DPG Indo-Pacific Monitor
Indo Pacific Monitor
Authors Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd.)
Date: June 01, 2020
COVID-19 remained at centre stage in the world’s primary theatre of geopolitical contestation during the month. At the time of writing, the number of infections world-wide had exceeded 6 million, with the number of deceased approaching 370,000. The silver lining was provided by the number of cases that had recovered, which approached 2.7 million. Nations across the Indo-Pacific including the United States, Russia, India, France, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, Bangladesh, Singapore and Indonesia were amongst the worst hit. Much of the world remained locked down, continuing to adversely impact economic activity. Merchandise cargo trade, including bulk, container and oil tanker traffic, went into the doldrums. The immediate priority for all nations will be coming out of COVID restrictions and restarting economic activity. Consequently, the financial demands imposed by the pandemic will constrain defence budgets. Indo-Pacific nations cannot, however, afford to lose sight of the ongoing geopolitical flux, of its impact on their future and of building individual and collective capability to deal with the changing strategic environment.
China’s Communist Party, seeing its window of strategic opportunity closing faster than expected and seeking to deflect domestic attention from its early mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis, escalated its coercive behaviour throughout maritime and continental Asia, resorting to trade, territorial and military intimidation. China increased its annual military budget by 6.6%, from $ 167 billion to $ 178.2 billion, more than the combined spend of Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. The character of its diplomacy also changed, embodying more of the “wolf warrior” approach than the traditional search for a mutually beneficial middle path. It ramped up viral propaganda, targeting Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, India and Australia. China’s untrammelled assertions were driven by its confidence that the sheer size (and attraction) of its domestic consumer market and the scale of the economic inducements and military resources it can bring to bear are well beyond the capacity of other Asian nations. That has made the continued engagement of the US to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific even more imperative for most regional states.
Meanwhile, the pushback in the US to China’s actions gained strength. President Trump threatened to break US relations with China. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Missouri) called for abandonment of the quest to turn the world into liberal democracies and demanded the abolition of the WTO on the grounds that it enabled nations like China to maintain trade barriers and protectionist workarounds and did nothing to prevent theft of intellectual property and products, while preventing others from defending their markets and jobs. Senator Thom Tillis (R-North Carolina) went public with a plan to hold China accountable for COVID-19 and protect America’s economy, public health and national security. Senators Jim Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) and Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island) announced their intention of establishing an Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative, on the same lines as the European Deterrence Initiative of 2014, in the National Defense Authorisation Act of 2021. Representative Scott Perry (R-Pennsylvania) introduced a bill in the Congress seeking to authorise President Trump to recognise Tibet and Hong Kong as separate countries. The White House published a report in accordance with the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act titled "United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China", detailing a whole of government strategy with respect to the PRC. In this hard-hitting report, the US acknowledged the failure of its near 40-year quest to incorporate China as a constructive and responsible stakeholder into the global order and highlighted the measures taken to implement the objectives of the National Security Strategy 2017. The report amply highlights the complete failure of trust in the PRC's willingness to abide by its international commitments and speaks of return to a regime of stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms.
US forces again transited through the Taiwan Straits and carried out ‘presence’ missions against coercion in the South China Sea using warships, submarines and bombers, though the intended beneficiaries of this support remained strangely silent and kept their ships in harbour. Commentators observed that US operations in support of Malaysia could have been better coordinated, but a fundamentally correct approach, even if poorly implemented, was preferable to an ambiguous approach, however well implemented. Meanwhile, Australia stuck to its guns in calling for an impartial international investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, despite punitive economic action against it announced by China, and was vindicated when the World Health Assembly unanimously passed a resolution seeking such a probe. India, too, stayed firm against Chinese border intrusions in Ladakh, prompting conciliatory messages from China’s Foreign Ministry and its Ambassador in New Delhi. While the China-US contest will no doubt shape the regional order in the years ahead, it was heartening to see middle powers stand up against the Chinese behemoth.
In West Asia, the US push for extension of the arms embargo on Iran beyond October, 2020 to be followed by a snapback of complete sanctions, was rejected by China on the grounds that by walking out of the JCPOA in 2018, the US had failed to meet its own obligations under the agreement and had thus lost the right to seek punitive action against Iran under it. Russia too signalled opposition to the extension of the arms embargo. On the other hand, US pressure on Israel to limit ties with China bore its first fruit when China lost out on the tender for the construction of the giant Soreq 2 desalination facility. The next signal may come when China Harbor’s bid for the power plant at Ramat Hovav in Israel comes up for decision.
Iraq and Israel both saw new governments assuming office: the Netanyahu led unity government in Israel, and the Mustafa al-Kadhemi led government in Iraq. In Afghanistan, there were terror attacks on a Gurdwara and a maternity hospital, leading to condemnation all round. These were followed by political rivals Abdullah Abdullah and President Ashraf Ghani arriving at a 50-50 power sharing agreement, the Afghan government announcing the release of 2000 Taliban prisoners and a Taliban ceasefire on Eid which was by and large holding. US envoy Khalilzad identified the key requirements for the US withdrawal as ensuring delivery by the Taliban on their commitment towards counter-terrorism and the commencement of intra-Afghan negotiations, while sidelining elements like the ISIS who were trying to increase violence.
India’s focus remained on overcoming COVID-19, bringing back its citizens stranded abroad using Air India ‘Vande Bharat’ evacuation flights and the Indian Navy’s ‘Samudra Setu’ missions, as well as providing assistance to continental and Indian Ocean neighbours, using its maritime capability to perform its ‘SAGAR’ mission. India experienced diplomatic success when the Maldives and the UAE thwarted Pakistan’s attempt to isolate India for ‘Islamophobia”, highlighting its democratic and multicultural character. On the other hand, major incursions of Chinese troops into Ladakh drew considerable attention. While India’s firm stance seemed to draw conciliatory messages from Chinese diplomats in both Beijing and New Delhi, there was considerable scepticism regarding the reliability of China’s words and whether the PLA would in fact withdraw to restore the status quo ante sought by India. At the time of writing, there were no signs of such withdrawal.
In South East Asia, China continued efforts to coerce maritime neighbours to give up their legitimate rights under UNCLOS and irrevocably alter the situation in the South China Sea in its favour. It followed up its assertive actions in April by notifying an annual fishing ban during the spawning season (May – August), an action that Vietnam promptly called on its fishermen to ignore; using its three maritime forces {the PLA (Navy), China Coastguard and Maritime Militia} to enforce its domestic law in contested international waters; describing foreign naval presence in the region as detrimental to peace and security; harassing vessels prospecting for oil in Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s EEZs in the South China Sea, thus raising the stakes; and deploying AEW and ASW aircraft from its reclaimed airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Reports about China declaring an ADIZ in the South China Sea surfaced again. The Code of Conduct negotiations with ASEAN went into limbo due to COVID-19. Doubt was expressed in the Malaysian media about whether the policy of appeasing China and participating in the BRI had produced the desired results, even though Malaysia, along with the rest of ASEAN, continued to repose its faith in diplomacy. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Thailand both announced cuts in defence spending to make more resources available for economic recovery.
Taiwan’s push for participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer did not fructify. However, two members of India’s parliament from the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party attended President Tsai Ing-Wen’s swearing in virtually and congratulated her on behalf of the Narendra Modi led Indian government, signalling a potential shift in India’s ‘One-China’ outlook. Qiao Ling, the celebrated author of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’, warned in an article published in the South China Morning Post that this was not the time to take Taiwan by force.
China’s rubber stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved President Xi Jinping’s decision to establish and enhance the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for national security in Hong Kong, altering the former colony’s special status as a self-governing city. Beijing had pledged to keep Hong Kong’s system and way of life unchanged for 50 years when Britain returned the city to Chinese rule in 1997. Protests erupted in Hong Kong again. The US State Department promptly responded by formally determining that Hong Kong no longer has a high degree of autonomy from China. This action opened up a range of possible US measures, from revoking the special status Hong Kong enjoys on trade, enabling export of advanced technology that may not be sold elsewhere in China, to Hong Kong’s separate representation on bodies like the WHO and ADB, to imposing sanctions on individuals involved in suppressing civil liberties in the territory.
In the South Western Pacific, the focus remained on China’s economic coercion. China-Australia ties soured, but were not yet weakening, as observed in an article published by the Lowy Institute. There still remains considerable debate regarding the economic costs of antagonising China, as is evident from Victoria state remaining firm on going ahead with the Belt and Road Framework Agreement it signed with China last year, even though broader Australian opinion appears to be turning irrevocably against China. Australia’s preference may be to keep the economic and political relationships separate, but this is unlikely to happen.
Official statements and pertinent analyses for the highlights mentioned above can be found in the relevant sections of this Indo-Pacific monitor.
China’s Communist Party, seeing its window of strategic opportunity closing faster than expected and seeking to deflect domestic attention from its early mishandling of the Covid-19 crisis, escalated its coercive behaviour throughout maritime and continental Asia, resorting to trade, territorial and military intimidation. China increased its annual military budget by 6.6%, from $ 167 billion to $ 178.2 billion, more than the combined spend of Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. The character of its diplomacy also changed, embodying more of the “wolf warrior” approach than the traditional search for a mutually beneficial middle path. It ramped up viral propaganda, targeting Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, India and Australia. China’s untrammelled assertions were driven by its confidence that the sheer size (and attraction) of its domestic consumer market and the scale of the economic inducements and military resources it can bring to bear are well beyond the capacity of other Asian nations. That has made the continued engagement of the US to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific even more imperative for most regional states.
Meanwhile, the pushback in the US to China’s actions gained strength. President Trump threatened to break US relations with China. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Missouri) called for abandonment of the quest to turn the world into liberal democracies and demanded the abolition of the WTO on the grounds that it enabled nations like China to maintain trade barriers and protectionist workarounds and did nothing to prevent theft of intellectual property and products, while preventing others from defending their markets and jobs. Senator Thom Tillis (R-North Carolina) went public with a plan to hold China accountable for COVID-19 and protect America’s economy, public health and national security. Senators Jim Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) and Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island) announced their intention of establishing an Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative, on the same lines as the European Deterrence Initiative of 2014, in the National Defense Authorisation Act of 2021. Representative Scott Perry (R-Pennsylvania) introduced a bill in the Congress seeking to authorise President Trump to recognise Tibet and Hong Kong as separate countries. The White House published a report in accordance with the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act titled "United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China", detailing a whole of government strategy with respect to the PRC. In this hard-hitting report, the US acknowledged the failure of its near 40-year quest to incorporate China as a constructive and responsible stakeholder into the global order and highlighted the measures taken to implement the objectives of the National Security Strategy 2017. The report amply highlights the complete failure of trust in the PRC's willingness to abide by its international commitments and speaks of return to a regime of stringent verification and enforcement mechanisms.
US forces again transited through the Taiwan Straits and carried out ‘presence’ missions against coercion in the South China Sea using warships, submarines and bombers, though the intended beneficiaries of this support remained strangely silent and kept their ships in harbour. Commentators observed that US operations in support of Malaysia could have been better coordinated, but a fundamentally correct approach, even if poorly implemented, was preferable to an ambiguous approach, however well implemented. Meanwhile, Australia stuck to its guns in calling for an impartial international investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, despite punitive economic action against it announced by China, and was vindicated when the World Health Assembly unanimously passed a resolution seeking such a probe. India, too, stayed firm against Chinese border intrusions in Ladakh, prompting conciliatory messages from China’s Foreign Ministry and its Ambassador in New Delhi. While the China-US contest will no doubt shape the regional order in the years ahead, it was heartening to see middle powers stand up against the Chinese behemoth.
In West Asia, the US push for extension of the arms embargo on Iran beyond October, 2020 to be followed by a snapback of complete sanctions, was rejected by China on the grounds that by walking out of the JCPOA in 2018, the US had failed to meet its own obligations under the agreement and had thus lost the right to seek punitive action against Iran under it. Russia too signalled opposition to the extension of the arms embargo. On the other hand, US pressure on Israel to limit ties with China bore its first fruit when China lost out on the tender for the construction of the giant Soreq 2 desalination facility. The next signal may come when China Harbor’s bid for the power plant at Ramat Hovav in Israel comes up for decision.
Iraq and Israel both saw new governments assuming office: the Netanyahu led unity government in Israel, and the Mustafa al-Kadhemi led government in Iraq. In Afghanistan, there were terror attacks on a Gurdwara and a maternity hospital, leading to condemnation all round. These were followed by political rivals Abdullah Abdullah and President Ashraf Ghani arriving at a 50-50 power sharing agreement, the Afghan government announcing the release of 2000 Taliban prisoners and a Taliban ceasefire on Eid which was by and large holding. US envoy Khalilzad identified the key requirements for the US withdrawal as ensuring delivery by the Taliban on their commitment towards counter-terrorism and the commencement of intra-Afghan negotiations, while sidelining elements like the ISIS who were trying to increase violence.
India’s focus remained on overcoming COVID-19, bringing back its citizens stranded abroad using Air India ‘Vande Bharat’ evacuation flights and the Indian Navy’s ‘Samudra Setu’ missions, as well as providing assistance to continental and Indian Ocean neighbours, using its maritime capability to perform its ‘SAGAR’ mission. India experienced diplomatic success when the Maldives and the UAE thwarted Pakistan’s attempt to isolate India for ‘Islamophobia”, highlighting its democratic and multicultural character. On the other hand, major incursions of Chinese troops into Ladakh drew considerable attention. While India’s firm stance seemed to draw conciliatory messages from Chinese diplomats in both Beijing and New Delhi, there was considerable scepticism regarding the reliability of China’s words and whether the PLA would in fact withdraw to restore the status quo ante sought by India. At the time of writing, there were no signs of such withdrawal.
In South East Asia, China continued efforts to coerce maritime neighbours to give up their legitimate rights under UNCLOS and irrevocably alter the situation in the South China Sea in its favour. It followed up its assertive actions in April by notifying an annual fishing ban during the spawning season (May – August), an action that Vietnam promptly called on its fishermen to ignore; using its three maritime forces {the PLA (Navy), China Coastguard and Maritime Militia} to enforce its domestic law in contested international waters; describing foreign naval presence in the region as detrimental to peace and security; harassing vessels prospecting for oil in Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s EEZs in the South China Sea, thus raising the stakes; and deploying AEW and ASW aircraft from its reclaimed airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Reports about China declaring an ADIZ in the South China Sea surfaced again. The Code of Conduct negotiations with ASEAN went into limbo due to COVID-19. Doubt was expressed in the Malaysian media about whether the policy of appeasing China and participating in the BRI had produced the desired results, even though Malaysia, along with the rest of ASEAN, continued to repose its faith in diplomacy. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Thailand both announced cuts in defence spending to make more resources available for economic recovery.
Taiwan’s push for participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer did not fructify. However, two members of India’s parliament from the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party attended President Tsai Ing-Wen’s swearing in virtually and congratulated her on behalf of the Narendra Modi led Indian government, signalling a potential shift in India’s ‘One-China’ outlook. Qiao Ling, the celebrated author of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’, warned in an article published in the South China Morning Post that this was not the time to take Taiwan by force.
China’s rubber stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved President Xi Jinping’s decision to establish and enhance the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for national security in Hong Kong, altering the former colony’s special status as a self-governing city. Beijing had pledged to keep Hong Kong’s system and way of life unchanged for 50 years when Britain returned the city to Chinese rule in 1997. Protests erupted in Hong Kong again. The US State Department promptly responded by formally determining that Hong Kong no longer has a high degree of autonomy from China. This action opened up a range of possible US measures, from revoking the special status Hong Kong enjoys on trade, enabling export of advanced technology that may not be sold elsewhere in China, to Hong Kong’s separate representation on bodies like the WHO and ADB, to imposing sanctions on individuals involved in suppressing civil liberties in the territory.
In the South Western Pacific, the focus remained on China’s economic coercion. China-Australia ties soured, but were not yet weakening, as observed in an article published by the Lowy Institute. There still remains considerable debate regarding the economic costs of antagonising China, as is evident from Victoria state remaining firm on going ahead with the Belt and Road Framework Agreement it signed with China last year, even though broader Australian opinion appears to be turning irrevocably against China. Australia’s preference may be to keep the economic and political relationships separate, but this is unlikely to happen.
Official statements and pertinent analyses for the highlights mentioned above can be found in the relevant sections of this Indo-Pacific monitor.
