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DPG China Monitor

The DPG China Monitor features developments related to China during the month and is compiled by our research team comprising Brig. Arun Sahgal (Retd.), Senior Fellow, Dr. Angana Guha Roy and Sanket Joshi, Research Associates, from open-source reports and publications.

Cover Photograph:
Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the SCO Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, September 16, 2022. Source: Official Website of the President of Russia

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Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................i

Foreign and Security Policy .........................................................................................................1
  I. China-India Relations ...............................................................................................................1
  II. China-South Asia Relations ....................................................................................................5
  III. China-United States Relations ..............................................................................................7
  IV. China-Russia Relations .........................................................................................................10
  V. China-European Union Relations ..........................................................................................12

SCO Samarkand Summit ..............................................................................................................13

Internal Developments ................................................................................................................15
  20th CPC National Congress ......................................................................................................15

Trade and Economy .....................................................................................................................16

Defence and Security ...................................................................................................................18

Technology ....................................................................................................................................19
Abstract

After a prolonged process of 16 corps commander-level meetings between India and China, an agreement was reached on coordinated disengagement at Patrolling Point 15, in the Gogra Hot Spring area of Eastern Ladakh. However, despite this, disengagement from the two earlier intrusions in Depsang Plains and Demchok in Eastern Ladakh remain to be resolved. The agreement on mutual pull-backs has resulted in the creation of four “buffer zones” where the two sides will not undertake any patrolling or construction of defence facilities. Although the geographical limits of the buffer zones have not been publicly spelled out, reports have claimed that patrolling limits of both sides are equidistant from the vacated positions. India has, however, clarified that the patrolling points do not define India’s LAC claims in Eastern Ladakh.

Following the conditional disengagement, China’s Ambassador to India claimed that the situation at the LAC is moving towards being “normalised and under control”. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar on the other hand underlined that there can be no normalcy till all border pacts are respected, adding that this is the “accurate policy assessment” of the current state of the bilateral relations.

Against the backdrop of China’s military and infrastructure build-up along the LAC, India too is strengthening its military posture. The Indian Army is bolstering its operational efficiency by an infrastructure build-up both in Ladakh and in the Eastern sector, Arunachal Pradesh in particular.

Amidst the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka, the Foreign Ministers of China and Sri Lanka meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), agreed to advance BRI cooperation and speed up negotiations on a free trade agreement. China has thus far refrained from committing to any debt restructuring plan and has instead proposed a refinancing strategy.

On China-Pakistan relations, Despite the two side’s reaffirming their “iron brotherhood”, no breakthrough has yet been achieved on a loan assistance package.

In Nepal, concerned over the ratification of the USD 500 million US MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) deal that will support Nepal’s development goals, China has gone into overdrive to strengthen political ties.

China’s state media described the 77th session of the UNGA as a “watershed moment” wherein Beijing sought to “push concrete, result-oriented
cooperation”, while the US-led West sought “division”. In his UNGA address, Foreign Minister Wang Yi touched on major issues that included “opposing war, upholding peace through dialogue and consultation”, “placing development at the center of international agenda”, “rejecting coercion, zero-sum game, and bloc confrontation”, “opposing drawing lines on ideological grounds”, “practicing true multilateralism”, “peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland”, “fully implementing new development philosophy”, and following the “Chinese path to modernisation to achieve great rejuvenation of the nation”.

Amidst growing US-China strategic competition, Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his meeting with his US counterpart, stressed five “certainties” about China: “prospects of China’s development are certain”, “China will remain resolute in reform and opening-up”, “principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation will shape China-US relations”, and “China will strengthen economic, trade, and multilateral cooperation with the US”. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on his part stressed the need to maintain open lines of communication and manage US-China relations responsibly.

China featured in President Biden’s UNGA address on issues of human rights violations, nuclear build-up, and assertions in Taiwan. Notwithstanding China’s warnings, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a proposed “Taiwan Policy Act 2022,” which includes USD 6.5 billion in US Security Assistance to Taiwan over the next five years.

In his first foreign visit since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, President Xi Jinping visited Samarkand, Uzbekistan, to attend the 22nd meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ (SCO) on September 16. In his address at the SCO, President Xi Jinping emphasised the “Shanghai Spirit” embodying “mutual trust”, “mutual benefit”, “equality”, “consultation”, “respect for diversity of civilisations”, and “the pursuit of common development” with a view to injecting positivity into Eurasia’s development and stability. Chinese state media rejected the claims that the SCO was an “anti-Western front” and asserted that the Eurasian organisation has grown from a regional body to a global force.

Chinese President Xi Jinping met Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the SCO Summit. A Global Times editorial asserted that “the meeting injected stability into a world of change and disorder”. Strengthening bilateral defence cooperation, China and Russia held their 2nd joint naval patrol in the Pacific Ocean, while China also participated in the ‘Vostok 2022’ strategic drills hosted by Russia.
Ahead of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 20th National Congress, President Xi Jinping asserted that the CPC’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is now the “standard-bearer of the global socialist movement” and the Party must keep up the “revolutionary spirit while pursuing self-reflection and self-correction to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union”. The CPC is likely to “amend its charter at the Congress” to “incorporate more of Xi’s governance philosophy and ideology”, paving way for his third term as Party’s General Secretary.

Amidst mounting economic headwinds and youth unemployment, China’s State Council promised more support for the country’s technology companies, including special loans. The State Council also extended tax deferrals for manufacturing firms facing hardships. Adding to investor concerns, a survey by the ‘US-China Business Council’ (USCBC) indicated that “US business optimism in China has tumbled to an all-time low owing to Zero-Covid policy, geopolitical tensions, and supply chain disruptions”.

China strongly condemned cyberattacks allegedly carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA) against the Northwestern Polytechnical University known for its research in aviation, aerospace and navigation. China’s MFA asserted that “the US used 41 specialised cyber weapons to steal core technical data from Northwestern Polytechnical University” and called upon Washington to “stop its unlawful cyber activities”. Further, as the US updated its “Space Policy” recognising outer space as a “priority domain of national military power” and adopted “tenets of responsible behaviour in space”, Beijing termed the US as a “grave threat to peace and security in outer space”.

Foreign and Security Policy

I. China-India Relations

After a long haul of 16 corps commander-level meetings, an agreement was reached to *vacate the last of the friction points* in Eastern Ladakh.¹ This led to a mutual pullout from Patrolling Point 15, in the Gogra Hot Spring area. This marks the *fourth round of disengagement* along the LAC as a result of which disengagement from the four recent friction points has been achieved.² Importantly, agreement on mutual pullback has resulted in the creation of four "buffer zones" where each side will not undertake any patrolling or construction of defenses. Although the geographical limits of the buffer zones have not been publicly spelt out, reports claim that *patrolling limits* of both sides are equidistant from the vacated positions.³ India, has, however clarified that the *patrolling points* do not define the Indian LAC claims in Eastern Ladakh.⁴

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¹ "India, China troops disengage at LAC friction point in Ladakh," *The Economic Times*, September 13, 2022
² "Disengagement of Indian, Chinese troops in Ladakh's Gogra-Hot Springs area set to be wrapped up today," *Hindustan Times*, September 12, 2022
³ "Decoding the key lessons from LAC disengagement," *Hindustan Times*, September 27, 2022
⁴ "Patrolling points do not define the Indian claim in East Ladakh LAC," *Hindustan Times*, September 26, 2022
Two issues that however remain to be addressed are: (i) China’s blocking positions at the Y junction in the Depsang plains on the North side of the Eastern Ladakh; (ii) legacy dispute in Demchok area where China wants India to give up its claims over grazing rights for the fear of gaining access to areas in Aksai Chin vulnerable for China.

With the establishment of the buffer zones, a clearly defined line setting the patrolling limits has emerged for both sides A new line has been created in Eastern Ladakh that traverses across Depsang, Galwan and Gogra Hot Springs and both banks of Pangong Tso leading to Charding Nala in Demchok. Although neither side has given up their LAC claims, now with separated buffer zones a resolution in face off can be possible. There are perceptions, however, that agreement may lead to a new LAC limiting the possibility of a breakthrough for a larger boundary resolution in the wake of establishing a status quo that only guarantees no flare ups along the disputed border in Eastern Ladakh. There is no resolution yet on the PLA’s fresh military structures that have come up as a result of recent aggression.

In the backdrop of China’s frenzied military and infrastructure buildup along the LAC, India, too, is strengthening its military posture. The Indian army is firmly focused on LAC with a multi-pronged strategy of capability enhancement through induction of new systems, technologies and extensive infrastructure development. The army has not only put effort in bolstering its functional efficiency in the Ladakh theater but is also focused on pushing infrastructure buildup in the eastern sector, especially Arunachal Pradesh. The proposed infrastructure push encompasses building roads, bridges, helipads, habitat for troops, ammunition holding areas and other logistics facilities to support forward-deployments.

Following the conditional disengagement, China’s Ambassador to India Sun Weidong at a virtual event celebrating the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China claimed the situation at the LAC is moving

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5 “Patrol blocking in Depsang by both sides will take time to resolve’, The Hindu, July 27, 2022.
6 “China continues its bullying. Stops Indian shepherds from grazing cattle along LAC,” Financial Express, August 31, 2022
7 “Decoding the key lessons from LAC disengagement,” Hindustan Times, September 27, 2022
8 Ibid.
9 “China slowly creating new LAC in Ladakh, disengagement not resolving problems,” India Today, September 19, 2022
10 “In eastern sector, Indian Army reorients forces in sharpened focus on LAC,” Hindustan Times, September 7, 2022
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
towards being “**normalized and under control**”. In a flawed conclusion he added “the current border situation is overall stable, and the phase of emergency response since the Galwan Valley incident has basically come to an end.” During the same event Ambassador Weidong proposed **four principles** to strengthen India-China bilateral relations: (i) mutual understanding and trust (ii) win-win cooperation (iii) strengthen coordination and collaboration (iv) appropriately handle differences and sensitive issues.

Reacting to Ambassador Weidong’s comments, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said that India sought a relationship with China but one that was built on mutual respect. He added there can be **no normalcy till border pacts are respected** - ‘remains the “accurate policy assessment” of the state of the relationship.’

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13 “Border situation moving towards being ‘normalised’, claims Chinese envoy to India,” Scroll, September 3, 2022
14 “Chinese ambassador puts forward 4 proposals on China-India relations,” People’s Daily, September 29, 2022
15 “India wants a relationship of ‘mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual interest’ with China: Jaishankar,” The Hindu, September 29, 2022
16 “No normalcy with China till border pacts are respected: Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, September 29, 2022
Meanwhile, although analysts linked the disengagement as an attempt to improve the “ambience” ahead of the SCO Summit, the two heads of states did not use the event for any talks or exchange on the sidelines. A report in the South China Morning Post reflecting on both leaders’ attendance highlighted that, despite “standing side by side during a group photo session, there was no eye contact, smiles or handshake between the two leaders. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang too refrained from holding one on one dialogue while attending the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

China used its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to put a hold on the UN Security Council’s Al Qaida and ISIL (Daesh) Sanctions Committee’s listing of Pakistan based Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist Sajid Mir, one of most wanted terrorist by India for his role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Despite China’s efforts to save Pakistan from global censure, the latter continues to be in the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Responding to China’s move, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar stressed that, “the United Nations responds to terrorism by sanctioning its perpetrators. Those who politicize the UNSC 1267 Sanctions regime, sometimes to the extent of defending proclaimed terrorists, do so at their own peril.”

On the trade front, as countries are increasingly working towards diversifying their supply chains and reduce dependency on China, technology giant Apple Inc. has decided to shift its new handset (iPhone 14) manufacturing facility from China to India. Responding to the development Chinese state media reported “Whether Apple’s move is a forced “political decision” or a forward-looking “economic decision,” there is no doubt that it comes against the backdrop of Washington’s shift to a containment-based strategy toward China...On the surface, this may seem bad for China, but in the long run, it is a

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17 “LAC disengagement improves ambience ahead of SCO summit,” The Economic Times, September 10, 2022
18 “No smiles, no handshake: China and India are in the midst of a geopolitical split,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2022
19 “Has India suffered a loss when border with China goes further toward stability? Global Times editorial,” Global Times, September 24, 2022
20 “A disruptive nexus of China and Pakistan,” The Hindu, September 19, 2022
21 Ibid.
22 “Jaishankar takes a dig at Pakistan, China over terrorism during UNGA address,” Mint, September 25, 2022
23 “iPhone in India: Apple makes new handset in India in shift from China,” BBC, September 27, 2022
good thing for the country. It is not so much a test of smartphones made in China as it is a test of the US’ "decoupling" policy."24

II. China-South Asia Relations

Amidst the ongoing economic crisis, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ali Sabry on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. The two ministers agreed to jointly advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation and speed up negotiations on a free trade agreement.25 However, there was no discussion on the conclusion of the FTA. Sri Lanka has been prevaricating and dragging its feet on the FTA since talks began in 2015.26 So far, Sri Lanka and China have failed to reach consensus on the terms of the FTA.

At present, China remains the largest external creditor of Sri Lanka. India superseded China as Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lender, having loaned a total of $968 million USD (between April and August) this year.27 Sri Lanka is currently in the midst of negotiations with the IMF to secure an Extended Fund Facility, a long-term financial aid package to assist economic recovery.28 As per the structural requirements, China holds key to Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring to ease economic crisis as the completion of debt restructuring is mandatory for the approval for the IMF loan.29 China has agreed to help Sri Lanka in facing the economic crisis, but so far has not committed to any debt restructuring plan. It has, instead, proposed a refinancing strategy.30 At present, Sri Lanka needs to make progress with its negotiations with China before the executive board votes to release the funds.31

Not just Sri Lanka, China has kept Pakistan too waiting on loan deals.32 China has offered Pakistan technical help as the country deals with record floods, but did not announce any substantial financial assistance. Chinese State media quoted Gen. Wei as calling on both countries “to tide over difficulties together,

24 “iPhone transfer to India a test of US ‘decoupling’” Global Times, September 29, 2022
26 “Despite Chinese pressure, Sri Lanka wary of entering into Free Trade Agreement,” ANI, September 28, 2022
27 “India supersedes China as Lanka’s largest bi-lateral creditor,” Newsfirst.lk, September 22, 2022
28 Ibid.
29 “China holds key to Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring to ease economic crisis,” Economy Next, September 7, 2022
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 “China keeps Pakistan, Sri Lanka waiting on loan deals,” The Hindu, September 20, 2022
fully trust each other, and unswervingly support each other’s core interests on the way forward” but did not detail any offers of assistance.\(^{33}\)

Despite the reaffirmation of “iron brotherhood” and resolve of taking “bilateral relations to greater heights”, no breakthrough was made on loan assistance, during the *summit meeting* between President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif.\(^{34}\) As both sides discussed the future prospects of CPEC President Xi urged Pakistan to provide *protection for the security of Chinese citizens* and institutions in Pakistan, and lawful rights and interests of Chinese businesses (following reports of Chinese businesses and nationals being attacked and targeted by locals).\(^{35}\) Pakistani PM hailed China for assistance to flood ravaged Pakistan. According to a report in Global Times, China announced another 300 million yuan (roughly $43 million) of aid to Pakistan after the emergency relief supplies worth of 100 million yuan earlier.\(^{36}\)

Meanwhile, reports of *China not fulfilling its commitment to invest* in Afghanistan have surfaced. “There has not even been a penny of investment by China,” Khan Jan Alokozay, vice president of Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Investment, averred in a recent interview. Adding, “many of their companies came, met with us, conducted research and then vanished, which is frustrating.”\(^{37}\)

During the month, the *new China- Afghanistan Corridor* was operationalized. According to reports, China dispatched first load of freight to Afghanistan on the new corridor which will cut travel time by several weeks. The multimodal route starts in China’s northwestern Xinjiang province then passes through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan before entering Afghanistan.\(^{38}\)

On an event celebrating the 73rd anniversary of the founding of People’s Republic of China, Chinese Ambassador in Dhaka, called Bangladesh an amicable neighbor and indispensable strategic partner. Later in an *interview*, Ambassador pointed out China’s plans to align BRI with Bangladesh’s Vision

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33 Ibid.
34 “President Xi Jinping Meets Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China*, September 16, 2022
36 “China to provide another 300 million yuan aid to flood-ravaged Pakistan as flood death toll surpasses 1,200,” *Global Times*, September 4, 2022
2041 plan that provides a roadmap for accelerating growth and lays down broad approaches for eradication of poverty, inequality and human deprivation. In a statement, State Minister for Planning Shamsul Alam urged China to increase FDI in Bangladesh. China’s investment in Bangladesh in 2021 amounted to 1.26 billion dollars.

China has gone into overdrive in Nepal after the ratification of the US MCC deal. China’s third-ranked leader Li Zhanshu visited Nepal on September 12, in a bid to strengthen political and social ties with the country. During the visit, Nepal and China signed a six-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on inter-parliamentary cooperation, which will facilitate high-level mutual visits by parliamentarians. Both sides also agreed to implement connectivity and infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In return for Nepal’s aspirations to build more BRI projects, Beijing sought Kathmandu’s support for its ‘one-China’ policy.

III. China-United States Relations

China featured prominently in US President Joe Biden’s 77th UN General Assembly speech. On the escalating China-US “competition” President Biden said, “Let me be direct about the competition between the United States and China. As we manage shifting geopolitical trends, the United States will conduct itself as a reasonable leader. We do not seek conflict. We do not seek a Cold War. We do not ask any nation to choose between the United States or any other partner.”

He further cited a UN report that found China may have committed crimes against humanity stating “Human rights are the basis for all that we seek to achieve. And yet today, in 2022, fundamental freedoms are at risk in every part of our world, from the violations of human rights in Xinjiang detailed in recent reports by the Office of U.N.” Before Biden’s speech Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson dismissed the UN report calling it illegal, null, void and a patchwork of disinformation by western forces. Biden also criticized China

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39 “We’re working very hard to increase Bangladesh’s export to China,” The Daily Star, October 1, 2022
40 “Nepal is the new battleground for China and US. Beijing goes into overdrive after MCC deal,” The Print, September 14, 2022
41 “Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” The White House, September 21, 2022
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
over its nuclear weapons programme mentioning “China is conducting an unprecedented, nuclear buildup without any transparency.”

President Biden sounded less confrontational on the Taiwan issue on which he mentioned “We seek to uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. We remain committed to our One China policy, which has helped prevent conflict for four decades. And we continue to oppose unilateral changes in the status quo by either side.” Without mentioning Biden by name, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his United Nations General Assembly address stressed that China’s “One China” policy has become a basic norm of international relations and a consensus of the international community... any move to obstruct China's reunification is bound to be crushed by the wheels of history.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi addresses the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, September 24, 2022. Source: Xinhua/Wang Ying

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s lecture at the Asia Society on September 23 on the sidelines of the General Assembly stressed that the America’s posture toward China should be based on “mutual respect,” “peaceful coexistence,” and “win-win cooperation,” warning disagreement over Taiwan undermines bilateral

45 “Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” The White House, September 21, 2022
46 “H.E. Mr. Wang Yi, State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs,” General Assembly of the United Nations, September 24, 2022
relations. He said, "Taiwan independence is like a highly disruptive gray rhino charging towards us that must be stopped resolutely." 47

Other major issues touched in FM Wang Yi’s UNGA address include “upholding peace and opposing war through dialogue and consultation”, “placing development at the centre of international agenda”, “promoting openness and opposing exclusion”, “rejecting coercion, zero-sum game, and bloc confrontation”, “opposing drawing lines on ideological grounds”, “practicing true multilateralism”, “peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland”, “fully implementing new development philosophy”, and following the “Chinese path to modernisation to achieve great rejuvenation of the nation”. With a view to “strengthening global cooperation on gun control”, FM Wang Yi announced China’s decision to launch its domestic procedure to ratify ’UN’s Firearms Protocol’ 48.

A day before the Asia Society speech Foreign Minister Wang Yi, criticized US’s Indo-Pacific policy stressing “Some in the United States try to take China down by repeating the containment tactic used on the former Soviet Union, and hope to encircle China through geopolitical maneuvering like the Indo-Pacific strategy. Such attempts will only prove futile”. 49

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s UN speech came after his meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. 50 Blinken discussed the need to maintain open lines of communication and to manage US China relations responsibly. Referring to China US tension over Taiwan, he emphasized that the United States is committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, consistent with its longstanding one China policy, maintaining that preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is critical to regional and global security and prosperity. 51 He underscored that the United States remains open to cooperating with the PRC on common points of interests. 52

47 “Wang Yi Delivers a Speech at Asia Society,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, September 23, 2022
49 "Wang Yi Expounds on China-U.S. Peaceful Coexistence," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, September 22, 2022
50 "Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi," US Department of State, September 23, 2022
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Prior to the UN talks, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the Taiwan Policy Act 2022, which provides Taiwan with USD 6.5 billion in security aid to purchase military equipment. The Act also includes a sanction package targeting key mainland Chinese officials and the banking system in response to Beijing’s invasion.

It also ensures that Taiwan would enjoy the status of a “major non-NATO Ally,” a strategic partnership on military and technology exchange and assistance. It is billed as the most sweeping upgrade of the relationship since the United States switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 under the Taiwan Relations Act 1979 (which was enacted to maintain Taiwan’s self-governing status quo by enhancing its self-defence military capacity as Washington switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China).

Amidst the proposed course of legislation on Taiwan, US President Joe Biden in a television interview said that unlike the Ukraine crisis, US forces would defend Taiwan if there is an unprecedented attack by China. Echoing President Biden’s comment on Taiwan, Vice President Kamala Harris stated that the US will “continue to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo” and will support Taiwan’s self-defence, consistent with US long-standing policy.

**IV. China-Russia Relations**

As sanctions are multiplying on Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping met Russian President Vladimir Putin on the margins of the SCO on September 15. President Xi Jinping referred to Vladimir Putin as his “dear and old friend,” but Putin admitted that Xi had raised “questions and concerns” about Ukraine, while praising China’s “balanced position” on the conflict.

After a preliminary assessment of their bilateral relations and core interests on areas such as trade, agriculture, connectivity, both sides reflected on the possibility of enhancing coordination and cooperation under multilateral

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53 “Senate panel advances bill to bolster US security assistance to Taiwan,” CNN, September 14, 2022
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 “Joe Biden again says US forces would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack,” Guardian, September 29, 2022
57 “Harris calls China’s behavior ‘disturbing’ and reiterates US support for Taiwan in speech,” CNN Politics, September 28, 2022
58 “Russia-Ukraine war: China Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin discuss Ukraine war for meeting,” BBC, September 15, 2022
frameworks including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the BRICS. So far, China has maintained a balance between support for Russia on broad commitments on one hand and on the other hand complying with western sanctions recommending peace and stability to connect with the partners who stand against the Ukraine war.

In a simultaneous development, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh met on the sidelines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Taking ahead the China-Mongolia-Russia economic and trade cooperation the three leaders reaffirmed the "Outline of the Development Plan on Establishing the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor" which the three sides had signed in 2016, and later extended by five years.

A week after the SCO meet, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. While discussing the future course of Russia-China

59 “President Xi Jinping Meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, September 15, 2022
60 “China-Mongolia-Russia economic and trade cooperation,” China Daily, September 30, 2022
bilateral relations, the two sides exchanged views on the Ukraine issue wherein Wang Yi stressed that “China will continue upholding an objective and just position to promote peace talks, and hopes that all parties refrain from giving up dialogue efforts and resolve security concerns through peace talks. Lavrov expounded on Russia’s position, stressing that security is indivisible and Russia is still willing to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation.”

China has so far maintained that its ties with Russia are based on “non-alliance principle.” It counts Russia as its only major ally in its intensifying strategic competition with the United States. China’s defence ministry in a statement spoke about deepening strategic communication between the forces of the two countries to carry out pragmatic cooperation. Interestingly the deepening strategic ties would require both sides to support each other’s core interests - China on Ukraine and Russia on Taiwan. Meanwhile, as the war drags on, Chinese public opinion is turning against Russia and toward Ukraine.

V. China-European Union Relations

In a move condemning China’s military assertions against Taiwan, the European Parliament backed a resolution that stated that Beijing’s “provocative actions” will have consequences on relations with the European Union. The resolution came days after the EU’s intelligence chief canceled his trip to Taiwan after China had put pressure on the EU to scrap the visit. Following the resolution, EU lawmakers have now jointly appealed to initiate talks to strike an investment deal with Taiwan. Following the global outcry condemning China’s aggression in Taiwan and human rights crackdown in Tibet and Xinjiang, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his meeting with Josep Borrell, high representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, urged the EU to cooperate with China to ensure the steady and long-term development of China-EU relations to resist decoupling and chain breaking. Wang also called on the two sides to hold a new round of high-level strategic

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61 “Wang Yi Meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, September 22, 2022
62 “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, May 6, 2022
63 “China’s Public Opinion Is Shifting Away from Russia”, The Diplomat, September 21, 2022
64 “EU parliament resolution slams China’s aggression towards Taiwan,” Al Jazeera, September 16, 2022
65 “EU intelligence chief cancels Taiwan trip after Beijing learns his secret plans,” Politico, September 13, 2022
66 “European Parliament resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan,” European Parliament, September 15, 2022
67 “China stresses EU’s strategic independence amid global turbulence”, Global Times, September 23, 2022
dialogue as early as possible and strive to launch high-level discussions on economic, trade, green, digital and people-to-people exchanges this year.\textsuperscript{68}

On the trade front, Joerq Wuttke, president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China at a briefing for the chamber’s annual China position paper stressed that at present European businesses in China are reevaluating their market plans, the reason being declining FDI from EU into China as European businesses face adverse environment in which “ideology” trumps economy.\textsuperscript{69} He further added the trend of declining FDI is unlikely to reverse while European executives are heavily restricted from traveling to and from China to develop potential greenfield projects because of Covid protocols.\textsuperscript{70} Contradicting Jeorj Wuttke’s earlier statement and without revealing any specific details Chinese state media in the wake of Nord Stream pipeline blast claimed energy shortage in Europe has led European companies in the region to flock to China to set up new plants and pursue investment opportunities, especially companies in auto-making and chemicals, which need stable power supplies.\textsuperscript{71}

Meanwhile in a tough policy move, Germany is working on a new trade policy with China to reduce dependence on Chinese raw materials, batteries and semiconductors, promising “no more naivety” in trade dealings with Beijing.\textsuperscript{72}

**SCO Samarkand Summit**

Chinese President Xi Jinping in his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 pandemic visited Samarkand, Uzbekistan, to attend the 22nd meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ (SCO) on September 16.\textsuperscript{73} In his address, at the SCO, President Xi Jinping emphasised the “Shanghai Spirit” embodying “mutual trust”, “mutual benefit”, “equality”, “consultation”, “respect for diversity of civilisations”, and “the pursuit of common development” with a view to injecting positivity into Eurasia’s development and stability. A Xinhua report claimed that SCO has grown from

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} “European businesses are rethinking their plans for a ‘closed’ China,” CNBC, September 22, 2022
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} “EU companies, facing energy crisis, invest more in China,” Global Times, September 28, 2022
\textsuperscript{72} “Germany drawing up new China trade policy: ‘We can’t allow ourselves to be blackmailed’,” South China Morning Post, September 14, 2022
\textsuperscript{73} “Xinhua Headlines: SCO injects more positivity into regional stability, development as Xi’s proposals win hearts of int’l community”, Xinhua, September 18, 2022.
a regional body to a global force. Global Times editorial rejected the Western description of the SCO as an “anti-Western front” and added that “Samarkand Summit once again showed the barrenness of Western worldview”. Contending that the SCO’s circle of friends is getting bigger as it emphasises the “sovereign equality of states” and “non-exclusive multilateralism” (no alliance, no confrontation, and no targeting of any third party). “The international community’s demand for genuine multilateralism will only get stronger if the US-led West continues to engage in coercive diplomacy pushing countries to take sides”, the paper added. With SCO set to grant Iran full membership, Iranian analysts described the Eurasian body as an “anti-evil axis”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the SCO Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, September 16, 2022. Source: Official Website of the President of Russia

People’s Daily commentary asserted that President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan “renewed the Silk Road Spirit” [Belt and Road Initiative] and the three countries will work toward building a “community with a shared future”.

74 “Xinhua Headlines: SCO grows from regional body to global force for common development, security”, Xinhua, September 17, 2022.
75 “Samarkand Summit will once again witness how barren the Western worldview is: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, September 15, 2022.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
Internal Developments

20th CPC National Congress

Ahead of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 20th National Congress, ‘Qiushi Journal’ published an article by President Xi Jinping providing insights into China’s future direction.80 Xi Jinping asserted that CPC’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is now the “standard-bearer of the global socialist movement” and the Party must keep up the “revolutionary spirit while pursuing self-reflection and self-correction to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union”.81 The CPC is likely to “amend its charter at the Congress” to “incorporate more of Xi’s governance philosophy and ideology”.82 Qiushi Journal also published an article by the Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi underscoring China’s continued emphasis on “deepening unity and cooperation among emerging markets and developing countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind”.83 State media expressed confidence that CPC National Congress will inject new impetus into the country’s economy and China will remain as the main growth driver of the global economy.84

The CPC released a list of 2,296 delegates who will attend the 20th Party Congress beginning October 16.85 In light of this, South China Morning Post (SCMP) shed light on “faces to watch” in the CPC who could land major roles in Party’s Central Committee and government ministries.86

Continuing its drive against dissent and corruption, China’s former Vice Minister for Public Security ‘Sun Lijun’ has been given suspended death sentence for “taking bribes”, “manipulating stock market”, and “possessing illegal firearms”.87 It appears that Sun had political ambitions and was critical of the CPC’s policies. Reportedly, it is customary for the CPC to arrest or sentence

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
84 “China’s economy set to get a major boost from 20th Party Congress, to anchor global economy in long run”, Global Times, September 9, 2022.
high-profile officials prior to the Congress, as a signal to Party members to remain loyal to its core leadership.\(^8\)

**Trade and Economy**

Amidst mounting economic headwinds and youth unemployment, China’s State Council promised more support for the country’s technology companies including special loans.\(^9\) Reportedly, four of China’s largest state-owned commercial banks have issued new loans over CNY 1 trillion (USD 144.73 billion) in the first half of 2022.\(^9\) The State Council also “extended tax deferrals for manufacturing firms” facing hardships and announced measures to stabilise foreign trade and foreign investment to consolidate China’s economic recovery.\(^9\) Adding to Beijing’s concerns, reports pointed toward China’s exports undergoing a prolonged deceleration.\(^9\) A survey by the ‘US-China Business Council’ (USCBC) showed that “US business optimism in China has tumbled to an all-time low owing to Zero-Covid policy, geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions”.\(^9\)

Marking 50 years of normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang held a high-level dialogue with representatives of the Japanese business community calling on the two sides to enhance economic cooperation.\(^4\) In the backdrop of deepening US-Japan cooperation, Global Times editorial stressed that “the sense of strategic doubt and mistrust has reached unprecedented levels” and therefore “China-Japan relations once again stand at historic crossroads”.\(^5\)

As President Xi Jinping eyes third term as the CPC’s General Secretary, South China Morning Post report shed light on his key economic policies -

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\(^8\) Ibid.

\(^9\) Orange Wang, “China looks to plug job market damage from tech crackdown with more support for internet economy”, South China Morning Post, September 9, 2022.

\(^9\) “Economic Watch: Chinese banks provide more loans to backstop real economy”, Xinhua, September 6, 2022.


\(^4\) “Premier calls on China, Japan to enhance economic cooperation”, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 23, 2022.

\(^5\) “Japan once again stands at the historic crossroads: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, September 28, 2022.

Beijing hosted ‘China International Fair for Trade in Services 2022’ (CIFTIS) under the theme “Cooperate for Better Development, Innovate for a Greener Future”. 98 Xinhua report stressed that CIFTIS underscores “China’s commitment to wider opening-up in services trade and promoting global economic recovery”.99 Amidst the US’s continued “technological decoupling” from China, Global Times editorial stressed that “trade events such as CIFTIS highlight the two different choices made by Beijing and Washington”100 China has chosen the path of openness, while, the US seeks isolation”, the paper added.101 It also rejected German Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action Robert Habeck’s claim that his country’s “naivety toward China was over” and Berlin was considering new measures to make business with China less attractive.102

The US hosted first ministerial meeting of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). In light of this, China Daily editorial maintained that IPEF is doomed to fail as it intends to “serve US’s strategic goal of containing China” and “reshape the global supply chains in favour of the US”.103

As the Chinese Yuan depreciated to 7/USD mark, its weakest point in over two years, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) cut banking system’s foreign exchange reserve requirement ratio to 6 percent from 8 percent to “stem CNY depreciation” and “boost USD liquidity in the market”.104

96 Frank Tang, “Explainer: China economy: 7 ‘Xicomic’ policies that have guided growth over the past decade”, South China Morning Post, August 25, 2022.
97 Ibid.
98 “Xinhua Headlines: China committed to wider opening-up in services trade, promoting global economic recovery”, Xinhua, September 1, 2022.
99 Ibid.
100 “Openness or isolation? China and US have given different answers: Global Times editorial”, Global Times, September 2, 2022.
101 Ibid.
104 Wendy Wu and Ji Siqi, “China cuts banks’ forex reserve requirement as yuan hits 2-year low against US dollar”, South China Morning Post, September 5, 2022.
Defence and Security

China’s state media described 77th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) as a “watershed moment” wherein Beijing seeks to “push concrete, result oriented cooperation”, while, the US-led West seeks “division”.105

As the US Navy destroyer ‘USS Higgins’ and Royal Canadian Navy frigate ‘HMCS Vancouver’ made a transit through the Taiwan Strait, Chinese analysts stressed that “PLA has overwhelming capabilities in the region” and therefore “warship transit by the US and its allies is a political show that has no military significance”.106 Amidst this, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng addressed the press on the topic “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at 40: Retrospect and Prospect”.107 As the US continues to accuse China of violating UNCLOS in the South China Sea, Chinese Vice FM reminded that the “US was not a party to UNCLOS” and was “not in a position to accuse others of breaching it”. “Washington only wants benefits of the convention without fulfilling its obligations”, he added.108

Strengthening defence cooperation, China and Russia held their 2nd joint naval patrol in the Pacific Ocean109, while, China also participated in the ‘Vostok 2022’ strategic drills hosted by Russia.110 Further, China, Russia, and Iran are likely to hold a joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean this autumn.111 In light of this, Global Times editorial asserted that “China-Russia relations inject stability into a world of change and disorder”.112

In a meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China reiterated “international community’s serious concerns about ‘AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation as an act of nuclear

105 ‘UNGA opens at a ‘watershed moment’; China to push concrete, result-oriented cooperation while US, West seek division’, Global Times, September 21, 2022.
108 Ibid.
111 Patrick Sykes, “Russia, Iran, China to Hold Joint Navy Drills in Indian Ocean”, Bloomberg, September 22, 2022.
112 Meeting of Chinese, Russian leaders injects stability into a world of change and disorder: Global Times editorial, Global Times, September 16, 2022.
Beijing also continued to express concerns about Japan’s military expansion including “increase in defence budget”, “developing anti-missile, hypersonic, and outer space weapon systems”, “strengthening US-Japan military cooperation”, and “advocating for nuclear sharing with the US”.  

**Technology**

China strongly condemned cyberattacks allegedly carried out by the US National Security Agency (NSA) against ‘Northwestern Polytechnical University’ known for its research in aviation, aerospace and navigation studies. Chinese MFA asserted that “the US used 41 specialised cyber weapons to steal core technical data from Northwestern Polytechnical University” and called upon Washington to “stop its unlawful cyber activities”.  

The US updated its “Space Policy” recognising outer space as a “priority domain of national military power” and adopted “tenets of responsible behaviour in space”. Terming the US Space Policy as a “grave threat to peace and security in outer space”, Chinese MFA stressed that “Washington was in no position to mention responsible behaviour in space as it has already established space command, developed space-based assault weaponry, carried out military exercises in space, and strengthened military cooperation with allies enhancing the risk of conflict”.  

Despite China’s semiconductor self-sufficiency drive, reportedly a record number of Chinese chip firms are going out of business. Meanwhile, Beijing has selected around 9000 enterprises as “little giants” eligible for preferential government treatment in pursuit of China’s technology ambitions in sectors

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114 “Japan should learn from history, win intl trust, Chinese FM says amid Tokyo’s ambition in hypersonic weapons”, Global Times, August 30, 2022.  
116 Ibid.  
118 Ibid.  
such as “semiconductors”, “advanced manufacturing”, “energy”, and “critical minerals”.  

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120 Coco Feng, “China has named nearly 9,000 ‘little giants’ in push to preference home-grown technologies from smaller companies”, South China Morning Post, September 9, 2022.