The US’ National Defense Strategy 2026
In 2017, the US Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to provide, every four years, a National Defense Strategy (NDS), to include an unclassified summary of the priority missions of the US military, the assumed strategic environment and enduring threats to US security, and a strategic framework to guide the DoD (now renamed Department of War).
In this Policy Brief, the author begins by outlining key elements of NDS 2018 and NDS 2022, and then goes on to analyse the contours of the latest iteration which was released on January 23, 2026.
The previous editions of the NDS had highlighted the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition with revisionist powers, and had characterised China as the most comprehensive and pacing challenge to US national security. NDS 2022 had also highlighted close cooperation with allies and partners as foundational for US national security interests.
The 2026 edition of the US NDS differs significantly from its predecessors. While the challenges it identifies remain the same, the US approach in dealing with them stands transformed. The document distances the US from “abstractions” like upholding the rules-based international order, affirming that the DoW will no long be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change and nation building. It prioritises defence of the homeland and domination over the Western Hemisphere as the main priority, in alignment with the perceptions of President Trump’s domestic support base.
NDS 2026 acknowledges that China is the second most powerful country in the world, and that the Indo-Pacific is emerging as the world’s economic centre of gravity, making it essential for America to engage with the region from a position of strength. However, while seeking strategic stability and a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the NDS reframes the US approach towards China from a pacing challenge to a strategic competitor with whom a “decent peace” under acceptable terms is possible, including through broader engagement between the DoW and PLA counterparts. Russia is seen as a persistent but manageable threat to be handled primarily by Europe. Similarly, US partners in the Middle East are seen as increasingly capable of doing more to preserve regional security.
A pronounced element of NDS 2026 is its thrust towards great burden sharing by allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with critical but limited support from US forces.
Neither India nor the Quad find any mention in the NDS 2026.
Finally, the author assesses the implications of NDS 2026, which marks an end to the idea of American “exceptionalism”, and the passing of the “end of history” unipolar moment. The NDS defines a defence strategy of US limitations, not a global domination, necessitating restraint and moderation in dealing with other great powers, China and Russia. Pressures on allies and partners will inevitably grow, reshaping their security policies as power rebalancing continues and multipolarity gains traction.
For India, this is a timely wake-up call to double down on strategic autonomy and devote even greater energy to building comprehensive national power.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. XI, Issue 5, please click “The US’ National Defense Strategy 2026”.
