

Assessing the Trump-Kim Summit

by Erika Ricci



Abstract

Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un met in Singapore on June 12, 2018. What does the historic Summit imply for the two parties involved? What implications for Asian players such as China, South Korea, and Japan?

After scanning the content of the common document and various commentaries on outcomes, this essay analyzes the results achieved by Washington and Pyongyang, as well as the possible repercussions regarding the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many express their disappointment over the broadly worded agreement, the Summit has paved the path for possible future diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea, which imply both advantages and disadvantages for Asian powers. However, achieving active bilateral cooperation will involve extensive negotiations and the coming months will be crucial in defining both the direction of the US-DPRK bilateral relationship and the wider possibility of an international détente.

A new beginning in the Washington-Pyongyang relationship

Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un met at Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018¹. For the first time, a sitting American President and a North Korean leader held a historic Summit by signing a bilateral agreement made up of four pillars:

- The commitment of both the US and the Democratic People's of Republic of Korea (DPRK) to meet the desire of their peoples for peace and prosperity.
- The willingness of Washington and Pyongyang to cooperate for a stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
- The reaffirmation of the Panmunjom Declaration, adopted on April 27, 2018, affirming the DPRK's commitment to work toward a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- The engagement of both the US and DPRK in recovering POW/MIA remains².

IN THIS ISSUE

"Assessing the Trump-Kim Summit"

Author:

Erika Ricci

DPG Summer Intern

DPG Event Brief is produced by the Delhi Policy Group, an independent and autonomous, not for profit think tank which focuses primarily on strategic issues of critical national interest.

In keeping with the growing dynamism of India's foreign and security policy, the DPG has expanded its focus areas to include India's broader regional and global role and the strategic partnerships that advance India's rise as a leading power. To support that goal, the DPG undertakes research and organizes policy interactions across a wide canvas, including strategic and geo-political issues, geo-economic issues and defence and security issues. DPG does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2018 by the Delhi Policy Group (DPG)



Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh
Director General

Although these pillars are listed as shared interests, the summit has different political implications for the two leaders. On the one hand, Trump decided the suspension of planned military exercises with South Korea³. He defined them as “expensive” and “provocative” (as against defensive), going with the North Korean line. By unilaterally withholding “War Games”, the American President made a considerable security concession. However, he also clearly stated that the reduction of US military capabilities from the Korean Peninsula is not an immediate goal⁴. Trump is the first sitting American President who has personally tried to improve the relationship with one of the most dangerous regimes in the world, as demonstrated by the sixth nuclear test carried out by DPRK nine months ago. No previous American administration had started such a complicated diplomatic process because of the high risk of failure involved⁵. Looking for the improvement of the Washington-Pyongyang relationship, Trump laid the foundation stone to eventually turn the 1953 armistice into a peace treaty. Therefore, according to Washington, the carrot and stick policy implemented over the last year, based on a combination of dire threats with diplomatic outreach, induced Kim to negotiate his nuclear program with Trump⁶.

On the other hand, the North Korean leader obtained an impressive result by participating in the summit. First of all, he realized his grandfather’s ambition. Kim Il-sung (1912-1994) wanted to improve the status of North Korea while making the country a fully recognized player within the international arena⁷. Dealing directly with the United States, North Korea seized the golden opportunity to discuss future negotiations, aimed at realizing a Washington-Pyongyang détente, from a position of strength⁸. The DPRK’s leader committed to “work toward” the complete denuclearization of the country, without any pre-ordained process⁹. According to some experts at Stanford University, the denuclearization process will take from ten to fifteen years¹⁰. This means that the meeting between the two leaders represented a first move towards the normalization of US-DPRK diplomatic relations rather than a real achievement related to North Korea’s effective denuclearization. Next actions will be challenging, but the premise of a substantial change in the Washington-Pyongyang relationship seems at least to be distantly plausible¹¹.

The meeting can be considered a turning point aimed at overcoming years of threats and counter-threats between the US and North Korea¹². Paving the path for future harmonious diplomatic relations among the two countries can be the first step toward an international détente¹³. However, achieving active bilateral cooperation still requires hard work from both Washington and Pyongyang. Next steps of the two leaders will

be crucial in defining the direction of their personal and diplomatic relationship.



US President Donald Trump and North Korea leader Kim Jong-un created history at the Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018. (Source: The Indian Express)

Although the Summit could pave the way for future cooperation between the United States and North Korea, many experts have expressed their disappointment over the Trump-Kim agreement for two main reasons. Firstly, Kim did not explicitly agree to nuclear disarmament, so that the accord appears faulty. Secondly, the US security guarantee and the North Korean pledge to work on denuclearization can be characterized as “a vague meaningless pledge for a vague meaningless guarantee¹⁴”.

After analyzing the meaning of the agreement for the main parties involved, it seems worthwhile to examine what are the implications for the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on other Asian powers such as China, South Korea, and Japan.

China

For the past year, Beijing has been calling for a “freeze for freeze deal”, which is what President Trump conceded in Singapore on June 12, 2018. By halting joint US-South Korean war games in exchange for Kim’s pledge to stop nuclear and missile tests and work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Trump and Kim reached the mutual freeze desired by Xi-Jinping. The suspension-suspension model adopted directly serves Beijing’s security interests¹⁵.

According to an assessment by the Atlantic Council¹⁶, the agreement could lead to three main outcomes. First of all, the absence of joint military exercises can result in weakening the US alliance with South Korea or, at least, Washington’s influence on Seoul. Secondly, China would benefit from a reduced American military presence in Asia. Although Trump did not define the US military withdrawal from South Korea as an immediate goal, he

admitted that he “eventually wants the troops to come home” during the post-Summit Press Conference. The massive US bases and the American armed forces in South Korea allow the US to project its power in the region to the detriment of China’s expansionist ambitions. Thus, the possibility of reduced American military presence in the Korean Peninsula in the future raises the Chinese hope of seeing one of its strategic goals met. As a result, Beijing’s next action will probably aim at redefining the role of the 28,000 US troops in South Korea, turning them into peacekeeping forces. Being surrounded by US bases in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and the Philippines, China would obtain a twofold outcome from a diminished US military presence in Seoul. Beijing would get a suitable opportunity to expand the Chinese sphere of influence in Asia while minimizing that of Washington. Last but not least, China’s security interest is to limit the threat of refugees at the Chinese border. If the Pyongyang regime falls because of sanctions pressure, a large number of refugees can come across to China in a very short time. In order to prevent the Pyongyang regime’s collapse, Beijing will now press the US to decrease the weight of economic sanctions against the isolated nation¹⁷. This is a shared goal for Xi Jinping and Kim. The Singapore Summit represented the first step in this direction.



*North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in May in the Chinese city of Dalian.
(Source: The Wall Street Journal)*

Relaxing the sanctions would also have another implication, as it would enable China to resume some economic relations with Pyongyang. From the Chinese point of view, the ideal outcome emanating from the Singapore Summit is a “phased and synchronous” approach to a completely denuclearized North Korea¹⁸, combined with Kim’s commitment to introducing Chinese style reforms and opening up of society. A less isolated regime would encourage the gradual spread of economic dynamism in the sub-region¹⁹, and Beijing is ready to take advantage of any opening up by Pyongyang. Specifically, China

is ready to enlarge the three industrial/free trade zone areas existing at the border between the two countries and let large infrastructure projects (such as new bridges) commence. Similarly, China is ready to exploit the North Korean labor force as much as possible, since it is one of the cheapest in the world. For China, improving economic links with Pyongyang is also crucial to stimulate economic growth in its northeastern provinces. For all these reasons, the reduction of North Korea sanctions by the White House is a primary Chinese interest²⁰.

Besides the Chinese interests cited above, Beijing’s concerns should also be considered. What China does not want is the prospect of a “group alliance” resulting from the Summit. Beijing’s most profound fear is a reunified Korea which is democratic and a US ally. Although this scenario is hardly feasible, Beijing will pay close attention to future improvements in the Washington-Pyongyang relationship. For China, in fact, geopolitics trump the issue of denuclearization. The Chinese geopolitical vision is a zero-sum game. As such, from the Chinese point of view, any progress in US-North Korea ties is a loss for China²¹. Overall, it seems reasonable to state that Beijing has gained from the historic meeting between the US President and the leader of North Korea.

South Korea

Unquestionably, South Korea is also impacted by the agreement signed by Trump and Kim. President Moon Jae-in played a crucial role, as a mediator, in paving the way for the Singapore Summit. What does the so-called “meeting of the century” imply for Seoul? It marked a first step aimed at reducing tensions among the two Koreas, in conflict for about 70 years. The Korean Peninsula has long been divided into a communist North and democratic South. The former suffered from a stagnant economy but proved capable of developing nuclear weapons, while the latter became one of the most industrialized countries. The South Korean President welcomed the agreement as a “truly historic feat”²² towards “a new era of peace and prosperity”²³. Ideally, the momentum for inter-Korean reconciliation could lead to cultural, economic, and humanitarian cooperation²⁴. The prospect of renewed South-North Korean relations, in turn, could be beneficial for the emergence of a sustainable peace process across the Asia Pacific region²⁵. Thus, the summit is just the

beginning of what can be defined as a very long process, but it is a crucial gain for Moon Jae-in, as inter-Korea negotiations are a centerpiece of his administration²⁶. He is looking for constructive dialogue and careful diplomacy with the North to achieve reconciliation and cooperation both within and outside the Korean Peninsula.

Despite official optimism in Seoul, the broader reaction among a large number of South Koreans was one of disappointment for two main reasons. First of all, many are concerned about the prospect of a failed peace, as has occurred in the past. It was during the “sunshine policy” period that Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moon-Hyun had met Kim Jong-il. Their attempt at improving inter-Korean relations proved unsuccessful: South Korea made economic investments in North Korea while Pyongyang decided not to concede anything. Because of these ghosts of the past and the volatile temperament of Kim Jong-un, the South Korean people doubt if they can trust him²⁷. Furthermore, as Trump has claimed, the reconstruction of Pyongyang will come from Seoul’s economic support: allocating high financial costs in favor of North Korea troubles many South Koreans²⁸.

Secondly, conservative South Koreans were shocked upon hearing Trump’s remark about suspending joint military operations with South Korea. The US President’s announcement fuels angst among South Koreans that his “America First policy” could leave Seoul abandoned. The Seoul government considers these military exercises as crucial for South Korean security, regardless of the nuclear threat posed by the North²⁹. According to a senior analyst for the Seoul-based Unification Strategic Center, the American troops based in South Korea are a cornerstone of the Washington-Seoul alliance. The concern of South Korea is that the current freezing of combined military missions, together with a possible future reduction in US armed forces in South Korea, might undermine the US-Korea alliance³⁰.



North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in met at the border village of Panmunjom in Demilitarized Zone, April 27, 2018. (Source: Korea Summit Press Pool via AP)

Fears regarding a decoupling of the alliance between the Americans and South Koreans, however, could also be considered from a different perspective. Paradoxically, Washington and Seoul are moving in the same direction. They are exploiting Kim’s inclination to dialogue. This means that Trump and Moon are cooperating to create a diplomatic opening. In other words, they are working together to reduce the shared North Korean threat while strengthening their historic alliance³¹.

After considering both fears and opportunities for South Korea, it appears reasonable to claim that the Singapore Summit resulted in a major step aimed at paving the way for a remarkable peace process within the Korean Peninsula and more broadly in the Asian region. However, difficulties will inevitably challenge the prospects of successful diplomacy.

Japan

Japan is another major actor closely following the Singapore Summit. Japan’s interests revolve around four primary issues. First of all, Japan does not want to lose its relevance as a regional player. In the lead up towards the Singapore Summit, Japan played only a marginal role. Moreover, although Tokyo is a member of the Six-Party Talks over North Korea, it has been the only one excluded from direct summit talks with Pyongyang³². Japan is willing to normalize bilateral relations with North Korea and consider some economic collaboration. However, North Korea has shown little inclination to commit to Tokyo, and the economic aid Pyongyang expects to receive from Beijing and Seoul make the possibility of cooperation between Japan and North Korea even more difficult³³.

Another significant concern for Abe’s government relates to North Korea’s short and medium-range missiles. Tokyo is within the range of 200 to 300 intermediate-range weapons capable of delivering conventional and nuclear warheads. If the US agrees to a compromise regarding inter-continental missiles without including those of intermediate range, it leaves Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s missile threat. If a “America First” approach leads to rolling back only North Korea’s Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles program, the Washington-Tokyo alliance can experience a serious decoupling because of the diminished credibility of US extended deterrence. In order to maintain the strength of the alliance, Abe has undertaken a number of visits to Trump. For Japan, the confirmation of alliance solidarity

serves to send a message to both North Korea and China, which would like to see reduced US influence in Asia³⁴.



President Donald Trump meets with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, June 7, 2018. (Source: VOA News)

Thirdly, failure to implement North Korea's denuclearization will strongly impact Japan's security. Tokyo's nuclear security rests on two pillars, the US extended deterrence and the NPT, from which North Korea withdrew in 2003. This implies that an adverse outcome on Pyongyang's denuclearization would put Japan at risk. In order to adequately safeguard its national interests, Tokyo may need to modify its national security policy, depending on future decisions emanating from the initial US-North Korea agreement³⁵.

Finally, another Abe priority is the abduction issue, concerning Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. According to Japan, at least seventeen Japanese were abducted by North Korea, while Pyongyang has acknowledged thirteen. Japan was keen to see this issue raised at the Trump-Kim meeting. According to Kim, however, the abduction issue should be discussed bilaterally, an option hardly possible due to the North Korean leader's refusal to meet Abe.

After examining Japanese interests, it appears that Tokyo gained almost nothing from the Singapore Summit. Kim did not establish any limit to North Korea's short and medium-range missile program, he just spoke about "working toward" a complete denuclearization, and he did not promise anything concerning the abduction issue. It will be vital for Japan to maintain its strong alliance with the US and not lose its relevance as a regional actor.

Conclusion

The meeting between Trump and Kim represents only the first step toward improved relations between the two countries. Conceding security guarantees in exchange for the promise to work towards complete denuclearization, Trump became the

first sitting American President to bring the North Korean leader to the negotiating table. Kim thereby improved the DPRK's international status as a fully recognized player in the global arena.

China appears to be the big winner of the Singapore meeting. The "freeze for freeze deal" can serve Beijing's security interests, as a reduced US presence in South Korea can minimize Washington's sphere of influence in Asia while expanding that of Beijing. The summit also represented a first step toward decreasing US economic sanctions pressure on North Korea. The survival of the Pyongyang regime is a shared interest between Kim and Xi-Jinping. What China wants to avoid is a triangular alliance among the US and a reunited Korean Peninsula.

The historic meeting has crucial implications also for Seoul. Despite their initial optimism, South Koreans doubt that they can trust Kim, because of both his volatile temperament and the ghosts of the past. A limited US presence in South Korea can weaken the Washington-Seoul alliance, which is crucial for South Korea's security. Considering the situation from a different point of view, the alliance can even become stronger, as Trump and Moon are cooperating on Kim's diplomatic opening. Despite the difficulties, the willingness among leaders can result in a gradual Korean Peninsula reunification which, in turn, can have a positive impact on Asian peace and stability.

The meeting is bound to generate concerns for Japan, which played a marginal role in paving the way for the Singapore Summit. No direct talks between Kim and Abe are on the cards and Tokyo fears it will lose its relevance as a regional player. Besides, a Washington-Pyongyang deal limited to inter-continental missiles can result in a decoupling of the US-Japan alliance, as it would undermine the credibility of US extended deterrence. Without the latter, Japan's nuclear security would be compromised. Abe gained almost nothing from the Trump-Kim meeting, not least concerning the abduction issue which was barely mentioned.

After examining the international implications of the Singapore Summit, it appears reasonable to state that future negotiations with Pyongyang have a massive impact on both North Korea's regime and its neighbors. China is ready to exploit the economic opportunities to expand its influence, South Korea aims at reunifying the Korean Peninsula while maintaining a strong US alliance,

Japan is looking for dialogue and cooperation with both Pyongyang and Washington, and the US is trying to restore American leverage in Asia.

Increasing diplomatic efforts will be required to make the Trump-Kim agreement work. Decisions taken by Washington and Pyongyang in the coming months can play a role determining future balances not only in Asia but in the entire international system.

Endnotes

¹ “Après « beaucoup de progrès », Donald Trump et Kim Jong-un ont signé un document commun”. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/06/12/le-chemin-pour-en-arriver-la-n-a-pas-ete-facile-admet-kim-lors-du-sommet-a-singapour_5313229_3210.html

² “READ: Full text of Trump-Kim signed statement”. CNN Politics. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/read-full-text-of-trump-kim-signed-statement/index.html>

³ Nicholas Kristof, “Trump Was Outfoxed in Singapore”. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/opinion/trump-kim-summit-north-korea.html>

⁴ “The meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un”. Il Post. <https://www.ilpost.it/2018/06/12/trump-kim-incontro-singapore/>

⁵ Jeffrey A. Bader, “Understanding the big downsides—and potential benefits—of the proposed Trump-Kim meeting”. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/12/understanding-the-big-downsides-and-potential-benefits-of-the-proposed-trump-kim-meeting/>

⁶ Stefano Carrer, “Trump-Kim and the doubt: who is the winner?” Il sole 24 ore. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2018-06-12/il-dubbio-chi-e-vero-vincitore--074509.shtml?uuid=AE0PJf4E>

⁷ Philippe Pons, “Sommet de Singapour : la métamorphose calculée de Kim Jong-un”. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/asia-pacifique/article/2018/06/11/la-metamorphose-calculée-de-kim-jong-un_5312868_3216.html

⁸ Stefano Carrer, “Trump-Kim and the doubt: who is the winner?”. Il sole 24 ore. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2018-06-12/il-dubbio-chi-e-vero-vincitore--074509.shtml?uuid=AE0PJf4E>

⁹ “Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un pledge peace and security at Singapore summit but doubt surrounds denuclearisation pact”. South China Morning Post.

<http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2150382/handshakes-and-history-donald-trump-and-kim-jong-un-sign>

¹⁰ Harold Thibault et Caroline Vinet, “La dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord pourrait prendre de dix à quinze ans”. Le Monde.

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/06/11/la-denuclearisation-de-la-coree-du-nord-prendrait-de-dix-a-quinze-ans_5312847_3210.html

¹¹ Stefano Carrer, “Trump-Kim: «Past s back». Historic commitment toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. Il Sole 24 Ore.

<http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2018-06-12/trump-kim-successo-vertice-singapore-passo-la-pace-corea-070022.shtml?uuid=AEFiwe4E>

¹² Jon Wolfsthal, “Here’s How the Trump-Kim Summit Could Play Out. Foreign Policy”.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/10/heres-how-the-trump-kim-singapore-summit-could-play-out/>

¹³ Everett Rosenfeld - Nyshka Chandran, “Trump says North Korea will keep its promises, and the US will stop war games”. CNBC.

<https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/12/trump-and-kim-sign-agreement-document-after-summit-in-singapore.html>

¹⁴ *Idem.*

¹⁵ Nick Wadhams, “China Gets Everything It Wanted from Trump’s Meeting with Kim”. Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-12/china-gets-everything-it-wanted-from-trump-s-meeting-with-kim>

¹⁶ Nyshka Chandran – Weizhen Tan, “China could come away a big winner from a US-North Korea peace deal”. CNBC <https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/us-north-korea-summit-chinas-interests.html>

¹⁷ *Idem.*

¹⁸ Mari Yamaguchi, “Worried, Hopeful, and Wary: Neighbors Await Trump-Kim Summit”. Associate Press (AP).

<https://apnews.com/5ad7bf869be547f6af193a35d62318b0>

¹⁹ *Idem.*

²⁰ Matthew Carney, “China is a clear winner from the Singapore summit with Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un”. ABC NEWS. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-13/trump-kim-summit-provides-challenges-and-opportunities-for-asia/9862214>

²¹ Nyshka Chandran – Weizhen Tan, “China could come away a big winner from a US-North Korea peace deal”. CNBC <https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/us-north-korea-summit-chinas-interests.html>

²² “South Korea's Moon says Trump-Kim summit freed world from threat of war”. Kyodo News. <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/06/b2800f0fba31-moon-says-trump-kim-summit-freed-world-from-worries-of-war.html>

²³ “South Korea hails Trump-Kim Singapore summit as ‘talks of the century’”. Channel New Asia.

<https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/south-korea-hails-trump-kim-singapore-summit-as-talks-of-the-10423218>

²⁴ Nyshka Chandran – Weizhen Tan, “China could come away a big winner from a US-North Korea peace deal”. CNBC

<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/11/us-north-korea-summit-chinas-interests.html>

²⁵ Nenjamin Haas – Justin McCurry, “Optimism and confusion in Seoul over Trump-Kim summit”. The Guardian.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/north-korea-sanctions-may-be-lifted-after-summit-says-china>

²⁶ Mari Yamaguchi, “Worried, Hopeful, and Wary: Neighbors await Trump-Kim Summit”. Associate Press (AP).

<https://apnews.com/5ad7bf869be547f6af193a35d62318b0>

²⁷ Hans Schattle, “The view from Seoul: why the Trump-Kim ‘deal’ worries South Koreans”. The Guardian.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/12/south-koreans-worried-trump-kim-deal>

²⁸ Matthew Carney, “China is a clear winner from the Singapore summit with Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un”. ABC NEWS.

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-13/trump-kim-summit-provides-challenges-and-opportunities-for-asia/9862214>

²⁹ Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Concession Over Military Drills Blindsides Many South Koreans”. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/world/asia/south-korea-trump.html>

³⁰ Brian Murphy, “South Korea struggles to digest strange new reality of Kim Jong Un bonding with White House”. The Washington Post.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-korea-struggles-to-digest-strange-new-reality-of-kim-jong-un-bonding-with-white-house/2018/06/13/83476c2c-6ea3-11e8-b4d8-eaf78d4c544c_story.html?utm_term=.12e9124110f7

³¹ John Delury, “What Are the Implications From The Trump-Kim Summit?”. National Public Radio (NPR).

<https://www.npr.org/2018/06/12/619109818/what-are-the-implications-from-the-trump-kim-summit>

³² Yoichi Kato, “Trump-Kim summit: why Japan’s defence strategy hangs in the balance”. The Straits Time.

<https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/trump-kim-summit-why-japans-defence-strategy-hangs-in-the-balance>

³³ Mari Yamaguchi, “Worried, Hopeful, and Wary: Neighbors await Trump-Kim Summit”. Associate Press (AP).

<https://apnews.com/5ad7bf869be547f6af193a35d62318b0>

³⁴ Nicholas Szechevi, “Japan’s unique, precarious position ahead of Kim-Trump summit”. The Hill.

<http://thehill.com/opinion/international/391641-japans-unique-precarious-position-ahead-of-kim-trump-summit>

³⁵ Yoichi Kato, “Trump-Kim summit: why Japan’s defence strategy hangs in the balance”. The Straits Time.

<https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/trump-kim-summit-why-japans-defence-strategy-hangs-in-the-balance>

Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, First Floor, India Habitat Centre
Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003

Phone: +91 11 48202100

Website: www.delhipolicygroup.org

Email: dg@dpg.org.in; dgooffice@dpg.org.in

DPG EVENT BRIEF
Volume III, Issue 10
June 2018