China-India relations hit a new low this month, as Indian and Chinese troops faced off at various places along the disputed LAC. Meanwhile, adding a twist to the tale, Nepal suddenly upped the ante over the Nepal-India-China tri-junction point at Lipulekh Pass, soon after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh virtually inaugurated a road to Lipulekh on May 8, 2020. Although China officially kept out of the India-Nepal row and focused on the on-going standoff in Ladakh, certain sections within the strategic community in China see the Nepal-India territorial dispute as a direct contributing factor to the recent flare-up along the Sino-Indian border, which is being referred to as “Donglang (Dokalam) 2.0”.
Chinese commentaries lauded Nepal for its “powerful counterattack and its first military confrontation against India in years,” encouraging the Himalayan nation to keep up the “tough stance” and “fight back by remaining uncompromising on its core interests”. Some Chinese strategists also seemed to be exploring the future possibility of a “prolonged guerrilla warfare”, a “prompt military action” on the India-Nepal border or setting up a “Three Front” (China-Pakistan-Nepal) strategic challenge to constrain India along its northern borders.
Meanwhile, the Chinese media closely followed the US position on the China-India border standoff. Various statements emanating from Washington were seen as the Trump Administration's support for India's territorial claims vis-à-vis China. Press reports complained that the US is trying to dictate terms between China and India and even encouraging India to intensify its confrontation with China, so as to secure the future of its “Indo-Pacific” strategy.
As for India, while some Chinese strategists ridiculed its great power ambitions “with an arsenal full of imported weapons”, others warned India that “the US is not the international community and China is not isolated. The more the Chinese nation encounters external pressure, the more united it will get, and more it cannot admit defeat. Hope Indian society will strengthen its understanding and research on China, and do not wish to understand China wishfully, let alone understand China through the perspective of the United States.”
The other key highlight of the month was the convening of the ‘Two Sessions’, the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The key ‘decisions’ taken during the meeting included not setting China’s economic growth target for the year, thereby providing “greater strategic flexibility” to deal with the uncertainty caused by the epidemic. Secondly, there was the approval of the Hong Kong-related national security law which, as per the Chinese assessment, embodied the CCP’s “great determination to prevent anti-China forces to interfere in Hong Kong affairs and curb China’s peaceful rise”.
As the new legislation brought the question of Hong Kong’s autonomy under the scanner and caused global outrage, China maintained that the discourse criticising the new law for undermining the "one country, two systems" arrangement and putting Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy in jeopardy is simply a reiteration of the US-centric viewpoint, while disregarding the fact that Hong Kong has been returned to China. For the US, China’s message was clear that after two years of the trade war, China is no longer afraid of US sanctions and is prepared for the worst. On the Taiwan issue, China breathed a sigh of relief as the Taiwanese agenda to re-enter the WHA as an Observer could be thwarted for the time being. However, China braced for another turbulent four years in Cross-Strait relations as Tsai Ingwen took the oath of office for her second term as Taiwan's President.
Meanwhile, despite Beijing’s propaganda overdrive, a sense of “isolation” seemed to be setting in among Chinese strategic circles, owing to a number of adverse developments during the month. First, the global consensus at the World Health Assembly (WHA) on May 18, 2020 agreed to conduct an independent investigation into the origin of the new coronavirus; second, initiatives like the ‘Economic Prosperity Network’ led by the US, designed to reorganise the international supply chain, reduce global dependence on Chinese manufacturing and create an alliance of ‘trusted partners’ (Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam) gaining currency among the participating nations. To offset the growing trend of ‘de-Sinicization’, China seems to be exploring a three-fold strategy: a) vigorously developing indigenous high technology industry; b) enhancing China's attractiveness to the outside world to undermine certain nations’ strategic will to decouple from China; and c) restoring the East Asian production network, while also building up on its own ‘discourse’ power.
In the defence arena, it was announced that China’s defence spending for the year will rise at the slowest rate in three decades, yet maintain an increase of 6.6% in 2020. China gave two reasons for this “moderate” but “steady” increase in the nation's defence budget: first, China wants to demonstrate that it has confidence in positive economic growth for the rest of the year and that the effect of the epidemic on China has only been temporary and short-lived; and second, in the post-pandemic period, China continues to face multiple military threats, including from the US, requiring continued military modernisation. Meanwhile, the South China Sea remained turbulent during the most part of the month, with several Freedom of Navigation operations by the US and various naval drills by China. Despite these probing developments, the Chinese side ruled out the possibility of a serious military conflict breaking out in the region in the near future.
Chinese commentaries lauded Nepal for its “powerful counterattack and its first military confrontation against India in years,” encouraging the Himalayan nation to keep up the “tough stance” and “fight back by remaining uncompromising on its core interests”. Some Chinese strategists also seemed to be exploring the future possibility of a “prolonged guerrilla warfare”, a “prompt military action” on the India-Nepal border or setting up a “Three Front” (China-Pakistan-Nepal) strategic challenge to constrain India along its northern borders.
Meanwhile, the Chinese media closely followed the US position on the China-India border standoff. Various statements emanating from Washington were seen as the Trump Administration's support for India's territorial claims vis-à-vis China. Press reports complained that the US is trying to dictate terms between China and India and even encouraging India to intensify its confrontation with China, so as to secure the future of its “Indo-Pacific” strategy.
As for India, while some Chinese strategists ridiculed its great power ambitions “with an arsenal full of imported weapons”, others warned India that “the US is not the international community and China is not isolated. The more the Chinese nation encounters external pressure, the more united it will get, and more it cannot admit defeat. Hope Indian society will strengthen its understanding and research on China, and do not wish to understand China wishfully, let alone understand China through the perspective of the United States.”
The other key highlight of the month was the convening of the ‘Two Sessions’, the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The key ‘decisions’ taken during the meeting included not setting China’s economic growth target for the year, thereby providing “greater strategic flexibility” to deal with the uncertainty caused by the epidemic. Secondly, there was the approval of the Hong Kong-related national security law which, as per the Chinese assessment, embodied the CCP’s “great determination to prevent anti-China forces to interfere in Hong Kong affairs and curb China’s peaceful rise”.
As the new legislation brought the question of Hong Kong’s autonomy under the scanner and caused global outrage, China maintained that the discourse criticising the new law for undermining the "one country, two systems" arrangement and putting Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy in jeopardy is simply a reiteration of the US-centric viewpoint, while disregarding the fact that Hong Kong has been returned to China. For the US, China’s message was clear that after two years of the trade war, China is no longer afraid of US sanctions and is prepared for the worst. On the Taiwan issue, China breathed a sigh of relief as the Taiwanese agenda to re-enter the WHA as an Observer could be thwarted for the time being. However, China braced for another turbulent four years in Cross-Strait relations as Tsai Ingwen took the oath of office for her second term as Taiwan's President.
Meanwhile, despite Beijing’s propaganda overdrive, a sense of “isolation” seemed to be setting in among Chinese strategic circles, owing to a number of adverse developments during the month. First, the global consensus at the World Health Assembly (WHA) on May 18, 2020 agreed to conduct an independent investigation into the origin of the new coronavirus; second, initiatives like the ‘Economic Prosperity Network’ led by the US, designed to reorganise the international supply chain, reduce global dependence on Chinese manufacturing and create an alliance of ‘trusted partners’ (Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam) gaining currency among the participating nations. To offset the growing trend of ‘de-Sinicization’, China seems to be exploring a three-fold strategy: a) vigorously developing indigenous high technology industry; b) enhancing China's attractiveness to the outside world to undermine certain nations’ strategic will to decouple from China; and c) restoring the East Asian production network, while also building up on its own ‘discourse’ power.
In the defence arena, it was announced that China’s defence spending for the year will rise at the slowest rate in three decades, yet maintain an increase of 6.6% in 2020. China gave two reasons for this “moderate” but “steady” increase in the nation's defence budget: first, China wants to demonstrate that it has confidence in positive economic growth for the rest of the year and that the effect of the epidemic on China has only been temporary and short-lived; and second, in the post-pandemic period, China continues to face multiple military threats, including from the US, requiring continued military modernisation. Meanwhile, the South China Sea remained turbulent during the most part of the month, with several Freedom of Navigation operations by the US and various naval drills by China. Despite these probing developments, the Chinese side ruled out the possibility of a serious military conflict breaking out in the region in the near future.
