral Western sanctions on the world economy and emphasised the need for international financial system reform.⁷¹ Further, it welcomed the use of local currencies in financial transactions between the BRICS countries and their trading partners.⁷² Reportedly, thirteen nations have been invited to become BRICS partners, including Algeria, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Türkiye, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Bolivia, Cuba, Nigeria, and Uganda.⁷³

Internal Developments

Key Developments and Addresses by Chinese Leaders

On September 30, 2024, President Xi addressed a reception marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. He reiterated that "modernisation and national rejuvenation" remain the country's most

⁶⁷ "Embracing a Broader View and Cutting Through the Fog of Challenges to Advance High-Quality Development of Greater BRICS Cooperation", [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC](#), October 23, 2024

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "The five major goals empower 'Greater BRICS Cooperation' with focused strength: Global Times editorial", [Global Times](#), October 24, 2024

⁷⁰ "Editorial | Greater cooperation by Brics nations to benefit global stability", [South China Morning Post](#), October 29, 2024

⁷¹ "BRICS summit: Key takeaways from the Kazan declaration", [Reuters](#), October 24, 2024

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Official X Handle RT, [Russia Today](#), October 24, 2024

important objectives.⁷⁴ He addressed several key issues, including upholding the Party's leadership, implementing the One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong and Macao, resolutely opposing the separatist activities of the "Taiwan independence" movement, and preparing for unexpected risks and challenges.⁷⁵

As part of his speech marking the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), President Xi stressed the importance of building a global community that shares a common future through promoting open and inclusive cooperation and win-win cooperation.⁷⁶

In the midst of escalating cross-strait tensions, President Xi visited Dongshan County in the Taiwan-facing Fujian province, the site of the cross-strait conflict of 1953.⁷⁷ During this visit, he examined the work related to rural revitalisation, the CPC's revolutionary traditions, and preserving cultural heritage.⁷⁸ In another address, Xi urged the CPC to transform China into a cultural powerhouse by 2035 by adapting Marxism to Chinese civilisational values.⁷⁹

On October 28, 2024, a meeting of the CPC Political Bureau was chaired by President Xi to examine the report of the disciplinary inspection as part of Beijing's anti-corruption drive.⁸⁰ Xi noted that the disciplinary inspection has strengthened the Party, state departments, and centrally administered financial institutions. However, he cautioned that problems remain and urged the CPC to maintain a strong stand against corruption over the long term.⁸¹

Among other developments, Former Judge Sam Hou Fai was elected as the new Chief Executive of the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR). China's

⁷⁴ "Xi urges greater national achievements, contributions to humanity's peace, development", People's Daily, October 1, 2024

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ "Xi stresses giving play to unique role of people-to-people diplomacy", People's Daily, October 12, 2024

⁷⁷ "Chinese President Xi visits Taiwan-facing island after PLA drills simulate blockade", South China Morning Post, October 17, 2024

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ "Xi stresses building China into cultural powerhouse by 2035", People's Daily, October 29, 2024

⁸⁰ "Xi chairs CPC leadership meeting to review disciplinary inspection report", People's Daily, October 28, 2024

⁸¹ Ibid.

State Council hailed Macao's election as an example of the country's "One Country, Two Systems".⁸²

Trade and Economy

China's GDP expanded by 4.6 percent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2024, reportedly at its slowest pace for six quarters as the depressed property sector remains a serious concern.⁸³ The country's economy grew 4.8 percent year-on-year in the first nine months of 2024 to around CNY 94.97 trillion (USD 13.33 trillion).⁸⁴ Analysts noted that "the stimulus package announced at the end of September would take time and patience to boost growth".⁸⁵ Despite the stimulus, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its estimate for China's economic growth for 2024 to 4.8 percent, down from its previous projection of 5 percent.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, Zheng Shanjie, Chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), expressed optimism regarding the country's future growth prospects. However, he expressed concerns about increasing external risks, downward pressure on the economy, and failures of some firms to adapt to "involution" competition.⁸⁷ He asserted that China would adhere to a systematic implementation of policies that would enhance domestic demand, contribute to the development of the private sector, including the capital markets, as well as address issues associated with local government debt and stabilize the real estate market.⁸⁸ In line with this, a draft law on promoting the growth of the private sector was unveiled by China on October 10, 2024.⁸⁹ China's top 500 private companies reportedly cut 314,600 jobs in 2023 as a result of the economic slowdown.⁹⁰

⁸² "Macao SAR elects new chief executive-designate", [People's Daily](#), October 14, 2024

⁸³ "Update: China's Third-Quarter GDP Rises 4.6%, Beating Expectations", [Caixin Global](#), October 18, 2024

⁸⁴ Qiushi Journal, [Official X Handle Qiushi Journal](#) – Flagship Magazine of the CPC Central Committee, October 18, 2024

⁸⁵ "China's Q3 GDP hits weakest pace since early 2023, backs calls for more stimulus", [Reuters](#), October 18, 2024

⁸⁶ "Despite China's stimulus, IMF lowers GDP forecast on property, consumer confidence", [South China Morning Post](#), October 22, 2024

⁸⁷ "China economic planner confident on growth, to front-load 100 billion yuan: as it happened", [South China Morning Post](#), October 8, 2024

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "China Focus: China unveils draft law on private sector promotion", [Xinhua](#), October 11, 2024

⁹⁰ "China's top private firms cut jobs, await greater support to allay anxieties", [South China Morning Post](#), October 15, 2024

On October 28, 2024, the State Council introduced new measures to overcome demographic challenges posed by [China's rapidly ageing population](#), including enhancing childbirth support services, expanding childcare systems, strengthening support in education, housing and employment, and creating a birth-friendly social environment.⁹¹

Among other developments, on October 2, 2024, Beijing filed a dispute with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against [Canada's tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles \(EVs\)](#) as well as steel and aluminium products. It criticised Canada's unilateralism and trade protectionism, urged Ottawa to abide by WTO rules, and rationally view trade relations with China.⁹² The production of [new energy vehicles in China continued to rise](#) in the first nine months of 2024.⁹³

Defence and Security

On October 18, 2024, China's Ministry of National Defence opposed Japan's new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's [proposal to establish an "Asian NATO"](#).⁹⁴ Beijing accused Japan of hyping up the "non-existent China threat" to divert international community's attention away from its military expansion. Japan was urged to refrain from forming exclusive military alliances and promote peace and stability in the region.⁹⁵

Amidst the continuing tensions in the South China Sea, Chinese analysts expressed concerns about the [militarisation of the region](#) with the deployment of the US Typhon mid-range missile system in the Philippines.⁹⁶ Moreover, as the Philippines and the Republic of Korea (ROK) [upgraded their relations to a strategic partnership](#) and agreed to boost defence cooperation, analysts noted that Seoul and Manila are catering to the US strategy of containing China in the South China Sea.⁹⁷

In a Strategic Guideline on Naval Operations, the US Navy reportedly highlighted China's ship-building capabilities and urged its forces to [prepare](#)

⁹¹ "China unveils new policy measures to boost birth support", [People's Daily](#), October 29, 2024

⁹² "China files complaint at WTO over Canada's unilateralism, trade protectionism practices", [People's Daily](#), October 3, 2024

⁹³ "China's vehicle industry sees massive growth yearly", [People's Daily](#), October 16, 2024

⁹⁴ "Defence Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on Recent Media Queries Concerning the Military", [Ministry of National Defence PRC](#), October 18, 2024

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ "US militarizing region with mid-range missile system deployment in Philippines: experts", [Global Times](#), October 22, 2024

⁹⁷ "Observers wary of US influence in S.Korea-Philippines defence cooperation boost", [Global Times](#), October 7, 2024

[for a potential conflict with China in 2027](#).⁹⁸ Reacting sharply, Beijing asserted that this exposes Washington's "Cold War mentality" and that China has no intention of challenging or replacing the US. It reaffirmed that China's modernisation and national rejuvenation cannot be impeded by foreign forces.⁹⁹

On October 17, 2024, during a visit to the southeastern province of Anhui, President Xi visited a [PLA Rocket Force \(PLARF\) unit](#).¹⁰⁰ Analysts noted that this visit followed the PLA's Joint Sword-2024B military drill around Taiwan, emphasising the critical role PLARF might play in preventing the US from getting involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, PLARF scientist Xiao Longxu was expelled from China's top political advisory body, the CPPCC, as part of the country's crackdown on corruption in the military.¹⁰²

Technology

On October 15, 2024, China unveiled its mid and long-term development [program for space science](#) that will guide the country's planning of space missions and space research from 2024 to 2050.¹⁰³ The five key scientific themes of the country's space research include "extreme universe" (exploring the origin and evolution of the universe), "space-time ripples" (detecting medium to low-frequency gravitational waves and primordial gravitational waves), "panoramic view of Sun-Earth", "habitable planets" (exploring exoplanets and extraterrestrial life), and "biological and physical sciences in space".¹⁰⁴

China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) warned of [imminent security threats from Intel products](#), claiming that Intel's chips are vulnerable and have high failure rates.¹⁰⁵ Further, China is reportedly encouraging local companies to [use domestic AI chips instead of Nvidia chips](#) as the US extends sanctions against

⁹⁸ "Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National Defence on September 26", [Ministry of National Defence PRC](#), October 8, 2024

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ "Xi Jinping visit highlights PLA Rocket Force's key role in Taiwan strategy", [South China Morning Post](#), October 23, 2024

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "PLA Rocket Force scientist stripped of political advisory post amid China's corruption crackdown", [South China Morning Post](#), October 12, 2024

¹⁰³ "China releases space science development program for 2024-2050", [People's Daily](#), October 15, 2024

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ "China spy agency warns of growing cybersecurity threats amid call for Intel review", [South China Morning Post](#), October 17, 2024

the country's high-technology sector.¹⁰⁶ Amidst China's drive for semiconductor self-sufficiency, analysts warned that US sanctions would be difficult to overcome.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) published the Global Innovation Index (GII) 2024, in which China was ranked 11th, highlighting its growing innovation capacity in high-technology industries.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ "Tech war: China advocates use of local AI chips over those from US powerhouse Nvidia", South China Morning Post, October 7, 2024

¹⁰⁷ "Can China find a way around US restrictions on hi-tech computer chips?", South China Morning Post, October 15, 2024

¹⁰⁸ "New Momentum | China's rise in GII 2024 mirrors strengthening innovation", People's Daily, October 12, 2024



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