A Strategic Dead End for India’s Eurasian Connectivity
The war in Iran, and the suspension of the Chabahar Project, has underscored an inescapable reality: geopolitics continues to obstruct India’s access to Eurasia.
In this policy brief, the author traces the history of India’s efforts to re-connect with Central Asia, a region which carries both historical resonance and strategic appeal. He observes that Pakistan’s unrelenting hostility towards India, instability in Afghanistan, and now conflict in Iran have transformed what should be natural corridors into a geo-political dead end. India’s trade with the five Central Asian Republics remains negligible, at roughly $1.2 billion in 2025-26.
For India, transit access across land borders is politically constrained; a northern alternative via China is equally problematic, as it intersects with the BRI. To circumvent these barriers, India has invested in initiatives such as the Chabahar port project and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
US Sanctions against Iran had already undermined the feasibility of both these initiatives, but with war breaking out, the Chabahar option has reached a standstill.
The author traces India’s engagement with Iran over transit corridors since the 1990s, concluding in the May 2024 agreement to run the Shahid Behesthi terminal in Chabahar. India’s disengagement from the project, in the author’s view, reflects not only immediate pressures but also deeper structural mis-calculations regarding the geopolitical constraints and the reliability of partnership with Iran. The consequences are visible, as India’s trade with Iran has declined sharply since 2019 while the viability of the INSTC Corridor remains uncertain.
This outcome also highlights the limits of relying on political goodwill in a competitive geopolitical environment, where the North-South link to Central Asia goes to the benefit of Pakistan and China, while East-West connectivity favours China’s massive investments in BRI infrastructure.
India retains important and complementary economic strengths which are valued across Central Asia, but trade and security cooperation face major logistical limitations.
The author concludes that these developments point to a broader reality: Eurasian connectivity is being shaped more by politics than geography. Regions that were once historically connected through trade, culture and the movement of people, are now divided by borders and political rivalries.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Volume XI, Issue 11, please click “A Strategic Dead End for India’s Eurasian Connectivity”.
