



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power



GLOBAL HORIZONS

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Cover Images:

1. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a group photograph with leaders of the Nordic countries during the 3rd India-Nordic Summit in Oslo, Norway on May 19, 2026. Source: [Prime Minister of India](#)
2. U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio welcomed by India's External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, in New Delhi, India, on May 24, 2026. Source: [U.S. Department of State](#)
3. India's External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar hosted the Foreign Minister of Australia, Penny Wong; the Foreign Minister of Japan, Toshimitsu Motegi; and U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio for the 11th Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting on May 26, 2026. Source: [X/@DrSJaishankar](#)

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by

Nalin Surie

The world continued to suffer the very serious consequences of the standoff between the US and Iran, as both kept on the search for an acceptable off ramp that both could claim as a victory. Countries like India continued to manage but were seriously impacted, as was the Global South in particular. President Trump has still not made up his mind whether the latest Iranian proposal for a fresh ceasefire and further steps is acceptable. The pain inflicted on the international economy and individual states continues to increase, but that is perhaps collateral damage.

The ceasefire remained in place, though President Trump threatened to unleash US power again. CENTCOM did conduct some limited strikes on a couple of occasions on minor facilities and the Iranians retaliated, but the ceasefire largely held.

Iran was essentially pushing its luck by keeping the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed and making the world suffer the energy, economic and other consequences. The US knows it can inflict further grievous damage on Iran, but the additional costs may not be worth it domestically, regionally and internationally. Iran seeks more than a face saving exit and seems so far unwilling to compromise on restoring the status quo ante of permitting free movement through the Strait of Hormuz and relinquishing its stockpile of enriched uranium. Both are redlines for President Trump. Question is how much longer can Iran hold out. President Trump shows no hurry to take a final call.

While this standoff continued, President Trump played his next card for the region on May 25 when he tweeted that he was calling upon Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan to mandatorily, and at a minimum, simultaneously sign on to the Abraham Accords since he had sorted out the Iran problem for them all. UAE and Bahrain had already signed on in 2020. Saudi Arabia and Qatar to start. Exceptions could be permitted. Post a deal, Iran is also invited. (Oman, whom Trump doesn't like and would indeed like to bomb, is not invited.) Those that do not sign on would not be part of the deal. How this demand plays out remains to be seen. What is clear though is that the Trump plan is to establish firm control over the Middle East along with Israel as its front end. How China, Russia and Europe respond time will tell, but push back is inevitable.

During the month, while Israel was compelled by the US to hold its powder dry over Iran, it nevertheless intensified its military operations and continued its predatory and occupation activities in southern Lebanon, Beirut and beyond, ostensibly against Hezbollah. This in spite of a ceasefire imposed by the US on Israel and Lebanon following direct talks between them in Washington. Over 3200 people have been killed in Lebanon since March and over one million displaced. It is pertinent to recall here that Iran has been insisting that any deal with the US must include cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon. It is unlikely though that this would be a deal breaker if Iran can extract enough concessions from the US on lifting of sanctions, unfreezing of assets, and a permanent end to hostilities.

Trump's war in Iran had more than one target in scope either directly or indirectly. China and Russia. This aspect was very clear though not necessarily articulated during Trump's postponed visit to China, May 13-15 and Putin's (25th) visit to China, May 19-20. Both China and Russia have been supporting Iran and have strategic interests in the region but have been unable to stop US military actions against Iran or rein in Israel in the region. The timing of Putin's visit to Beijing may have been a coincidence, but undoubtedly permitted Russia to assess and be reassured that the Xi-Trump understandings were not to be at Russia's cost, especially at a time when efforts are on to end the war in Ukraine without Russia losing face.

During the month, Russian attacks on targets against Ukrainian infrastructure, civilian and other targets intensified, including with the use of missiles and fibre optic drones. Ukraine hit back deeper into Russian territory. In spite of a special three day ceasefire intended for that purpose, the traditional Victory Day parade on May 09 in Moscow was majorly scaled back and shortened for fear of Ukraine drone attacks, including reportedly on Putin. No heavy equipment was on display.

Perhaps the most anticipated and commented on issue during the month was US President Trump's visit to China in mid-May, the first by a US President since 2017. A lot of commentary would suggest that the Chinese gained the upper hand during the visit. That, however, may not necessarily be the case. Trump's visits cannot be judged by traditional yardsticks, especially since his objectives are not always clearly articulated and he can be both ambivalent and ambiguous in language when he wants. Besides, on this occasion the Chinese were not necessarily holding all the critical cards, inter alia, in view of the Iran war and China's dependence on Iranian oil, domestic economic vulnerabilities and the need for world markets and supplies.

Xi's reference to the Thucydides trap was not necessarily a sign of strength. Nor his elevation of the Taiwan issue as something that could lead to clashes and even conflict with the US. Trump gave no assurance but did indulge in ambiguous comments.

If China is so confident of its power and status, why should it seek validation from its principal competitor/threat? Why did Xi seek "a new vision of building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability"? Trump said he agreed to the latter subject to it being "on the basis of fairness and reciprocity".

The reality is that both the Chinese and Americans have their own interpretations of what was agreed between the two Presidents and these differences have been projected in writing. There clearly was some forward movement on Chinese purchases of some farm products, aircraft and the establishment of Boards to look at trade and investment issues, but here too there is lack of clarity on functions, numbers and products. The Chinese are silent also on the US concerns on rare earths and other critical minerals.

Trump claimed in a post on social media that China had agreed "that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy" and that "both countries agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon". This may well be the case. Also, that Xi "expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce China's dependence on the Strait in the future".

It is clear that both sides are highlighting issues of interest to them in their public pronouncements. They are not really denying what the other is saying either. Perhaps there was not enough of a consensus beyond a point but discussions will no doubt continue to resolve differences to mutual benefit and gain tactical advantage. The compromises on trade issues entered into last October appear to remain in place.

It was an important visit. Trump would have had an opportunity to assess China's positions on Iran, the war in Ukraine and the state of the China-Russia alliance.

Xi has been invited to pay a visit to the US this fall.

China seeks constructive strategic stability till it can catch up with the US or see through the Trump presidency. Thus its focus on the need for "equal footed consultations" on disputes/differences. China is the challenger and the mantra proposed is of cooperation, competition and stability versus Trump's

transnationalism and intention to ensure that the US remains the most powerful country in the world. Xi and Trump are scheduled to meet at least two more times during different summits this year. There are thus several acts of this play to follow.

Hot on the heels of President Trump, President Putin visited Beijing on May 20 for the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Friendship Treaty between the two countries. It was Putin's 25th visit to China.

A joint declaration was issued on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations. Evidently it is no longer enough for these two countries to be permanent members of the UNSC. In addition, they need a more just and rational system of global governance based on the principles of openness for inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperation; of indivisible and equal security; of democratisation of international relations and world civilisational and values diversity. These are principles these two countries are not known to adhere to in practice. They define themselves as important centres of power in a multipolar world, playing a constructive role in maintaining the global balance of power and improving the system of international relations. According to Xi, it is essential to advance high-quality international cooperation and to reform and improve global governance on account of the damage caused by unilateral actions and hegemony, along with the threat of regression to the law of the jungle. He was presumably referring to actions by the Trump administration.

Following the talks, Xi Jinping and Putin spoke to the media. Xi's remarks were of particular interest, coming soon after his talks with Trump. He said that China and Russia are making a great contribution to protecting international justice and shaping a new type of international relations; that bilateral relations have reached a new milestone; that the two countries must act as each other's strategic bulwark; they must continue to offer each other firm and mutual support on matters pertaining to each other's respective core interests and key concerns; and they must inject new momentum into high quality mutually beneficial cooperation. He called for deepening cooperation in aligning China's 15th Five Year plan with Russia's national development goals to 2030, making full use of the stabilising role of energy cooperation and vigorously developing new growth drivers in the digital economy, artificial intelligence, and technological innovation. In effect, China seeks to further strengthen its integration with the Russian economy.

Putin's remarks to the media were more workmanlike. He noted that bilateral relations had reached an unprecedented level, had continued to develop, and were

self sufficient. Bilateral trade was USD 240 billion in 2025 and its structure had expanded, including due to high value added goods. Nearly all bilateral trade is now in their respective currencies. He conveyed that Russia is definitely ready to continue to ensure reliable and uninterrupted supplies of oil, coal and natural gas including LNG to China. He noted that Russia and China are committed to an independent and sovereign foreign policy, to act in close strategic coordination and play an important stabilising role on the global stage.

Russia, Putin said, intends to promote the alignment of integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union and China's BRI, with a view to forming a Greater Eurasian Partnership. This will need watching from India's perspective.

An extensive joint statement was adopted and a sheaf of agreements signed. The relationship is to deepen and diversify. There are some interesting elements in the joint statement. There is to be unhindered functioning of bilateral Transport Corridors; the volume of trade cargo transportation by rail between the two countries as well as transit through third countries is to increase; an economic corridor among Russia - Mongolia - China is to be created; implementation of large space projects is to continue; Russian-Chinese regional cooperation in trade, economic investment, and humanitarian fields will be enhanced; cultural sovereignty will be strongly defended; cooperation in education will be substantially enhanced; and unfriendly actions of third parties that can negatively impact bilateral media cooperation etc. will be jointly resisted.

Russia and China will deepen the dialogue on the development of cooperation on China's Global Security Initiative as also on the Architecture of Eurasian security, a Russian initiative. In effect, support for each other's initiatives is still work in progress.

Russia acknowledged the "great importance" it attaches to China's Global Civilisation Initiative. Explicit support is still pending. In contrast, Russian support for China's Global Development Initiative and Global Governance Initiative were conveyed.

Without naming the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the joint statement stresses that Russia and China do not accept the actions taken, without naming them, by the US and its allies and strongly condemn them. It is posited that external destructive interference in the affairs of Eurasia is currently the main factor destabilising the situation in the continent.

There are detailed references on disarmament issues. Russia has conveyed its “respect” for the Chinese position on the trilateral negotiations between China-USA-Russia on nuclear arms control. (China has refused to join since its arsenal is still limited in comparison.) The US Golden Dome project is assessed as completely denying the key principal of maintaining strategic stability, which provides for inseparability of the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons and also significantly increases the risk of conflicts in outer space.

Japanese actions in recent times came in for serious criticism. Serious concern was expressed about Japan’s large scale accumulation of sensitive nuclear materials in the absence of reliable evidence of their civilian use. The fear is that Japan could “even acquire its own nuclear weapons”. Japan was also called upon to fulfil its obligations to the early, complete and final destruction of chemical weapons left in China. Russia and China stressed that Japan’s current course of accelerated remilitarisation poses a serious threat to peace and stability in the region.

In the same vein, concern was expressed about the statements of a number of formally non-nuclear countries in the European Union in favour of acquiring nuclear weapons. China has also taken note of the concern of Russia in connection with the European Union’s policy towards militarisation. Opposition was expressed against efforts to set up an Asian counterpart of NATO.

Opposition was expressed to the foreign policy isolation, economic sanctions and pressure being put on the DPRK. It was argued that Russia and China, based on geopolitical realities, support balanced solutions to the problems of the Korean Peninsula.

Russia and China are clearly concerned about the potential fast evolving changes in strategic stability in Eurasia, East and South East Asia; changes that are the result of their own actions and those of the US.

Russia and China announced their opposition to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) as a geopolitical tool for maintaining a dominant position. They advocated strengthening international cooperation in the field to obtain benefits from the development of smart technologies and overcome potential risk and challenges associated with it. At the same time, they reiterated their intention to develop cooperation in the military use of artificial intelligence technologies both in a bilateral format and relevant multilateral platforms. They will also coordinate positions on issues related to science in the field of AI in international organisations.

The Putin visit to Beijing was clearly well prepared and substantive. The China-Russia partnership continues to strengthen, but the US continues to drive the show and China and Russia are so far unable to gather additional allies, even while the US under Trump continues to lose them.

An important development during the month was the relatively unusual step taken by Pope Leo XIV who issued his first encyclical on May 25 on the crucial AI issue entitled “Magnificent Humanity: On safeguarding the human person in the time of AI”. He has reportedly drawn attention to five critical issues, namely that human value cannot be measured by efficiency, output or algorithms; technology is not inherently neutral, but carries moral responsibility and must serve the common good; economic development must be measured by human well-being, not accumulated wealth alone; society must resist the isolation created by the digital world by prioritising real and in person, human relationships; and that moral responsibility and the ultimate ethical veto over human life must always belong to human conscience and never to automated cyber warfare systems.

The Pope’s weighing in on the critical AI issue has come at an opportune time given the far reaching implications of the unfettered development and virtually unlimited range of applications of AI. It remains to be seen, though, whether humanity will prevail or whether geostrategic considerations and human greed will trump the former. The international community needs to urgently evolve a consensus on this vital technological game changer that is impacting the entire world and has as much potential for harm as for good.

During the month, efforts by the European Union nations, Japan, Canada, ROK, Australia, India and other countries of the Global South continued with a view to adjusting to the ongoing changes in strategic balances and economic and other impacts following the war in Ukraine and accentuated since the second Trump presidency’s policies, including the US/Israel war on Iran. This includes fresh defence arrangements among partners, including production of military hardware. It has become a very complicated melting pot, and outcomes are difficult to predict but would hopefully entail greater multipolarity based, inter alia, on respect for international law and linked to secure supply chains, energy security, equal access to technologies and trust.

The annual Shangri La Dialogue was held in Singapore, May 29-31. The keynote address was delivered by the President of Vietnam. US Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, like last year, delivered an important statement of US policy. The focus was on the Pacific. To address regional threats, he said that interests must align

and the partners must act with focused resolve. Where interests diverge there is need for pragmatic adjustment without drama or moralising. The last comment was also intended for West Europe.

Hegseth made clear that the Pacific is America's strategic priority. The region has profound implications for US security and prosperity. He conveyed that there is rightful alarm in the region regarding China's historic military buildup and the expansion of its military activities in the region and beyond. The US is working to prevent any unravelling of the regional balance of power that would happen if the Pacific were to be dominated by any hegemon (other than the US that is). For this purpose, the United States will work to maintain a genuinely stable equilibrium in the region that works for the US as well as its allies. This would be a favourable, durable balance of power in which no state, including China can impose its hegemony. In effect the US will remain the hegemon.

Hegseth stated that Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China. However, America is a Pacific nation and insists that China must respect its long-standing position in the region. For the latter purpose, the US will maintain the manifest military strength to underwrite it. But, this will require burden sharing with allies. And this had begun to happen with ROK, Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. He then singled out India (not a Pacific nation but an Indo-Pacific nation) as "a critical anchor to hold the line. A powerful India acting in its own self interest advances our shared goal of maintaining a balance of power across the region". He then spoke of India "modernising its military to carry its share of the security burden, particularly in the Indian Ocean" and the bilateral collaboration to build India's industrial muscle as an "immediate operational imperative".

Hegseth's statement of policy is clear. It is helpful from India's perspective, even though it does not directly address the Indo-Pacific, but does highlight India's importance in the Indian Ocean where the two are already collaborating on several issues.

Notwithstanding international efforts, the situation in Eastern DRC did not improve. The discovery of the outbreak of Ebola has only made matters worse. A public health emergency has been declared. As a result, India had to postpone the fourth India-Africa Forum that had been scheduled for end May.

From the US perspective, though, there was some progress when a MOU was signed on May 13 by US based Elevation Energy with the Congolese trader

Trafigura for building a framework for the long term supply of Congolese cobalt hydroxide to the US for domestic processing. DRC is seen by the US as a significant source to reduce its dependence on China for critical minerals.

On May 11, the European Union announced the end of its partial suspension, in place since 2011, of its cooperation agreement with Syria. The EU has also pledged new financial support packages for Syria and announced a planned investment conference to support Syria's recovery and reconstruction.

In Sudan, the civil war showed no sign of slowing down. If anything, it widened. Drones were being increasingly used. The capital Khartoum's international airport was struck by drones on May 4. RSF drones also hit residential districts and military installations. The attacks by the RSF were evidently intended to challenge the effort by the SAF to show that it was winning the war and back in the capital. The SAF accused Ethiopia and UAE of being behind the attacks. Charges that were obviously rejected.

There was no ceasefire. Hence, the stalemate, the killings, the displacement and the humanitarian crises continues. Sudan is increasingly described as an "abandoned crisis". The world's conscience has clearly gone to sleep.

President Lula's visit to Washington on May 07 was an important bilateral and regional development. Trump and Lula met over three hours in a closed door session. There were reportedly four principal objectives from the Brazilian perspective, namely, to avert fresh punitive tariffs on Brazilian goods and seek reduction of existing trade barriers; to seek understanding on rare earths/critical materials available in Brazil; neutralise US support for the Bolsanaro opposition to Lula in the forthcoming Presidential elections; and obtain support for Brazil's digital trade system. Lula expressed satisfaction after the meeting and said that "I leave here with the understanding that we have taken an important step in the consolidation of the historic and democratic relationship between Brazil and United States. It was an important meeting." He said he had suggested to Trump that their ministers be tasked with resolving the trade issues within the next 30 days. Trump posted on social media that he had had, a "very good" meeting with Lula.

Given the criticality of the Western Hemisphere in Trump's foreign, economic and security policies, Brazil, the biggest country in Latin America, very rich in natural resources, undoubtedly looms large in Washington's rear view mirror. As does the US for Brazil. And Brazil under Lula clearly seeks to play a critical role in the

Western Hemisphere and in the Global South, in the UN, WTO, the G20, BRICS etc. It will be important to see how this relationship plays out as and when the Trump Administration intensifies efforts to remove the current government in Cuba, on which it is steadily building pressure to capitulate.

It was a difficult month for the Indian economy. Problems created by the war in Iran compounded existing difficulties. The challenge has to be met by both external and internal actions. On the latter, the challenges have again highlighted the need for early reform and liberalisation of many economic policies and regulations. The debate on how to proceed is on. There is a consensus on the need to act swiftly and in an out of the box manner. The ball rests in the government's court, and while actions taken so far to mitigate the current situation are in hand, these will not be enough to restore and strengthen growth impulses in the economy.

On the external front, however, important steps were taken during the month with a view among others to shoring up energy security, enhancing trade and investment flows, putting in place more secure supply chains and strengthening technological partnerships with old and new partners taking into account the drastically reordered international situation. These were reflected in PM Modi's visits to the UAE, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands and Italy, May 15-20 ; the third India-Nordic summit in Oslo, May 19; visit of the Cyprus President to India, May 20-23 ; US Secretary of State Rubio's visit to India, May 23-26 ; and the meeting of the QUAD FMs in Delhi, May 26. The US is attempting to reboot ties with India and invigorate the Quad.

The visit of the newly elected President of Myanmar, which began on May 30 has its own significance. His official engagements start on June 01.

PM Modi's visits delivered substantial outcomes. Foreign Secretary Misri noted that the visit to UAE was PM Modi's eighth in twelve years and the two and a half hour visit saw the conclusion of several important initiatives to further deepen the strategic partnership. These cover, inter alia, energy including UAE participation in India's strategic petroleum reserves, fresh investment commitment of USD 5 billion, conclusion of a framework on a strategic defence partnership, establishment of an 8 exaflop supercomputing facility in India, operationalisation of a virtual bilateral trade corridor to enhance efficiencies in bilateral maritime commerce, and a ship repair cluster at Vadinar etc.

The relationship with the Netherlands was enhanced to a Strategic Partnership and a roadmap for this purpose for the period 2026–2030 was announced. Areas of

cooperation include defence and security, cyber security, critical and emerging technologies, water management, and maritime development. 17 agreements were signed, including on semiconductors and green hydrogen. While no trade and investment targets were announced, it has been agreed to expand both these facets.

During the visit to Sweden, relations were elevated to a Strategic Partnership and a joint action plan announced for the period 2026–2030.

An India-Sweden Technology and AI Corridor was launched. It has been agreed to double trade and investment exchanges within five years. Other areas of cooperation defined include innovation, green energy, defence and security.

The relationship with Norway has been elevated to a Green Strategic Partnership. Areas of cooperation include trade and investment, climate action, Arctic cooperation, defence, digital & innovation sectors and renewable energy. Notably, this was the first visit by an Indian PM to Norway in 43 years. The last was by PM Indira Gandhi in 1983.

The relationship with Italy was elevated to the status of a Special Strategic Partnership. Areas of cooperation include defence and security issues, critical and emerging technologies, maritime transport and ports, science, and technology, and the IMEC. 15 MOUs were signed, including on an India-Italy Defence Industrial Roadmap and on critical and emerging technologies.

The third India-Nordic summit was an important acknowledgement of the importance of these countries for India's development, defence and technological advancement and for the need for India to significantly advance this partnership and make up for lost time. The relationship with the Nordics has been elevated to a trusted Green Technology and Innovation Strategic Partnership.

A joint statement was issued. It was agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of maritime security; accelerate cooperation on renewable energy and on zero and low emission technologies; to partner for nurturing a sustainable blue economy; the importance of inclusive and democratic access to AI; recognised the potential for further enhancing cooperation in the Arctic; underlined the importance of defence industrial collaboration and supply of essential components and equipment while acknowledging investment opportunities, including 100% FDI being offered to Nordic defence firms in Indian Defence Industrial corridors.

The onus is now on the Indian establishment and industry to fully leverage the partnership with the Nordics and Netherlands and convert potential into reality.

The visit by the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, to India helped further cement an old and trusted partnership. Cyprus is an important source of investment into India, an EU member state and strategically located in the East Mediterranean. PM Modi had visited Cyprus in June 2025.

There were important outcomes. A detailed joint statement was issued. The bilateral relationship has been elevated to a Strategic Partnership; a joint working group on counter terrorism is to be established; a defence cooperation roadmap for 2026-31 announced; a cyber security dialogue established and it has been agreed to work on a comprehensive Migration and Mobility partnership along with a Social Security Agreement.

The BRICS Foreign Ministers met in New Delhi on May 14-15. India is the current chair. A detailed Chairman's statement and Outcome Document was issued in the absence of consensus caused by the war in Iran. This was understandable and anticipated since the members include Iran and the UAE, which are on opposite sides of the conflict. The Chair's statement is detailed and provides the framework for work leading up to the summit later this year, by which time hopefully the Iran issue would have been satisfactorily addressed by the parties to the conflict. BRICS nations should not allow this current road block to short circuit its broader agenda of strengthening cooperation and collaboration among the countries of the Global South.

The extended visit of US Secretary of State Rubio to India, his first, was very much in focus. In addition to his official engagements, including at the highest level, he found time to visit the Taj Mahal and Jaipur. During his visit, he also extensively interacted with Indian media and opinion makers.

It was an important visit, the details of which have been extensively reported and do not need repetition. So too the substance and symbolism of the meeting of the Quad Foreign Ministers.

The Rubio visit was a conscious effort to, at the very least, help mitigate the impact of the negative actions and policies inexplicably and unjustifiably taken by the Trump administration, since it came back to power, vis a vis India be they on trade and economic issues, the Indian diaspora and migration issues, in India's neighbourhood and in the Indo-Pacific. India's interests have been clearly

adversely affected. Trump's policies towards India have indeed attracted criticism from within knowledgeable political, academic and economic circles in the US itself. Rubio has to be complimented for trying to undo the damage done. Whether the trajectory of bilateral relations going forward improves though remains to be seen.

To hold the relatively substantive meeting of the Quad FMs during his visit was probably part of the same play book. The US's partners in the Quad want it to work and grow. Obviously, Australia, India and Japan can do only so much without the US support in the Indo-Pacific, but they can keep the collaborations going till the US returns effectively to the fold. Rubio signalled that Quad was not being abandoned and was on board with the substantive outcomes endorsed by the four ministers including on maritime security surveillance initially focused on the Indian Ocean region, the critical minerals framework, investment and project development, Energy Security, Quad ports of the future and undersea cable systems.

It is still not clear, though, how far the US will go with the Quad since China, which has already objected to the Quad decisions, figures in the equation and President Trump seems to seek some conciliatory via media with China going forward. No decision was taken at the Delhi meeting when the Quad Summit would be held, which India has to host.

June is awaited with both anticipation and trepidation. Anticipation that the US and Iran will agree on a framework agreement that will free up energy and other much needed supplies and enable the gradual return to normalcy in the international economy. Trepidation because the alternative would only compound problems, uncertainties and create even greater danger for international peace and security. It is also necessary for Russia to end its unnecessary war in Ukraine and for Israel to seek a genuine and equitable agreement with the Palestinians based on a two state solution.



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